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Prior to 1972, the United States Supreme Court never appeared terribly
interested in mentally disabled criminal defendants. Putting aside cases such
as Baxstrom v. Herold,1 which dealt with the status of prisoners, the Court
seemed to limit its decisions about criminal defendants almost exclusively to
cases involving the constitutional and statutory problems associated with an
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1. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In Baxstrom, the court held--on equal protection grounds-that a
state prisoner civilly committed at the end of his prison sentence was denied equal protection when
he was denied a jury trial that the state made available to all other individuals facing involuntary
civil commitment. Id. at 111-112.
The Baxstrom literature is legion. See, e.g., H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE
CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974); Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and CriminalActiv-
ity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 80 (1972); Steadman, Follow-Up
On Baxstrom Patients Returned to Hospitals for the Criminally Insane, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 317
(1973).
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incompetency to stand trial determination. 2
Following Mr. Justice Blackmun's famous 'cue bid' observation in the
1972 case of Jackson v. Indiana,3 however-where he noted, "Considering
the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive
constitutional limitations on [the commitment] power have not been more
frequently litigated" 4-the Court began to take notice of the full range of
cases involving mentally disabled individuals.5 While most of these dealt
with the civil commitment process, 6 more recent cases have considered a full
range of issues affecting mentally disabled individuals facing criminal trials.
7
2. See, eg., Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956) (construing federal statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 4244-4246 (1949) (cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4246 (1985)), providing for commitment of indi-
viduals found incompetent to stand trial on federal charges); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960) (constitutional test for competency to stand trial is whether defendant has "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him"); Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966) (conviction of an accused who is mentally incompetent violates due process).
See also, Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (where hearing held on defendant's competence
to stand trial, further hearing required on his competence to waive constitutional right to counsel).
For a recent opinion synthesizing relevant doctrine, see Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.
1986); see generally R. ROESCH & S. GOLDINO, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 10-45 (1980); Silten
& Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 1053 (1977).
But see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1967) (procedural due process protections
apply to proceedings under state sex offender's law, where defendant subject to "criminal punish-
ment even though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to keep individuals from inflicting
future harm"). The continuing vitality of Specht is questionable following Allen v. Illinois, 106 S.
Ct. 2988 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 407-56.
Cf. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) (indigent had no constitutional
right to psychiatric assistance at state expense to aid in presentation of insanity defense), rejected as
not controlling in Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) (discussed extensively infra at text ac-
companying notes 125-201); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (state statute vesting discretion-
ary authority in governor to determine whether condemned, mentally ill convict was competent to
be executed did not violate due process claus), rejected in Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986)
(similar statute violates eighth amendment; Ford is discussed extensively infra at text accompanying
notes 507-622).
3. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Jackson was the Supreme Court's first decision applying the due pro-
cess clause to the involuntary commitment process.
4. Id. at 737.
5. In 1972, the Court also decided Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (evidentiary hear-
ing required to resolve constitutional claim that renewal of defendant's commitment under state sex
offender statute violated equal protection clause, where defendant denied jury trial otherwise avail-
able to those facing civil commitment, relying on Baxstrom and Specht), and McNeil v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 105 (1972) (denial of due process to continue to confine patient at
institution for "defective delinquents" without procedural safeguards mandated in Jackson); see also,
Murel v. Baltimore County Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972), dismissing cert. as improvidently
granted in Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (habeas corpus challenge to constitu-
tionality of Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law); see also, id. at 358 (Douglas J., dissenting).
6. See, eg., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (burden of proof); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (juvenile commit-
ments); cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). See generally Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes
as a Source ofRights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier? LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. (1987) (in
press).
Vitek dealt with a prison-hospital transfer; although the patient in Addington had originally
been charged with a criminal offense ("assault by threat" against his mother, 441 U.S. at 420), his
case was processed as a civil commitment. Both O'Connor and Parham dealt solely with civil com-
mitment questions.
7. In addition to those cases cited infra notes 32-33, see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171-72 (1975) (prohibition against trying presently-incompetent defendant is "fundamental to an
adversary system of justice"); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 112 (1983) (establishing appropriate stan-
dard for review of trial court determination of competency to stand trial).
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Like the moth to the flame,8 the Court remains irresistably drawn to
these cases, especially when they arise in the capital punishment context.9
Why this is so is not clear-it may be that it is merely a vestigial remain of
the Chief Justice's well-documented preoccupation 10 with the entire ques-
tion of the significance of mental disability in the criminal trial process from
the days of his wars on the District of Columbia Circuit with Judge
Bazelon. 1I It may be an unconscious, anticipatory response to the no-longer
accurate assumption of several decades ago that mental disability defenses
were raised solely (or, at the least, primarily) so as to "cheat the death pen-
alty."12 It may be that it is a reflection of the creative ways counsel has been
8. After this Article was written the Court heard argument in Colorado v. Connelly, 702 P.2d
722 (Colo. 1985), cert granted 106 S. Ct. 785 (1986), on the question of whether defendant's severe
mental disability rendered his Miranda waiver ineffective. As discussed more fully infra at note 206,
the Court's decision, at 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986), held that the defendant's mental instability did not
invalidate his confession. Connelly is discussed in Parry, Involuntary Confession Based on Mental
Impairment, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrrY L. RPTR. 2 (1987).
9. For an empirical study, concluding that support for the death penalty springs mainly from
a "symbolic perspective" reflecting society's "basic values," see Tyler & Weber, Support for the
Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime or Symbolic Attitude? 17 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 21, 43
(1982). See also, Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life
in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 31, 45-47 (1985), discussing significance of passage in
opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ)
characterizing capital punishment as "an expression of society's moral outrage." On the specific
question of whether "death-qualified" jurors are more likely to reject the insanity defense, see Ells-
worth, Bukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The Death Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 81, 91 (1984) (in controlled, simulated study, such jurors estimated that only 31%
of defendants who pled insanity "really are" insane). Cf. Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, The Insanity
Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 404 (1983)
(in 138 of 141 patients found not guilty by reason of insanity in New Jersey over a seven year period,
there was no question as to the presence of severe mental illness).
See Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric Testi-
mony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles
Heel, 3 N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTs. ANN. 91-93 (1985):
For centuries, the symbol of the insanity defense and the symbol of capital punish-
ment have been linked-symbolically and empirically-in a dance of death. It was taken
as common wisdom that the insanity defense developed as a procedural shield primarily, if
not solely, to thwart the use of the death penalty. While this was not the sole rationale for
pleading the defense, the connection appeared inextricable: if capital punishment were to
be abolished, as seemed likely less than fifteen years ago, the use of the defense would fade
into obscurity.
(footnotes omitted). See also, id. at 92 n.4, 96-97 nn.27-34.
For the most recent additions to the voluminous death penalty literature, see van den Haag, The
Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. Rnv. 1662 (1986); Greenberg, Against the American
System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (1986). According to Professor Greenberg,
our system of capital punishment "results in infrequent, random, and erratic executions, [and] is
structured to inflict death neither on those who have committed the worst offenses nor on defendants
of the worst character." Id. at 1675.
10. See, eg., Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers and the Courts, 28 FED. PROB. 3 (1964).
11. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 168. Judge Bazelon has been described as having "invited the
world of mental health professionals and criminologists into his courtroom and [as having] extended
his courtroom back into the world." Wales, The Rise, the Fall, and the Resurrection of the Medical
Model, 63 GEO. L.J. 87, 104 (1974).
12. See Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the 'Boiler Plate.
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 810 (1978) (insanity defense "grew out of
perception that abnormal mentality tempers the justification for criminal punishment because the
individual's responsibility for the crime is diminished or removed") (footnote omitted). See also,
Perlin, supra note 9, at 96 (quoting Dr. Karl Menninger: "Were capital punishment to be removed,
with it would go automatically the absurd insanity defense and the perennial nonsense about suffi-
cient responsibility, sufficient mentality and sufficient mental health to properly profit from the
vastly expensive hanging or electrocution ritual"). See also, infra text accompanying notes 861-73.
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able to successfully articulate new and original claims on behalf of this class
of clientele.' 3 It may be that it is yet another example of the Court's obses-
siveness with narrowing the universe of potential new issues which could be
raised in death penalty appeals.' 4 It may be an expression of the historic
fear' 5 of punishing-especially in the context of a capital case-a person
who is "genuinely insane." 16 Finally, it may simply be that "members of the
[Supreme] Court-like the rest of us-are beset by ambiguous and ambiva-
lent feelings in need of self-rationalization: unconscious feelings of awe, of
fear, of revulsion, of wonder" towards the mentally ill individual charged
with crime.
17
While it is not clear which (if any) of these reasons explains the Court's
interest in the area, what does appear clear is the fact that, at first-and
second-reading, the cases appear to defy categorization, and seem to re-
flect, rather, a "doctrinal abyss," ' an idiosyncratic, result-oriented jurispru-
dence, or, even worse, simply random decision-making, with no doctrinal
cohesiveness whatsoever 19 in an area where commentators have, generally
13. See, eg., Malmquist, United States Supreme Court and Psychiatry: A Critical Look, 13 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 137, 138 (1986) ("Some have suggested that a new generation of lawyers was
primarily responsible, a generation which had been exposed to courses in some of the best law
schools dealing with sophisticated issues in the area of mental health law"). But see M. PESZKE,
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL 105 n.8 (1975) (lawyers exhibiting anti-psychi-
atric bias may have been taught psychology as college students "by young, often quite radical faculty
who are very venemous in their condemnation of society in general and medicine in particular"), and
id. at 136 (law students' interest in law and psychiatry "is to learn how to pick holes and to show the
psychiatrist up in court").
14. See, eg., Rodriguez, Perlin & Apicella, Proportionality Review in New Jersey: An Indispen.
sable Safeguard in the Capital Sentencing Process, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 417 n.121 (1983) ("With
each Supreme Court decision denying a challenge to a particular state's death penalty statute, the
universe of federal issues shrinks dramatically," referring to Greenhouse, As Appeals Hit Final Stage,
Life on Death Row Runs Out, New York Times (Dec. 18, 1983), § E, at 5. See also Perlin, supra note
9, at 101-02 n.57.
15. See sources cited in Perlin, supra note 9, at 92-93 n.4; see generally Ford v. Wainwright, 106
S. Ct. 2595, 2600-02 (1986); Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incom-
petent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1980).
16. For a clinical discussion of this population, see Rachlin, Halpern & Portnow, The Volitional
Rule, Personality Disorders and the Insanity Defense, 14 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 139, 147 (1984). For
a discussion of the concept of the "totally crazy" in a related area, see Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 654 (1978), dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 808-10.
17. Perlin, supra note 9, at 168. The classic expression of this argument is found in Goldstein &
Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853, 868-69 (1963). See also sources
cited in Perlin, supra note 9, at 168 n.504.
18. Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 UCLA L. REV. 822, 829 n.35 (1967)
[hereinafter UCLA Project] quoted in Note, 6 WHIrIER L. REV. 519, 543 (1984).
Interestingly, the student author immediately rejected this notion, concluding: "however, scien-
tific observation of mental patients over many generations has established the accuracy of psychiatric
theory and the psychiatrist's understanding of the functions of the mind." UCLA Project, supra.
But see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-
room, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974) (psychiatric judgments neither highly reliable nor significantly
valid); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Despite
many recent advances in medical knowledge, it remins a stubborn fact that there are many forms of
mental illness which are not understood [;] there can be little responsible debate regarding 'the un-
certainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment,'" quoting Green-
wood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1966)).
19. See, for a devastating attack on the Burger Court's jurisprudence in general, Empty Robe,
NEw REPUBLIC (July 14 & 21, 1986), at 4. See also Nagel, A Plague of Judges: The Burger Court's
Secret Plan for America, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Nov. 1980), at 20, 21: "[Tlhe zig-zagging of the
justices tempt litigants of all types to try their hand at constitutional argument. On any given Mon-
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unsuccessfully, tried to decipher some decision-making motif or common
thread which might indicate principled and predictable decision-making.
20
Dr. Paul Appelbaum, for instance, sees the Court's "tortuous" 21 reasoning
as purely outcome-determinative, and as a reflection of its "unwillingness to
confront directly the problems of psychiatric testimony at death penalty
hearings," z22 serving only to further a set of specific "transcedent ideological
goal[s]."z 3
It is also necessary to consider the relationship between the Court's atti-
tude towards these issues and its concomitant message-in civil cases--"that
it does not view the federal courts as an appropriate forum in which involun-
tarily committed individuals may assert their rights." a24 Dr. Carl Malm-
quist, for example, has suggested that Appelbaum's analysis should be
"extend[ed]" to reflect the Court's desire "to restore an era in which federal
courts played almost no-role in overseeing institutions such as mental hospi-
tals."25 While none of the criminal cases under consideration in this paper
involve the sorts of broad institutional reform26 that were before the Court
in such cases as Mills v. Rogers,27 Youngberg v. Romeo,28 or Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman,29 a climate of hostility to "judicial activ-
ism"'30 evidenced in such cases might well "spill over" to decision-making in
constitutional criminal procedure cases as well.
Although Appelbaum's and Malmquist's analyses are appealing-and
day, if you catch the brethren in the right frame of mind, you might win." See generally, Nagel, A
Comment on the Burger Court and "JudicialActivism,' 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 223 (1981) [hereinafter
Burger Comment].
20. Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 LOYOLA U. L.J.
405, 407 (1982). See id. n.12, comparing Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual and the Criminal
Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518 (1977), with Seidman, Factual Guilt
and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80
COLUM. L. Rv. 436 (1980). See also Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court and the Legacy
of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320 (1977); Saltzburg, Foreward: The Flow and Ebb of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980).
21. Dr. Appelbaum Replies, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 387, 388 (1985) [hereinafter Appelbaum].
22. Appelbaum, Death, the Expert Witness, and the Dangers of Going Barefoot, 34 Hosp. &
COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 1003, 1004 (1983).
23. Appelbaum, The Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCH. 827, 831 (1984),
discussed in Perlin, supra note 9, at 111, id. n.121, and id. at 167.
24. Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Inadequacy of Existing Procedural and Substan-
tive Protections, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 906, 951 (1981); see generally Perlin, supra note 6, mscpt. at 6-
9.
25. Malmquist, supra note 13, at 156.
26. On the Burger Court's attitude towards such cases, see, e.g., Perlin, supra note 6, msept. at
78-79 nn.41-43, citing, inter alia, Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial Power to
Reform Social Institutions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 71 (1984) [hereinafter Rudenstine I]; Rudenstine,
Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonationalism and the Debate Over Political
Structure, 59 So. CAL. L. REv. 449 (1986) [hereinafter Rudenstine II]; Sherry, Issue Manipulation
by the Burger Court: Saving the Community From Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611 (1986); Chemerin-
sky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst, 12 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L. Q. 643 (1985).
27. 451 U.S. 291 (1982) (right to refuse treatment).
28. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (right to training).
29. Penhurst I, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Penhurst II, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984) (right to community
services in the least restrictive alternative).
30. Malmquist, supra note 13, at 156; cf Burger Comment, supra note 19, at 245 (Burger




may well be accurate3 1-it is possible that when examined more closely
these decisions do reveal some doctrinal consistency that transcends the
more narrow area of mental disability law. Since four of the cases in ques-
tion have been decided in the Court's most recent term,32 it is perhaps timely
to examine anew the eight important cases of the past five years,33 in an
effort to determine whether such consistency exists.
First, I will discuss the eight cases, looking at the more recent four in
greater depth than the earlier ones. Next, I will briefly consider existing
critical commentary on the cases as well as subsequent judicial interpreta-
tions, in an effort to determine the responsiveness of state and lower federal
courts to Supreme Court "signals." Then, I will attempt to determine
whether there are, in reality, important and consistent doctrinal threads run-
ning through the cases or whether they reflect simply a "doctrinal abyss."
THE CASES
I have arbitrarily categorized the key cases for purposes of analysis into
three34 groupings which cover an important spectrum of the procedural is-
sues relevant to the criminal trial process: 1) role and weight of expert testi-
mony;35 2) privilege against self-incrimination including the interplay
between Miranda and mental disability;36 and 3) competence to be
executed.
37
31. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 167.
32. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986); Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988
(1986); Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986).
33. The five year time period is chosen arbitrarily so as to begin with Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1982), which discussed many of the pertinent issues for the first time in a Supreme Court
opinion. Other cases to be discussed include Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
Because the earlier cases have generally been considered closely by commentators-see, e.g.,
Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat From Its Death Pen-
alty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 737 (1985) (Barefoot); Perlin, supra note 9; Margulies, The
"Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad:" Procedures for the Commitment and Release of
Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 793 (1984); Slobogin, Estelle
v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71 (1982)-they
will be discussed somewhat more briefly than the four cases decided in the Supreme Court's most
recent term. See supra note 32.
While Ake has been discussed in some depth, see Perlin, supra note 9, the range of commentary
has been somewhat limited, see infra notes 665-86, so that case will receive, to use a favorite phrase
of the Supreme Court's, "intermediate scrutiny."
34. In addition, some consideration must be paid to what I will call a "shadow grouping":
cases dealing with an area of the law-competence of counsel-which appears to be neutral with
regard to mental disability issues, but which, in reality, may prove to be as important as any cases
dealing frontally with such questions. See, eg., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984),
discussed infra note 721.
35. Barefoot; Jones; Ake.
36. Estelle; Greenfield; Smith; Allen.
37. Ford. While one case probably does not make a "grouping," the legal and symbolic signifi-
cance of this case demands separate consideration. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 91-92 n.3. See also,
Alvord v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 355-60 (1984) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiora). The facts of the Alvord case are discussed in Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems
in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 42, 44-45 (1986); Radelet & Barnard, Ethics and
the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to Be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 37, 52-53 n.38 (1986).
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(A) Role and Weight of Expert Testimony
The Court's three cases-Barefoot v. Estelle,
3 8 Jones v. United States39
and Ake v. Oklahoma 4°-which focus on the role of the expert witness in the
criminal trial process, the weight to be given to such testimony, and the
constitutional implications of such expert testimony are the most perplexing,
apparently-inconsistent and seemingly-irreconcilable of all of the decisions
under consideration. 4 1 They seem, on the surface, to be utterly idiosyn-
cratic, and the first two of the decisions-Barefoot and Jones-seem to share
no common constitutional or social values with the third (Ake). While
deeper analysis may reveal some commonality in doctrines, the cases, when
read together, appear to deserve Dr. Appelbaum's characterization of
"tortous reasoning." 42
(1) Barefoot v. Estelle
After Thomas Barefoot was convicted of murdering a Texas police of-
ficer,4 3 two psychiatrists44 testified in response to hypothetical questions45 at
the penalty phase4 6 that defendant "would probably commit further acts of
violence and represent a continuing threat to society." 47 The jury subse-
quently accepted this testimony4 8 and the death penalty was imposed.
49
The defendant's conviction was affirmed in the state courts,50 and his
38. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
39. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
40. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
41. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 164-69.
42. Appelbaum, supra note 22.
43. 463 U.S. at 883.
44. One of the psychiatrists testifying on the state's behalf, Dr. James Grigson, has been charac-
terized as "Dr. Death." See, eg., Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychologi-
cal Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 407, 410
(1983). For an analysis of other cases in which Dr. Grigson has participated, see Dix, Participation
by Mental Health Professionals in Capital Murder Sentencing, 1 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 283
(1978); Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing Evidentiary and Constitutional Con-
siderations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 47 (1981) [hereinafter Expert Prediction]. Professor Dix has
suggested that Dr. Grigson operates "at the brink of quackery." Dix, The Death Penalty, "Danger-
ousness," Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) [herein-
after Dix I].
45. Neither doctor examined the defendant prior to testifying. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 885.
According to Dr. Paul Appelbaum, the decision to pose hypothetical questions to experts who
did not personally examine the defendant may have resulted from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 484 (1981), holding that it was a constitutional violation not to warn a
defendant at the outset of such a pretrial psychiatric examination that the information he revealed
might be used against him; see infra text accompanying notes 207-55. Appelbaum, Hypotheticals,
Psychiatric Testimony, and the Death Sentence, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 169, 170-
171 (1984). Cf. Holloway v. State, 691 S.W.2d 608, 617 n.3 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1984) (expert
witness testified half the time in response to hypotheticals "when we are not allowed to" examine
defendants) (emphasis in original).
46. See TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
47. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884.
48. Under Texas procedures, special questions are submitted to the jury as part of the penalty
phase. Id. at 883-84.
49. Id. at 884-85.
50. Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1980). On state appeal, defendant
had urged unsuccessfully (1) that the use of psychiatrists to make predictions at the punishment
hearing as to his future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatrists "individually, and as a
class," are not competent to predict future dangerousness, and (2) that permitting answers to hy-
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application in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus was denied,5'
a denial that was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.52 The Supreme Court then
agreed to hear the case.53
In affirming the denial of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court first dealt
with an important procedural issue that, while not appearing particularly
relevant to the issues of mental disability and expert testimony, casts a clear
light on the court's attitude towards death penalty litigation in general.
5 4 It
held that a habeas corpus petitioner must make a "substantial showing of the
denial of [a] federal right," 55 and that, while a circuit court, "where neces-
sary to prevent the case from becoming moot by the petitioner's execution,
should grant a stay of execution" pending appellate disposition,"'5 6 even
"when a condemned prisoner obtains a certificate of probable cause on his
initial appeal,"'57 the court of appeals "may adopt expedited procedures in
resolving the merits of habeas appeals." 58
On the psychiatric issue, the Court summarized defendant's claim:
First, it is urged that psychiatrists, individually and as a group,
are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that
a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future, and so
represent a danger to the community. Second, it is said that in any
event, psychiatrists should not be permitted to testify about future dan-
gerousness in response to hypothetical questions and without having
examined the defendant personally. Third, it is argued that in the par-
ticular circumstances in this case the testimony of the psychiatrists was
so unreliable that the sentence should be set aside.59
The Court first rejected the argument that psychiatrists could not relia-
bly predict future dangerousness in this context, 60 noting that it made "little
sense" to exclude only psychiatrists from the "entire universe of persons who
might have an opinion on this issue,"' 6 1 and that defendant's argument
would also "call into question those other contexts in which predictions of
potheticals by psychiatrists who had not examined defendant was similarly constitutionally forbid-
den. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884-885.
For a critical, pre-Barefoot analysis of the administration of death penalty cases in Texas, see
Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Related to the
Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1343, 1396, 1399 (1977) (failure of majority of Texas
Supreme Court to "scrutinize more diligently" expert psychiatric testimony on dangerousness issue
in similar cases "discouraging"; trial courts use expert testimony in "woefully inadequate" way at
penalty phase). See also Dix I, supra note 44.
51. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 885.
52. 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1983). See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 885-87, for the full procedural
history below.
53. 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
54. For a sampling of the literature on this aspect of Barefoot, see Note, 32 U. KAN. L. REV.
869 (1984); Note, Habeas Corpus-Expedited Appellate Review of Habeas Corpus Petitions by Death
Sentenced State Prisoners, 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1404 (1983); Young, Guidelines Issued
for Death Sentence Review, 69 A.B.A. J. 1532 (1983).
55. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893, quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 170 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972).
56. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893-94.
57. Id. at 894.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 896.
60. Id.
61. Id. On this point, the Court relied heavily upon its opinion in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
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future behavior are constantly made."'62
In the course of this argument, the Court rejected the views presented
by the American Psychiatric Association as amicus that (1) such testimony
was invalid due to "fundamentally low reliability," 63 and (2) that long-term
predictions of future dangerousness were essentially lay determinations that
should be based on "predictive statistical or actuarial information that is
fundamentally nonmedical in nature."4
(1976), rejecting the claim that it was impossible to predict future behavior and that dangerousness
was thus an invalid consideration in death penalty imposition decisionmaking. Id.
62. Id. at 898. On this point, the court relied on O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576
(1975) (nondangerous mentally ill person could not be institutionalized against his will), and Add-
ington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (commitment determination turns on "meaning of the
facts which must be interpreted by expert[s]") (emphasis in original).
Also, under the rules of evidence, such testimony is ordinarily admitted, with the fact-finder-
who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party, Bare-
foot, 463 U.S. at 898;-determining the appropriate weight to be allocated. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at
898. While such evidence may be opposed as erroneous on either a case-by-case or global basis, the
jury should have the benefit of all of the available evidence. Id. at 898-99.
The Court stressed that no evidence was offered by defendant at trial to contradict the testi-
mony in question. Id. at 899 n.5. See also, id. n.7 (no contradiction of state's expert testimony that
psychiatrists could predict future dangerousness of individuals "if given enough information"); but
see Appelbaum, supra note 45, at 173-75 (experts in Barefoot had "inadequate information" and
were "[lacking] crucial data" needed in order to appropriately make the diagnoses offered).
63. Amicus Brief of American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983), at 14.
64. Id. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916, 920-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), sources cited at nn.1-5.
See, for the most recent addition to this voluminous literature, Miller & Morris, Predictions of Dan-
gerousness: Ethical Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL 393
(1986). The definitive work remains J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESS-
MENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981), reprinted as THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR (1981).
The specific predictivity problems raised in cases involving defendants such as Barefoot-diag-
nosed as a "criminal sociopath" and suffering from a "classical, typical, sociopathic personality dis-
order," Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 917-19-are discussed comprehensively in Dix, Clinical Evaluation of
the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 525, 532-50 (1980) [herein-
after Dix 1]; Dix I, supra note 44, at 175-92; Expert Prediction, supra note 44, at 44 n.219 (danger of
undue prejudice arising from the use of this diagnosis may be "exceptionally great"); see also Davis,
Texas Capital Sentencing Procedures: The Role of the Jury and the Restraining Hand of the Expert,
69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 300 (1978). See infra note 215.
In one of his analyses of the Barefoot case, Dr. Appelbaum points out that, assuming the "soci-
opathic personality disorder" language used by the Barefoot experts meant roughly what is now
classified as "antisocial personality disorder" (A-SPD), see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Ill
320-21 (1980) (DSM-III), it was "clear" that the expert had inadequate information upon which to
base such a diagnosis, Appelbaum, supra note 45, at 173:
DSM-III requires onset of symptoms before age of 15 for a diagnosis of A-SPD to be
made. The hypothetical question that was presented to [the witness] began when the de-
fendant was age 24. DSM-III requires that four of eight specified behaviors be manifested
after the age of 18. There was information in the hypothetical dealing with only two of
these behaviors.
The diagnostic criteria for A-SPD also require "a pattern of continuous anti-social
behavior in which the rights of others are violated with no intervening period of at least five
years without anti-social behavior between age 15 and the present time." Since information
about the defendant's functioning between age 15 and 24 was completely lacking, it would
be impossible to say whether the defendant met this criterion.
Finally, the criteria require that the individual's anti-social behavior not be due either
to severe mental retardation, schizophrenia, or manic episodes. The information in the
hypothetical contained no information about any of these diagnoses being present or ab-
sent. Thus, [the witness] could not have reasonably concluded that the pattern of behavior
was not attributable to [such a disorder]. Of course, this is precisely the kind of informa-
tion that would be available from a personal examination. It is, therefore, clear that [the
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It construed its decision in Estelle v. Smith 65 to in "no sense disap-
prov[e of] the use of psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness. '66 On
the hypotheticals issue, the Court simply held that expert testimony "is com-
monly admitted as evidence where it might help the fact finder do its as-
signed job," 67 and that the fact that the witnesses had not examined the
defendant "went to the weight of their testimony, not to its admissibility.
68
Justice Blackmun dissented (for himself, and Justices Brennan and
Marshall), 69 rejecting the Court's views on the psychiatric issue:
The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant's
witness] could not have reached the conclusion that the defendant was suffering from an
anti-social personality disorder, at least using the generally accepted criteria of DSM-III.
Id. at 173-74.
65. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 207-55.
66. Id. at 473, quoted in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898. The Court was unpersuaded that the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, as amicus, sought to bar such expert testimony:
The amicus does not suggest that there are not other views held by members of the
Association or of the profession in general. Indeed, as this case and others indicate, there
are doctors who are quite willing to testify at the sentencing hearing; who think, and will
say, that they know what they are talking about, and who expressly disagree with the
Association's point of view.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899. But see Dix I, supra note 44, at 172 (Barefoot witness Grigson operated
"at the brink of quackery").
Further, the Court added that it was "unconvinced... that the adversary process cannot be
trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinions about future dangerous-
ness," Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901, adding that this was so "particularly when the convicted felon has
the opportunity to present his own side of the case." Id. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087
(1985). It specifically rejected what it characterized as Justice Blackmun's charge in his dissenting
opinion (see Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920-23, (Blackmun, J., dissenting)), that a jury would not be able
to separate "the wheat from the chaff," id. at 899-900, answering that "[w]e do not share in this low
evaluation of the adversary process," id.
67. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 903.
68. Id. at 904, quoting Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d at 887. See generally, on this point, Per-
lin, supra note 9, at 118, text accompanying nn.156-60. See also, Bonner, Death Penalty, [1984]
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 493, 507-08. ("Expert testimony predicated on hypotheticals and speculation
has no place in a death sentencing system that claims to value fairness and reliability.") Cf Hy-
potheticals, supra note 45, at 176 (while hypotheticals ought not necessarily to be entirely excluded
from capital sentencing process, "they ought to be inadmissible as the sole basis for a psychiatric
opinion") (emphasis in original).
On the application of these rules to the case before it, the Court concluded that there was no
error, noting that the defendant could have put forth his own hypothetical, (Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 905
n.10) and that, when an expert witness is as positive about his predictions as were the witnesses in
Barefoot-Dr. Grigson, for instance, asserted that he was "100% sure" that an individual with the
characteristics described in the hypothetical would commit violent acts in the future-the easier it
should be to impeach him. Id. n.1 1. For the full colloquy on this point, see Appelbaum, supra note
45 at 169.
Noted the Court:
Dr. Fason [defendant's witness] testified at the habeas hearing that if a doctor claimed
to be 100% sure of something without examining the patient, "we would kick him off the
staff of the hospital for his arrogance." H. Tr. 48. Similar testimony could have been
presented at Barefoot's trial, but was not.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 905 n.1l.
Time has not made Dr. Grigson more modest. See Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 709 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. 1985) (Grigson said he was "probably the best authority in the area," and stated he
was "100% accurate in his predictions of future violence").
69. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall would
have vacated the death penalty as violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, id. (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, would have vacated and remanded "for
further proceedings," id. at 938 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens concurred, reasoning that, while he agreed with that aspect of Justice Marshall's
dissent which found "serious procedural error" in the way the Fifth Circuit handled the case, he
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future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony
is wrong two times out of three. The Court reaches this result--even
in a capital case-because, it is said, the testimony is subject to cross-
examination and impeachment. In the present state of psychiatric
knowledge, this is too much for me. One may accept this in a routine
lawsuit for money damages,70 but when a person's life is at stake-no
matter how heinous his offense-a requirement of greater reliability
should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychia-
trist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable
untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death
itself.71
Relying on the American Psychiatric Association's amicus brief, Justice
Blackmun made four main points: 1) no "single, reputable source" was cited
by the majority to contradict the proposition that psychiatric predictions of
long-term violence "are wrong more often than they are right;' 72 2) laymen
can do "at least as well and possibly better" than psychiatrists in predicting
violence; 73 3) it is "crystal-clear" from the literature that the state's wit-
nesses "had no expertise whatever," 74 and 4) such "baseless testimony" can-
not be reconciled "with the Constitution's paramount concern for reliability
in capital sentencing."
75
Because such purportedly scientific testimony-"unreliable [and] preju-
dicial" 76 -was imbued with an "'aura of scientific infallibility,' "77 it was
capable of "shroud[ing] the evidence [thus leading] the jury to accept it with-
out critical scrutiny."' 78 Justice Blackmun charged: "when the court knows
full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious, there
can be no excuse for imposing on the defendant, on pain of his life, the heavy
agreed with the majority's ultimate conclusion that the District Court's judgment should be af-
firmed, id. at 906.
Justice Marshall dissented (for himself and Justice Brennan), arguing that 1) the procedures
followed by the Court of Appeals were inconsistent with prior Supreme Court caselaw, (see id. at
908-912, discussing Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968), and Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 (1967)), and 2) the Court's adoption of summary
procedures was "grossly improper," Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Cf Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (rejecting preponderance of evidence
standard-used in the "typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties"-
because the person facing such commitment "should not be asked to share equally with society the
risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm
to the state," id. at 427).
71. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 921.
73. Id. at 922.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 919.
76. Id.
77. Id., quoting Gianelli, The Inadmissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Hal/-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 1197, 1237 (1980). See generally sources cited in
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Note, People v. Murtishaw: Applying the
Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1069,
1075-77 (1982) (on prejudicial impact of expert predictions of dangerousness).
Barefoot is considered in the light of Frye in Perlin, supra note 9, at 111-13 (concluding that,
under both the majority and minority Frye positions, "the testimony in Barefoot would still fail to
pass muster," id. at 113). See also, id. at 115-16 n.147 (discussing Note, supra at 1087, quoting Dr.
Bernard Diamond for proposition that Frye should be applied to all psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness).
78. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919.
1987]
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burden of convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud."'79
(2) Jones v. United States
Jones v. United States,80 on the other hand, presented a fact pattern as
diametrically opposed to that before the court in Barefoot as one could imag-
ine. The underlying criminal charge in Jones involved the attempted petit
larceny of a piece of clothing (a jacket) from a department store,81 or, as it is
more commonly known, shoplifting, a misdemeanor under District of Co-
lumbia law, punishable by a maximum one-year prison sentence.8 2 After
Michael Jones was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)8 3 follow-
ing a bench trial, 84 pursuant to local statute,8 5 he was ordered committed to
a mental hospital.
8 6
At his first hearing 7 he was denied release.88 At his second hearing-
held more than a year after he was initially hospitalized-he argued that
1) he was entitled to unconditional release, since he had been hospitalized for
a longer period of time than the maximum to which he could have been
sentenced, and 2) he was entitled to full civil commitment safeguards at such
a hearing, including a jury determination as to whether the hospital had
proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was still mentally ill and
dangerous. 89 The trial court rejected these arguments. 90
Jones then appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
which first affirmed, 91 then, on rehearing, reversed, 92 and finally, on an en
banc rehearing, again affirmed the trial court's decision.93 It reasoned that
abbreviated post-commitment procedures were appropriate because of the
predictive value of the initial determination of insanity and dangerousness at
the criminal trial.9
4
79. Id. at 935-36. Cf. Note, Estelle v. Smith and Psychiatric Testimony: New Limits on Predict-
ing Future Dangerousness, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 1015, 1033 (1981) ("When the decision of whether a
criminal defendant shall live or die is put to the jury, only the most credible evidence should be used
in the determination") (emphasis added).
80. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
81. Id. at 359.
82. D.C. CODE §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981).
83. Under District of Columbia law, an insanity acquittal shall only be entered where the de-
fendant's insanity is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." D.C. CODE
§ 24-3010) (1981). See Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
84. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
85. D.C. CODE § 24-301(d)(1) (1981).
86. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
87. Under District of Columbia law, an NGRI acquittee is entitled to a hearing 50 days after
commitment, at which the patient may demonstrate-by a preponderance of the evidence-that he
either is no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to himself, and thus entitled to release. D.C.
CODE § 24-301(d)(2) (1981).
88. Jones, 463 U.S. at 460.
89. Id. at 360-61.
Nineteen states currently commit insanity acquittees under the same procedures used to commit
persons subject to involuntary civil commitment. Note, Throwing Away the Key: Due Process Rights
of Insanity Acquittees in Jones v. United States, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 4769, 480-81 n.7 (1985).
90. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360-61.
91. Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978).
92. Jones v. United States, 411 A.2d 624 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980).
93. Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981).
94. Id. at 373, citing Jones, 396 A.2d at 189. In addition, the court stated that tying the dura-
tion of confinement to a hypothetical maximum sentence that an individual could have received for
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The Supreme Court, in a sharply-split decision,95 affirmed.96 First, it
sanctioned automatic commitment based upon an insanity acquittal.97 Writ-
ing for a five-judge majority, Justice Powell reasoned that, since an insanity
acquittal establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that the defendant
committed a criminal act,98 this provides "concrete evidence" as to the pa-
tient's dangerousness that is generally as persuasive as any predictions about
dangerousness made regularly in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings. 9 9
Rejecting Jones' arguments based on the lack of predictive value of
prior dangerous acts as an indication of future dangerousness,100 the court
concluded that it was appropriate to "pay particular deference to reasonable
legislative judgments" made by Congress in the context. 10 1 Significantly, the
Court refused to distinguish between acts of violence and crimes such as the
one with which Jones was charged,102 quoting from a District of Columbia
Court of Appeals opinion written by the Chief Justice when he sat on that
court: "[tlo describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is
to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the same
as to both."
10 3
The Court clearly distinguished Addington v. Texast1 4 on the question
of the appropriate standard of proof. To equate the NGRI and involuntary
civil commitment process "ignores important differences between the
[classes of patients,]" 10 5 reasoned the Court, concluding that "insanity ac-
quittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from
other candidates for commitment." 106
the underlying criminal act, ignored the "most basic precepts of medicine and psychiatry." 432
A.2d at 370.
95. Justice Powell wrote for a five-judge majority; Justice Brennan (for himself, Justices Mar-
shall andBlackmun) and Justice Stevens filed separate dissenting opinions. Jones, 463 U.S. at 371
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 371.
97. The Court analyzed the statute in light of the rational basis equal protection test. Id. at 362
n.10. For a sharp criticism of the use of this test, see Margulies, supra note 33, at 814-18.
98. Jones, 463 U.S. at 363-64.
99. Id. This also served to distinguish the case from the fact pattern in Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972), which dealt with persons incompetent to stand trial and who were thus never
judged culpable of the underlying offense. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.12.
100. Id. at 362.
101. Id. at 364-65 n.13.
102. Id. at 365 n.14. But see Gelwan, Civil Commitment and Commitment of Insanity Acquit-
tees, 11 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 328, 353 (1985) (legislatures should be permitted to
retain the presumption of continuing dangerousness only as to defndants acquitted of violent
crimes).
103. Jones, 463 U.S. at 365, quoting Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
104. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, the Court mandates a standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" as the appropriate burden of proof in involuntary civil commitment
cases. Id. at 433.
105. Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
106. Id. at 370.
On the question of whether the patient's mental illness continued, the court found that it was
reasonable "to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a
criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." Id. at 366. A de novo commitment
hearing would merely "relitigate much of the criminal trial" without "focusing on the critical ques-
tion [of] whether the acquittee has recovered." Id.
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Further, the concerns motivating the Court's opinion in Addington-
the risk of error in non-judicial commitment decisions, and the possibility of
stigma occasioned by an involuntary commitment-were absent in the pres-
ent case.107 Finally, the Court rejected the patient's argument that his re-
lease was compelled because he had already been institutionalized for a
longer period of time than had he received the maximum sentence for the
misdemeanor involved.1
0 8
Dissenting for himself, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Bren-
nan 0 9 charged that the Court "pos[ed] the wrong question." Justice Bren-
nan restated the issue as: "whether the fact that an individual has been
found 'not guilty by reason of insanity,' by itself, provides a constitutionally
adequate basis for involuntary, indefinite commitment to psychiatric
hospitalization."10
Noting that the Court had previously held that the state "may not im-
pose psychiatric commitment as an alternative to penal sentencing for longer
than the maximum period of incarceration the legislature has authorized as
punishment for the crime committed,"' I IJustice Brennan listed four major
arguments which he saw as rejecting the majority's thesis that "the Govern-
ment may be excused from carrying the Addington burden of proof with
respect to each of the O'Connor112 elements of mental illness and dangerous-
ness in committing [the patient] for an indefinite period."' '
13
1. The argument that the "mere facts of past criminal behavior and
mental illness justify indefinite commitment without the benefits of the mini-
mum due process standards associated with civil commitment, most impor-
107. Id. at 367.
First, the commission of a criminal act by the NGRI acquittee was seen as persuasive evidence
of activity not within a "range of conduct that is generally acceptable," on the part of an individual
who, by the entry of his NGRI plea, conceded that his actions were produced by mental illness, id.,
quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27. Second, given the stigma resulting from the NGRI verdict
itself, there is "little additional harm" which can result from civil commitment. Id. at 367 n.16.
108. Id. at 368-69.
Construing the test that the court had articulated in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972)-that the nature and duration of commitment must "bear some reasonable relationship to the
purpose for which the individual is committed"-it found that the basis for the patient's confinement
rested "on his continuing illness and dangerousness," Jones, 463 U.S. at 369. The severity of the
underlying criminal act bore no necessary correlation to the amount of time needed to treat a patient
for mental illness or render him nondangerous. Thus, the maximum hypothetical sentence had no
necessary relationship to the permissible purposes of commitment following an insanity acquittal,
and the patient was thus not entitled to release. Id.
Contrarily, the court noted that punishment of an insanity acquittee would contradict the essen-
tially exculpatory nature of the insanity defense. "As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished." Id.
109. The three dissenting Justices in Barefoot. See supra text accompanying note 69.
110. Jones, 463 U.S. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 374, citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1972). (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). In Humphrey, the patient had been first convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, and then, under state law, was found at a special hearing to be in need of psychiatric treat-
ment, was then committed for treatment for the maximum period for which he could have been
punished for the underlying crime, and was then recommitted for another five years pursuant to a
subsequent hearing after a judicial hearing on mental illness and dangerousness. Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. at 506-07.
112. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975), the Court found that a "State cannot
confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends."
113. Jones, 463 U.S. at 374 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tantly proof of present mental illness and dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence" was inconsistent with the Court's precedents in other
commitment contexts.' 
14
2. "An acquittal by reason of insanity of a single, nonviolent misde-
meanor is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for the due process pro-
tections of Addington and O'Connor, Le. proof by clear and convincing
evidence of present mental illness or dangerousness, with the government
bearing the burden of persuasion."'1 15
3. The due process calculus of Mathews v. Eldridge1 16 could be satis-
fied by taking into account criminal behavior and past mental condition,
without depriving insanity acquittees of the Addington protections; while
commitment of insanity acquittees "for a reasonably limited period without
requiring the Government to meet its Addington burden" might be justifi-
able, "at some point the Government must be required to justify further
commitment" under Addington. 117
4. The Court's dual arguments that the "risk of error" in this sort of
case is diminished-because the defendant has admitted to the commission
of a criminal act outside the generally acceptable "range of conduct";1 18 be-
cause the successful use of the insanity defense itself necessarily stigmatizes
114. Id. at 375 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While Justice Brennan conceded that Addington and
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), might be distinguishable because, in those cases, there was
never proof that a crime had been committed, he argued that such an objection could not be leveled
at Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) or Humphrey, in both of which cases the patient had
been originally convicted of a criminal act. Jones, 463 U.S. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He
added:
Under today's ruling,... it is difficult to see how a constitutional claim like the one
made in Humphrey could conceivably have merit, unless there is somehow a constitutional
difference between Colorado's pre-1972 "mentally disordered sex offenders" statute and
the District of Columbia's "not guilty by reason of insanity" statute. Both statutes were
designed to authorize involuntary commitment for psychiatric treatment of persons who
have committed crimes upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime
was the product of a mental condition appropriate for psychiatric therapy.
463 U.S. at 376-77 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict is "backward-looking, focusing on one moment in
the past, while commitment requires a judgment as to the present and future," Justice Brennan
continued, citing to the near-unanimous clinical literature that "even the best attempts to identify
dangerous individuals on the basis of specified facts have been inaccurate roughly two-thirds of the
time, almost always on the side of overprediction," id. at 378. See sources cited id. at 378-81 nn.8-
15. Justice Brennan continued that such research "is practically nonexistent on the relationship of
nonviolent criminal behavior... to future dangerousness," id. at 379 (emphasis in original).
While Justice Brennan conceded that Jones might overrule Humphrey "by implication," he
pointed out that it could not be so read to overrule Baxstrom or [Baxstrom's progeny, including
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)], id. at 380. Under Baxstrom, "the separate facts of crimi-
nality and mental illness cannot support indefinite psychiatric commitment," id. On this point, he
concluded:
Given the close similarity of the governmental interests at issue in this case and those
at issue in Addington, and the highly imperfect "fit" between the findings required for an
insanity acquittal and those required under O'Connor to support an indefinite commitment,
I cannot agree that the Government should be excused from the burden that Addington
held was required by due process.
Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
116. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
117. Jones, 463 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 367.
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the defendant' 19-are incorrect. First, under O'Connor, there must be proof
of "dangerous" behavior,1 20 not merely "unacceptable" behavior.
121 Sec-
ond, there are reasons beyond the avoidance of stigma in support of the
argument that there is a recognizable liberty interest in the avoidance of
involuntary commitment; in many respects, confinement in a mental institu-
tion "is even more intrusive than incarceration in a prison."'
22
He thus concluded that indefinite commitment "without the due pro-
cess protections adopted in Addington and O'Connor is not reasonably re-
lated to any of the Government's purported interests in continuing insanity
acquittees for psychiatric treatment."'
23
Justice Stevens also dissented, finding that the patient was "presump-
tively entitled to his freedom after he had been incarcerated for a period of
one year."' 124
(3) Ake v. OklahomaI
25
Less than two years after the Barefoot and Jones decisions, the Court
looked at an entirely different aspect of expert witness issues in Ake v.
Oklahoma. In Ake the Court considered the question of the scope of a crim-
inal defendant's right to expert assistance in the context of an insanity de-
fense trial.
1 2 6
a. Experts in Insanity Defense Cases
Although the Court had held in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi 1
27
in 1953 that there was no such right of expert assistance, in the intervening
three decades that doctrine had been "progressively eroded"' 128 by develop-
119. Id. at 367 n.16.
120. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
121. Jones, 463 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 384:
Inmates of mental institutions, like prisoners, are deprived of unrestricted association
with friends, family, and community; they must contend with locks, guards, and detailed
regulation of their daily activities. In addition, a person who has been hospitalized invol-
untarily may to a significant extent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to
medical treatment.
Id. at 384-85.
Cf. Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 407-56.
123. Jones, 463 U.S. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Note, Rulesfor an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquit-
ted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 329 (1982) (endorsing "hypo-
thetical sentencing approach" as "reasonable, and, in the absence of any alternative, necessary under
equal protection").
125. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). See generally Perlin, supra note 9, at 121-39.
126. For helpful analyses of relevant issues, see, e.g., Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of
Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CINN. L. REV. 574
(1982); Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A Search for
Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate
Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632
(1970); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L.
REV. 1054 (1963); Kwall, The Use of Expert Services by Privately Retained Criminal Defense Attor-
neys, 13 LOYOLA U. L. REV. 1 (1981).
127. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
128. Perlin, supra note 9, at 122.
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ments in constitutional doctrine applying both the due process 129 and equal
protection clauses130 to claims made by indigent criminal defendants in such
areas as right to transcripts of trials131 and of preliminary hearings,
132 right
to counsel at trial 133 and appeal,134 right to effective counsel, 135 and the right
of prisoners to adequate legal assistance in certain habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 136 Commentators had articulated at least seven distinct policy ratio-
nales in support of the extension of necessary defense services to
indigents. 137
Partisan defense experts had been used in insanity cases for over three
centuries, 138 and other medical experts have testified in criminal matters at
least as far back as 1345.139 According to Dr. Seymour Halleck, such testi-
mony in insanity defense cases serves at least three purposes:
[F]irst, it supplies the court with facts concerning the offender's
illness; second, it presents informed opinion concerning the nature of
that illness; and third, it furnishes a basis for deciding whether the
illness made the patient legally insane at the time of the crime under
that jurisdiction's standard of insanity. 140
The ante is increased even further in an insanity case because of the
nature of psychiatric expert testimony,141 which demands "adversarial test-
ing." 142 This in an area where, while certainties are "render[ed] virtually
meaningless," 143 the Court has endorsed the validity of such testimony on
129. See, eg., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
130. See, eg., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to trial transcript).
131. Id.
132. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
133. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
134. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
135. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); see generally Strickland v. Washington, 104
S. Ct. 2052 (1984), discussed infra at text accompanying note 721.
136. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
137. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 126, at 652:
(1) establishment of the defendant's innocence; (2) equality of access to justice as be-
tween the poor and the rich; (3) equality of access to justice as between the indigent defend-
ant and the prosecutor; (4) access to that which is fundamental for a "fair trial"; (5) access
to that which assures an "adequate defense"; (6) access to that which "assists counsel," and
(7) access to that which assures an "effective defense."
138. Simon, The Defense of Insanity, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 183, 193 (1983).
139. See, eg., M. GuiTTMACHER, THE MIND OF THE MURDERER 109 (1960), citing Hand, His-
torical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901). See
generally Perlin, supra note 9, at 124 n.197.
140. Halleck, The Role of the Psychiatrist in the Criminal Justice System, PSYCHOLOGY 1982
ANN. REV. 386, 391 (1982).
141. On the role of expert witnesses in this context, see generally United States v. Byers, 740
F.2d 1104, 1138, 1167-70, and nn.177-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); Diamond &
Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L.
REv. 1335, 1344-45 (1963); Diamond, The Psychiatrist as Advocate, 1 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1973);
Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code
in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 769-88 (1974). On the question of the
ethical obligations of the psychiatric expert witness in an analogous situation, see Perlin & Sadoff,
EthicalIssues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 161 (1982).
142. See, eg., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
143. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979). But see Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 905 n.ll
(discussing, and refusing to reject, expert testimony suggesting that psychiatrist can be "100% sure"
of predictions). See supra note 68.
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the question of future dangerousness in capital cases, assuming that the ad-
versary system can expose such testimony's deficiencies. 144
In reality, however, a defense attorney, in order to realistically fulfill his
or her role of adducing evidence in support of a mental disability claim or to
appropriately challenge state-adduced testimony, must acquire some mea-
sure of requisite psychiatric expertise to accomplish such an end.145 While
this role might be partially fulfilled by rigorous cross-examination, 146 "call-
ing to the stand a psychiatrist who disagrees with the opposing psychiatrist
is an even better way of forcing judges and juries to use their common
sense." 147 Independent psychiatric expertise thus becomes a necessity
(rather than a luxury),148 as the absence of such a witness "goes to the very
trustworthiness of the criminal justice process."' 149
The Ake case set the stage for the Supreme Court to reconsider the
Baldi doctrine in the light of two conflicting trends: on one hand, the gen-
eral expansion of constitutional rights in the cases of indigent criminal de-
fendants asserting such rights in the context of assistance of trial counsel and
the actual trial process; I50 on the other, the severe contraction of such rights
in Barefoot and Jones.
b. The Ake' 5 ' Case
Glenn Barton Ake was charged with two counts of murder and two
counts of shooting with intent to kill.152 Prior to trial, he was institutional-
ized to determine his competency to stand trial,1 53 in accord with a recom-
mendation rendered by a court-appointed psychiatrist who characterized
Ake as "frankly delusional" 154 and a "probable paranoid schizophrenic."' t5 5
That Ake had serious mental problems cannot be seriously disputed: in a
remarkable colloquy with the judge, trial counsel had characterized the de-
fendant as "goofier than hell."' 1
56
144. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898-99.
145. See Brief of Amicus the N.J. Dep't of the Public Advocate, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct.
1087 (1985), at 43. See generally, Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training
Attorneys to Cope With Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 18 (1978) [hereinafter
Poythress I]; Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
201, 204 (1977) [hereinafter Poythress I].
146. See Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 141, at 166; Poythress I, supra note 145, at 15; Poythress II,
supra note 145, at 214.
147. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 18, at 746.
148. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (describing right to counsel).
149. See United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring),
cert. denied 411 U.S. 984 (1973).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 129-36.
151. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
152. Id. at 1091.
153. Because of the defendant's behavior at the arraignment, see Brief of Petitioner, Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) [hereinafter Ake Petitioner's Brief], at 2, quoting Joint Appendix
at 2 (arraigning judge characterized defendant's behavior as "bizarre"), the trial judge sua sponte
ordered an evaluation to determine if the defendant needed an "extended period of mental observa-
tion." Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1090.
154. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1090-91.
155. Id. at 1091.
156. See Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 153, at 10, quoting Joint Appendix at 27:
We waive presence of our-he ain't going to talk to us anyway. He doesn't know
what is going on. He is goofier than hell. We don't need him, and he can't assist us. We
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After being initially found incompetent to stand trial by the chief foren-
sic psychiatrist at the state hospital, 1 57 a hearing was held, as a result of
which1 58 the defendant was committed to the state hospital. 159 Within six
weeks, a hospital psychiatrist found that he had regained his competency,
160
following the regular daily administration of Thorazine.
1 61
When criminal proceedings were resumed, defense counsel notified the
court that he would raise the insanity defense, 162 and asked the trial judge to
either arrange for a psychiatric examination of the defendant so as to evalu-
ate his responsibility at the time of the offense, or to make funds available (in
light of the defendant's indigency) to allow him to arrange for his own evalu-
ation.1 63 This request was denied on the basis of what the judge character-
ized as the "almost cripplingly restrictive"' 64 state law, and on the authority
of Baldi,165 that there was no such constitutional right.
1 66
At trial, the sole defense raised was insanity.' 67 Although the defend-
ant called each of the psychiatrists who had examined him while he was at
the state hospital, none could testify as to his mental state at the time of the
offense, because none had examined him for that purpose. 168 As a result,
there was "no expert testimony for either side on Ake's sanity at the time of
the offense."'1 69 Ake's insanity defense was rejected, 170 and the defendant
was convicted on all counts.'
7 '
At sentencing, 172 the prosecutor relied on prior psychiatric testimony to
establish that defendant was mentally ill and dangerous, 173 and that it was
highly probable that he would again commit violent acts. 174 There was no
defense witness to rebut this testimony.17' Ake was sentenced to death on




158. A consulting psychiatrist was unequivocal as to Ake's mental state: "[Ake] is a psychotic
... his psychiatric diagnosis was that of paranoid schizophrenia--chronic, with exacerbation, that is
with current upset, and that in addition to the psychiatric diagnosis, that he is dangerous." Ake
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 152, at 2-3.
The psychiatrist was never asked about defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense.
Id. at 3-4.
159. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
160. Id.
161. Id. For a discussion of the properties of Thorazine, see sources cited in Perlin, supra note 9,
at 129 n.231, 131-32 n.248.
162. Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 152, at 5, quoting Joint Appendix at 20.
163. Id.




168. Id. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 130 n.237, quoting Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 152, at
7, quoting Joint Appendix at 46.
169. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091 (emphasis in original).
170. On the impact of Ake's mental disability on the decision that he would not testify, see
Perlin, supra note 9, at 130 n.239, quoting Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 152, at 193, quoting
Joint Appendix at 54-55.
171. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092.
172. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13 (Supp. 1985).





each of the murder charges, and to 500 years in prison on each of the lesser
offenses. 1
76
After the Oklahoma state courts affirmed Ake's convictions, rejecting
his constitutional plea that he was entitled to an expert witness "as incident
to his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and availability
of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses,"' 177 and surmising that per-
haps the interposition of the defense of insanity possibly fostered his mute
behavior at trial,178 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 179
The Supreme Court then reversed, 180 holding that "when a defendant
has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense iS
likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State
provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant
cannot otherwise afford one." 181
After disposing of a collateral procedural issue,182 the Court, per Justice
Marshall, 183 reviewed prior decisions which held that the state "must take
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his de-
fense,"1 84 noting that the due process clause's "fundamental fairness" guar-
antee bars the denial to a defendant of "the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake."' 85
After employing a Mathews v. Eldridge186 balancing test, the Court found




177. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). The state court found that there was
no responsibility upon the state to provide such services to an indigent accused facing the death
penalty. Id.
178. Id. at 7 n.4.
179. Ake v. Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984).
180. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092.
181. Id.
182. The Court rejected the state's claim that defendant had waived his claim-on the theory
that he had not repeated his request for expert assistance in his new trial motion filed below as was
required by state law, see Ake, 663 P.2d at 6, citing Hawkins v. State, 569 P.2d 490 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1977)-reasoning that, since the error in question was a "fundamental" one (Ake, 105 S. Ct. at
1092), the state law prong was not independent of federal law, and jurisdiction was thus not "pre-
cluded," id. at 1093.
At least one commentator has seen this aspect of Ake as a significant exception to the proce-
dural default rule of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), if under a specific state's law, funda-
mental error negates procedural default-see, eg., Buchanan v. State, 523 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1974) (under Oklahoma law, violation of constitutional right constitutes fundamental
error)-and federal constitutional error is deemed "fundamental error." Note, Ake v. Oklahoma:
The New "Fundamental Error" Exception to Wainwright v. Sykes, [1985] B.Y.U. L. REv. 559, 570.
For a discussion of Sykes, see infra note 338.
Sykes is not cited in any of the Ake opinions.
183. Justice Marshall's wrote on behalf of himself and six others; the Chief Justice concurred,
and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
184. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1093.
185. Id.
"Meaningful access to justice," id. at 1094-the theme of earlier cases-means more than"mere access to the courthouse door"; a criminal trial is "fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral
to the building of an effective defense." Id.
186. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
187. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
First, in assessing the relevant factors to be considered in such a due process inquiry, the Court
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The Court thus set out what it perceived as the role of the psychia-
trist18 8 in such cases:
Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they be-
lieve might be relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists
can identify the "elusive and often deceptive" symptoms of insanity,
and tell the jury why their observations are relevant. Further, where
permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can translate a medical
diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of fact, and therefore
offer evidence in a form that has meaning for the task at hand.
Through this process of investigation, interpretation and testimony,
psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors, who generally have no training in
psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated determination
about the medical condition of the defendant at the time of the
offense. 189
When jurors determine such issues as responsibility and future danger-
ousness, "the testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and 'a virtual neces-
sity if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success.'"190 The Court
concluded "inexorably" 191 that, without the assistance of a psychiatrist to
conduct a professional examination on relevant issues, "to help determine
whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of
an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high."'192 With access
to such information, however, the defendant should be "fairly able to present
at least enough information to the jury in a meaningful manner, as to permit
it to make a sensible determination."'' 93
Finally, the Court held that if the defendant were to make an "ex parte
threshold showing... that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his
defense,"' 194 the state must assure him access to a "competent psychiatrist
found the private interest in accuracy of the criminal proceeding to be "almost uniquely compel-
ling." Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094. Second, it foresaw minimal burden to the states as over 40 states and
the federal government (see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1985)), had already made such services available.
Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094-95, and id. nn.4-6. Third, other than economy, the Court could not point to
any significant countervailing state interest. Id. at 1095.
The Court focused on the "pivotal role" of psychiatry in criminal proceedings, as a reflection of
the reality that "when the State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial
to the defendant's ability to marshall his defense." Id.
188. [P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional examination, interviews, and
elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gath-
ered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the defendant's mental condition, and
about the effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the de-
fendant's mental condition might have affected his behavior at the time in question. They
know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to inter-
pret their answers.
Id. at 1095 (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 1095-96.
190. Id. at 1096, quoting, in part, Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert-Some
Comments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 LAW &
PSYCHOLOGY REV. 99, 113-14 (1976).
191. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
192. Id. See generally Note, supra note 77, at 1080.
193. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
194. Id. at 1097.
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who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the evaluation,
preparation and presentation of the defense.'
195
Similarly, a defendant has a right of access to a psychiatrist for assist-
ance in the preparation of the sentencing phase so as to rebut the prosecu-
tion's testimony as to future dangerousness. 196 The Court's prior holding in
Barefoot, it reasoned, was premised in part on the assumption that the
factfinder would have the views of both the prosecutor's psychiatrist and
opposing doctors, and would therefore be competent to "'uncover, recog-
nize, and take due account of. . . shortcomings' in predictions on this
point."' 197 Since, on the facts of the case before it, the Court found it
"clear"'198 that the defendant's mental state at the time of his offense "was a
substantial factor in his defense"' 99 and that his future dangerousness was a
"significant factor" at the sentencing phase,200 it reversed and remanded for
a new trial.201
(B) Privilege against self-incrimination and interplay between Miranda
and mental disability
The Supreme Court's decisions involving mentally disabled criminal de-
fendants and the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination 20 2 have fo-
cused on three unrelated questions: 1) the privilege's applicability to
statements made to psychiatrists in the course of court-ordered pretrial eval-
uations of criminal defendants,20 3 2) its applicability to statements made to
police officers in the course of police arrest and/or investigation proce-
dures,2°4 and 3) its applicability vel non to proceedings involving allegedly
mentally ill individuals facing commitment following proceedings brought
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id., quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899. See, for a prescient post-Barefoot, pre-Ake analysis
of this issue, Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 160-65 (1984).
Professor Dix has predicted that, as a result of this aspect of the Ake holding, "the availability
of capital sentencing diminished responsibility is likely to attract increasing attention and will there-
fore assume increasing importance in American capital litigation." Dix, Psychological Abnormality
and Capital Sentencing: The New Diminished Responsibility, 7 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 267
(1984).
The Court also finally disposed of its prior holding in Baldi, pointing out (1) the defendant in
that case had been examined by neutral psychiatrists, and (2) that decision predated the "extraordi-
narily enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today," as well as the court's recognition of cer-
tain elemental constitutional rights . . . [signalling] our increased commitment to assuring
meaningful access to the judicial process," Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1098.
198. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1098.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1099.
201. Id.
Chief Justice Burger concurred, suggesting that nothing in the majority's opinion could be read
to extend to non-capital cases, id. at 1099 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See Note, An Indigent's Consti-
tutional Right to Expert Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957, 973 (1985) (pre-
dicting that most states will follow the Chief Justice's limitation suggestion).
Justice Rehnquist dissented, criticizing the majority for announcing a "far too broad" constitu-
tional rule, Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1099 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and indicating that he would limit any
entitlement to "an independent psychiatric evaluation, and not a defense consultant," id. at 1101-02.
202. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
203. E.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1982).
204. E.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
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under state sex offender statutes.205 Yet another decision is expected later
this term on the question of the impact of severe mental disability on Mi-
randa waivers. 20 6 Different sets of interests, principles and precedents are
relevant to each of these sets of cases, and these differences are of some sig-
nificance in attempting to analyze and harmonize the court's decisions.
(1) Estelle v. Smith207
Ernest Smith was indicted for murder stemming from his participation
in the armed robbery of a grocery store during which a cashier was fatally
shot by Smith's accomplice.208 The trial court then ordered the state to ar-
range a psychiatric evaluation 20 9 to determine Smith's competency to stand
trial,21o even though defense counsel had raised neither Smith's competency
to stand trial nor his sanity at the time of the offense as an issue.211 Dr.
205. E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986). Cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
206. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986). In a decision reached after this Article was
written the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the defendant's mental state would not
affect the question of a waiver of Miranda rights. In reversing the Colorado Supreme Court (People
v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985)) the Court held that coercive policy activity was a necessary
predicate to a finding that a confession was not voluntary. The Court also held that the defendant's
state of mind, which went to the issue of "free-will" and voluntariness, was not the proper measure
of the validity of a waiver of fifth amendment protections.
In Connelly, the defendant, a chronic paranoid schizophrenic with a significant history of psy-
chiatric hospitalizations, confessed to a murder in response to auditory hallucinations. Unrefuted
psychiatric testimony attested that the defendant's "command" hallucinations, described as the
"voice of God," usurped his ability to make free and rational choices. Following "God's com-
mand," the defendant had travelled from Boston to Denver where he confronted a uniformed police
officer with his confession; as part of the hallucination, "God" had commanded that he either con-
fess or kill himself.
See also, eg., State v. Perry, 508 A.2d 683, 688 (R.I. 1986) (defendant who seeks to suppress
statements made to police on grounds that he was functionally unable to understand the Miranda
warnings by reason of retardation or mental illness or incapacity should, in most instances, be re-
ferred for a competency examination prior to the determination of the motion to suppress a state-
ment). On the special issues raised in cases involving mentally retarded defendants, see Ellis &
Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 414 (1985).
207. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
208. 451 U.S. at 456. After Smith held a gun on the cashier, saying "This is a holdup," the
cashier moved suddenly, and Smith yelled to his confederate either "Get him, Howie," or "Look out
Howie." After the latter fatally shot the cashier, the two then took the money from the register and
departed. Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.
694), aff'd 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
209. By Dr. Grigson, the same doctor who testified for the state in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880 (1983). See supra note 44; see generally Expert Predictions, supra note 44, at 42-46. For a list of
other similar cases in which Dr. Grigson testified on behalf of the state, see Smith, 445 F. Supp. at
653 n.7; see generally Ewing, supra note 44, at 410 (as of 1983, Dr. Grigson had testified in 70 cases
in all of which but one the jury returned the death penalty); Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 708
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Grigson had testified in 120 capital murder cases, always in the affirmative
on the question of future dangerousness).
See also Dix I, supra note 44, at 172 (Grigson stood on the "brink of quackery"); Note, supra
note 79, at 1029.
Extensive excerpts from Dr. Grigson's testimony in Estelle are found in Dix I, supra note 44, at
155-65.
210. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57.
211. Id. at 457 n.1. Explained the trial judge:
In all cases where the State has sought the death penalty, I have ordered a mental
evaluation of the defendant to determine his competency to stand trial. I have done this for
my own benefit because I do not intend to be a participant in a case where the defendant
receives the death penalty and his mental competency remains in doubt.
Id.
At the habeas hearing, the district court judge noted that this practice "cannot be faulted in the
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Grigson examined the defendant, concluded that he was competent, and, in
his letter to the court, added that it was also his opinion that the defendant
"knew right from wrong. '2 12 "Inexplicably," 2 13 defense counsel was never
notified that this examination was to take place.
After the jury convicted Smith of murder,214 the State called Dr. Grig-
son to testify at the penalty hearing.2 15 Following voir dire,216 he testified:
(a) that Smith "is a very severe sociopath"; that his sociopathic
least," given the court's "authority to protect the integrity of the judicial system by making certain
only mentally competent defendants stand trial." Smith, 445 F. Supp. at 651.
212. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457.
213. Smith, 445 F. Supp. at 651.
214. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457.
215. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, see TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071
(Vernon 1981), the state rested, subject to the "right to reopen." Estelle, 451 U.S. at 458. Defense
counsel then called lay witnesses to testify (as to defendant's character and to his preexisting knowl-
edge that the gun he wielded had a mechanical defect, and was thus inoperable). Id.
Defense counsel was aware by this time that Dr. Grigson had submitted a psychiatric report
finding Smith competent and characterizing him as a "severe sociopath." Id. at 458-59. The report,
however, made no other reference to Smith's future dangerousness. Id. at 459.
Professor Dix has noted the "special problems" which arise when a defendant is diagnosed as a
"sociopath" or "psychopath", since there is no agreement within the psychiatric profession as to
term's meaning. Expert Prediction, supra note 44, at 44 n.219. Subsequently, the American Psychi-
atric Association's Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process has recom-
mended that the diagnosis not be used "to justify or support predictions of future conduct."
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 932 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N, DRAFT RE-
PORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS 30 (1983).
As early as 1930, it was suggested that the diagnosis of "psychopathic personality" was a
"waste basket category," Bursten, What ifAntisocial Personality is an Illness? 10 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 97, 98 (1982) [hereinafter Bursten I], quoting Partridge, Current Conceptions of
Psychopathic Personality, 10 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 53 (1930). The confusion that has surrounded the
use of this diagnosis has never fully abated; see generally B. BURSTEN, BEYOND PSYCHIATRIC Ex-
PERTISE 23-26 (1984) [hereinafter Bursten II]; J. ROBiTSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 169-
70 (1980). In a well-publicized series of cases in the mid-to-late 1950's--characterized by Bursten as
a "fiasco," see Bursten II, supra, at 25-the administrative staff at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Wash-
ington, D.C., declared, as a matter of "administrative fiat" (Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597,
611 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J., dissenting)), first, that persons with sociopathic personalities would
be considered to be without mental disorder, and then, three years later, that the condition was a
mental disorder, (Bursten I, supra, at 98) a decision which turned out to have an "enormous legal
consequence," (Campbell, 307 F.2d at 611) (emphasis in original) when individuals with such a
diagnosis pled the insanity defense in the District of Columbia, since the disposition of such cases in
that jurisdiction were controlled by the "product test" of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954). See, e.g., Blocker v. United States,a 274 F.2d 572, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
The clinical literature on the treatment of sociopathy continues unabated, with researchers con-
sidering the effects of such radical interventions as castration, (Sturup, The Treatment of Criminal
Psychopaths at Herstedvester, 25 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOLOGY 31 (1952)) and psychosurgery,
(Narabyashi, Stereotaxic Operations for Behavior Disorders, 5 PROGRESS IN NEUROL. SURG. 113
(1973)), such controversial interventions as the pharmacologically reduced induction of male hor-
mones (Persky, Smith & Basu, Relation of Psychologic Measures ofAggression and Hostility to Testos-
terone Production in Man, 33 PSYCHOSOMAT. MED. 265 (1971)), and such commonly-used therapies
as psychotropic medication (Dale, Lithium Therapy in Aggressive Mentally Subnormal Patients, 137
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 469 (1980)), and behavior modification (Brown & Gutsch, CognitionsAssoci-
ated With a Delay of Gratification Task-. A Study With Psychopaths and Normal Prisoners, 12 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 453 (1985)). The most recent literature suggests that violent psychopathic behavior
is associated with the organic malfunction of the left temporal brain lobe. Weller, Medical Concepts
in Psychopathy and Violence, 26 MED. Sci. & L. 131 (1986); accord, Mungas, An EmpiricalAnalysis
of Specific Syndromes of Violent Behavior, 171 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISORDERS 354 (1983).
216. At the hearing, Grigson stated that a) he had not obtained permission from defense counsel
to examine Smith, b) he discussed his diagnosis and conclusion with the state's attorney, and c) the
prosecutor had given him approximately five days notice prior to the hearing. Estelle, 451 U.S. at
458. Defendant's motion to exclude (based on the grounds that Dr. Grigson's name was not on the
state's witness list) was denied. Id.
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condition will "only get worse"; (d) that he has no "regard for another
human being's property or for their life, regardless of who it may be";
(e) that "[t]here is no treatment, no medicine that in any way at all
modifies or changes this behavior"; (f) that he is "going to go ahead
and commit other similar or same criminal acts if given the opportu-
nity to do so"; and (g) that he "has no remorse or sorrow for what he
had done."
'2 17
After answering the requisite questions218 in the affirmative, the jury re-
turned the "mandatory" 2 19 death penalty.
After Smith's conviction and sentence were affirmed in the state
courts, 220 and his application for state post-conviction relief was denied,
2 21
Smith petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court.222 That court
vacated his death sentence,223 finding that it was constitutional error to ad-
mit Dr. Grigson's testimony at the penalty phase.2 24 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, 225 holding that the "devastating" consequences of the "surprise" use
of Dr. Grigson as a penalty phase witness denied Smith due process.
226
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 227 and affirmed. 228 Speaking for
the majority, the Chief Justice turned first to the fifth amendment question
of whether Dr. Grigson's testimony violated Smith's privilege against self-
incrimination,2 29 and rejected the state's contention of inapplicability on the
217. Id. at 459-60.
On cross-examination, Dr. Grigson testified, inter alia, 1) that it is not known what causes a
person to be a sociopath, 2) that he did not speak to any of Smith's relatives or friends (except the
other defendant charged with the same crime), 3) that the was "certain" Smith was a "severe soci-
opath," and 4) this diagnosis was based on Smith's "failure to show any guilt feelings or remorse"
with respect to the underlying offense. Smith, 445 F. Supp. at 653.
218. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(1)-(3) (Vernon 1981).
219. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 460.
220. Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977).
221. Smith, 445 F. Supp. at 654.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 658.
The failure 1) to advise Smith to remain silent at the pretrial psychiatric examination and 2) to
notify defense counsel that Dr. Grigson would testify violated Smith's fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights to due process and privilege against self-incrimination, his sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel, and his eighth amendment right to present complete evidence of miti-
gating circumstances in a death penalty case. Id. at 664.
225. Smith, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
226. Id. at 699.
Also, the court found that, under the fifth and sixth amendments, "Texas may not use evidence
based on a psychiatric examination of the defendant unless the defendant was warned, before the
examination, that he had a right to remain silent; was allowed to terminate the examination when he
wished; and was assisted by counsel in deciding whether to submit to the examination." Id. at 709.
227. 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
228. The Chief Justice was joined by five of his colleagues in the majority opinion, although one
of the justices, Justice Marshall, declined to join in that aspect of the opinion which implied that
there were circumstances under which the death penalty might ever be constitutionally imposed,
Estelle, 454 U.S. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part); see also, id. (separate statement of Bren-
nan, J., adhering to similar position). Justices Stewart and Powell concurred in a brief statement,
and Justice Rehnquist concurred as well, id. at 474-76; see infra text accompanying notes 251-55.
229. This argument was based on the theory that Smith was not advised prior to the pretrial
psychiatric examination that he could remain silent and that any statement made could be used
against him at a sentencing proceeding. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 461.
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theory that Dr. Grigson's testimony went to punishment, not to guilt.230
The fifth amendment, the Court found, extended to "any criminal case"
231
and forbade the state from producing evidence "to convict andpunish'232 an
individual "by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.
'23 3
Because the privilege's availability turns on "the exposure it invites,
'234
just as it prevents a defendant from being made "the deluded instrument of
his own conviction, '235 so does it protect him as well "from being made the
'deluded instrument' of his own execution. '2 36 There was thus "no basis to
distinguish" between the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial for Fifth
Amendment privilege purposes, '237 given the "gravity of the decision to be
made at the penalty phase."
238
Focusing specifically on the Miranda issue, the Court then ruled that
that case applied "with no less force to the pretrial psychiatric examination
at issue here."'2 39 When Dr. Grigson went beyond "simply reporting to the
court on the issue of competency" and instead testified for the prosecution,
"his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent of the State
recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting,
'
"240
thus violating the defendant's fifth amendment rights.24 1 Stressed the Court:
"a criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor at-
tempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to re-
230. Id. at 462.
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id. (emphasis in original).
233. Id., quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961) (opinion announcing
judgment); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); E. GRISWOLD, THE
FIrH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955). See United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 431 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applying Estelle where psychiatrist recounted "statements rather than just medical conclusions").
234. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 462, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967). But see Allen v. Illinois,
106 S. Ct. 2988, 2994 (1986), suggesting that Gault may no longer be good law on this sort of
inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 440-46.
235. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 462, quoting Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581, quoting 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 595 (8th ed. 1824).
236. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 462.
237. Id. at 462-63.
238. Id. at 463.
The Court also rejected the state's argument that Smith's communications to Dr. Grigson were
"nontestimonial in nature," drawing on prior doctrine that had so found in cases dealing with voice
exemplars, eg., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); blood samples, e.g., Schmerber v. Cali.
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); handwriting exemplars, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
and lineups, eg., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Grigson's diagnosis was not based
solely on observations, it reasoned, but on Smith's "account of the crime" and his perceptions of
Smith's "lack of remorse." Estelle, 454 U.S. at 464; see also, id. n.9 (Grigson's explanation of his
findings).
The mere fact that the statements were uttered in the context of a pretrial psychiatric examina-
tion did not remove them from the privilege's protection, the Court found, where the state used the
results of the inquiry for "a much broader objective that was plainly adverse" to the defendant, id. at
465. The interview could thus not be classified as a "routine competency examination," nor was it
analogous to a sanity examination following on the heels of the entry of an NGRI plea by a defend-
ant, id. See, eg., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S.
855 (1976) (permissible to compel defendant to submit to state-conducted sanity examination after
defendant enters such a plea). The state's use of the defendant's statements---"unwittingly made
without an awareness that he was assisting the State's efforts to obtain the death penalty"-thus
implicated the fifth amendment, Estelle, 454 U.S. at 466.
239. Id. at 467.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 468.
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spond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital
sentencing proceeding."
242
In addition, the defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel was also violated by the State's failure to notify Smith's lawyer of the
pretrial psychiatric examination. 24 3 Defendant's right "clearly had at-
tached" when Dr. Grigson examined him, and the interview was thus a
"critical stage" of the proceedings. 244 As the evaluation was a "life or death
matter,"2 45 the defendant should not have been forced to resolve such an
important issue without "the guiding hand of counsel.
'2 46
This ruling, the Court added, "will not prevent the State in capital cases
from proving the defendant's future dangerousness as required by stat-
ute." a24 7 The Court noted that that inquiry "is in no sense confined to the
province of psychiatric experts.12 48 It added, in a sentence which in no way
hinted at its ultimate disposition two years later of the Barefoot case:
"[i]ndeed, some in the psychiatric community are of the view that clinical
predictions as to whether a person would or would not commit violent acts
in the future are 'fundamentally of very low reliability' and that psychiatrists
possess no special qualifications for making such forecasts.
'2 49
Justices Brennan and Marshall filed brief separate statements, adhering
to their position that the death penalty was in all aspects unconstitutional.
250
Justice Stewart also concurred, indicating he would limit the decision to the
242. Id. The Court added, however, that it was not holding that the same fifth amendment
concerns were necessarily presented by "all types of interviews and examinations that might be or-
dered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination." Id. at 469 n.13.
243. Id. at 469-71.
244. Id. at 470; see, eg., Coleman v. Alabama, 499 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (plurality opinion).
The Court noted that defendant did not assert a right to have counsel present during the exami-
nation, noting that the Fifth Circuit had observed that "an attorney present during the psychiatric
interview could contribute little and might seriously disrupt the examination." Estelle, 454 U.S. at
470 n.14, quoting Smith, 602 F.2d at 708. Cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated and remanded 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
(although privilege applies in civil commitment context, "the safeguards of the privilege may be
obtained without the presence of counsel at the psychiatric interview"). But see Allen v. Illinois, 106
S. Ct. 2988 (1986), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 406-56.
245. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 471, quoting Smith, 602 F.2d at 708.
246. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 471, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
247. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 472. Justice Marshall declined to join in this portion of the opinion. Id.
at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 472. Ironically, one of the three sources cited by the Court on this point-REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIO-
LENT INDIVIDUAL (1974)-was cited in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920-23
(see also supra text accompanying notes 69-79) in support of the position that the quoted sentence
appears to urge: that psychiatric expertise in long-term dangerousness prediction is inadequate to
allow such testimony. Justice Blackmun similarly relied on an updating of a second source: the
American Psychiatric Association's (APA) amicus brief. See also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 378-80 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on an update of the APA's brief).
After concluding that psychiatrists lack special qualifications, the Court continued by explain-
ing that, while its decision in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), upholding the constitutionality of
the Texas statute in no way disapproved of the use of psychiatric testimony on the issue of future
dangerousness, its holding "was guided by recognition that the inquiry mandated by Texas law does
not require resort to medical experts." Estelle, 454 U.S. at 473.
The Court declined to reach the question of whether the failure to give defendant advance
notice of Dr. Grigson's appearance as a trial witness violated the due process clause. Id. n.17.
250. Id. at 474 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
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grounds that the sixth amendment mandated notice to Smith's lawyer prior
to the interview in question.
25 1
Justice Rehnquist also concurred, agreeing sub silentio with Justice
Stewart that defendant's sixth amendment rights were so violated. 25 2 He
added that, while he did not feel it was necessary to consider the other issues
in order to decide the case, that he was "not convinced that any Fifth
Amendment rights were implicated by Dr. Grigson's examination of [de-
fendant].1 253 Even if such rights were implicated, however, the defendant
"never invoked these rights when confronted with Dr. Grigson's ques-
tions."' 254 Justice Rehnquist concluded:
The Miranda requirements were certainly not designed by this
Court with psychiatric examinations in mind. [Defendant] was simply
not in the inherently coercive situation considered in Miranda. He had
already been indicted and counsel had been appointed to represent
him. No claim is raised that [defendant's] answers to Dr. Grigson's
questions were "involuntary" in the normal sense of the word. Unlike
the police officers in Miranda, Dr. Grigson was not questioning re-
spondent in order to ascertain his guilt or innocence. Particularly
since it's not necessary to decide this case, I would not extend the Mi-
randa requirements to cover psychiatric examinations such as the one
involved here.
255
(2) Wainwright v. Greenfield
256
An entirely different aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination
was before the court in Wainwright v. Greenfield. Focusing on police behav-
ior rather than psychiatric behavior, the case concerned the question of
whether silence in the face of Miranda warnings can be used as evidence of a
defendant's sanity.
257
a. Silence and Miranda
A decade ago, the Supreme Court ruled, in Doyle v. Ohio,25 8 that the
use of defendant's silence in the face of the receipt of Miranda warnings (in
an attempt to impeach his exculpatory storm through cross examination)
violated due process.
The Court reasoned that while the Miranda warnings "contain no ex-
press assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit
to any person who receives the warning, '259 and it would thus be "funda-
mentally unfair" to allow the defendant's silence to be used to impeach sub-
sequently offered trial testimony.260 In short, according to Professor Stone,
251. Id. at 474 (Stewart, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 474-75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 475.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 475-76.
256. 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
257. Id. at 636.
258. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
259. Id. at 618.
260. Id. at 617 n.7, 618.
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"it violates due process for the government to inform an individual that he
may do something free of any adverse consequences and then later penalize
him for doing the very thing."
26 1
Post-Doyle Supreme Court cases consistently referred back to Doyle "as
a case where the government has induced silence by implicitly assuring the
defendant that his silence would not be used against him, '262 and then at-
tempted to use his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial.26 3 Such references to Doyle can be found even in those opinions which
chose to distinguish Doyle. The limits on the Doyle doctrine have been made
in cases involving post-conviction, pre-sentencing silence,264 pre-arrest, pre-
custody silence,265 or statements uttered after post-Miranda warnings were
given.
26 6
Two circuits, however, had distinguished Doyle in cases where the gov-
ernment offered defendant's silence as evidence of sanity so as to rebut an
insanity defense. In one case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had rea-
soned that, since the defendant did not choose to testify, "the [police] agent's
testimony had no impeaching purpose. ' 267 In the other case, the Seventh
Circuit held that, given the difficulty of determining insanity the relevance of
the testimony outweighed any potential prejudice, especially in this sort of
case where any "deterrent effect [of suppression of the testimony] is more
tenuous."
268
b. The Greenfield case
In June 1975, David Wayne Greenfield was walking on a wooded path
towards a bench area when he grabbed a passerby, choked her, dragged her
into the woods and forced her to engage in oral sex.2 6 9 Subsequently, he
made several inconsistent statements to the victim, including, "I don't know
why I did this/I know why I did this." 270 After smoking one of the victim's
cigarettes, he located her car keys (which had apparently fallen loose during
the assault), and released her.271
The victim went immediately to police headquarters and described her
assailant. 272 Approximately two hours later an officer came to the beach
area, located the defendant, and arrested him.273 After being given his Mi-
randa warnings, defendant indicated that he wished to speak to a lawyer and
261. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Cr. REv. 99, 144.
262. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982).
263. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1985).
264. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 561 (1980).
265. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1980).
266. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980).
267. United States v. Trujillo, 578 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858
(1978). In addition, the court added that post-arrest silence "may be probative to a claim of in-
sanity." Id.
268. Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983).
The court also took note of what it referred to as psychiatry's inability "to defeat every effort to feign
insanity." Id. See infra note 946.
269. Brief of Petitioner, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986), at 3-6.






further thanked the policeman for giving him the warnings.274
Defendant was charged in Florida state court with the crime of "sexual
battery committed with force likely to cause serious personal injury," 275 and
pled not guilty by reason of insanity.276 As part of the state's case, the
prosecution introduced police testimony indicating the defendant's silence
and request for a lawyer at the time he was given his Miranda warnings.
277
Defendant did not take the stand, but did call two psychiatrists both of
whom testified that defendant demonstrated "classic symptoms of paranoid
schizophrenia," 278 and that he did not know right from wrong (the insanity
test in Florida)279 at the time of the alleged crime. On rebuttal, the state
called a psychiatrist who disagreed sharply with each of the defense psychia-
trists' conclusions.
280
In his summation and over defense counsel's objections, 281 the prosecu-
tor focused sharply on defendant's behavior after apprehension:
This is supposedly an insane person under the [throes] of an acute
condition of schizophrenia paranoia at the time. He goes to the car
and the officer reads him his [Miranda] rights. Does he say he doesn't
understand them? Does he say, "What's going on?" No. He says, "I
understand my rights. I do not want to speak to you. I want to speak
to an attorney." Again an occasion of a person who knows what's
going on around his surroundings, and knows the consequences of his
acts.... [Later, defendant] said "I appreciate that, thanks a lot for
telling me that." And here we are to believe that this person didn't
know what he was doing at the time of the act.... And after [defend-
ant] talked to the attorney again he will not speak. Again another
physical overt indication by the defendant.... So here again we must
take this in consideration as to his guilt or innocence, in regards to
sanity or insanity.2 82
The jury found defendant guilty and sentenced him to life imprison-
ment.283 After his motion for a new trial or acquittal N.O.V. (based on the
prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence) was denied, 284 defendant
appealed to the state courts which affirmed his conviction. 285 He then filed a
274. At trial, the arresting officer testified Greenfield said: "I appreciate that, thanks a lot for
telling me that." Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 636-37 n.2.
275. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West Supp. 1986).
276. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 636.
277. Id. At this time, defendant made no objection to the testimony. Id. at 637.
278. Brief of Respondent, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986), at 12-13 n.5 [herein-
after Greenfield Respondent's Brief].
279. See Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919).
280. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 636. That psychiatrist, who found that defendant was not a para-
noid schizophrenic, conducted his examination while the defendant was "under the influence of
Thorazine" (see supra note 160), a drug which, he testified, made defendant's symptoms "worse
rather than better." Greenfield v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 329, 331 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
281. Id.
282. Greenfield, 741 F.2d at 331.
283. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 636-37.
284. Greenfield, 741 F.2d at 331-32.
285. After the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed (Greenfield v. State, 337 So. 2d 1021
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)), the state Supreme Court remanded to that court for further considera-
tion in light of its intervening decision in Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978), holding that,
while a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's silence was not "fundamental error," it was "consti-
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,28 6 which was
denied.
28 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, 28 8 holding that (1) defend-
ant's failure to contemporaneously object to the key testimony did not pre-
clude his right to seek appellate review (in light of his strenuous objections to
the prosecutor's summation on that point),289 and (2) defendant's post-Mi-
randa silence was inadmissible as substantive evidence to rebut his insanity
defense.
290
Relying primarily on Doyle v. Ohio,29 1 the court first found that defend-
ant's silence was not prohibitive of sanity.292 The court also found that be-
cause defendant did not testify (but, rather, raised the defense through
expert testimony), the testimony as to silence was not admissible as a rebut-
tal of perjury.293 "Petitioner's assertion of insanity, through psychiatric tes-
timony, made no reference to his conduct at the time of the arrest, did not
constitute perjury, and therefore did not open the door to the prosecutor's
use of post-Miranda silence as permitted by Doyle." 294 The state sought,
and was granted, certiorari.
295
Writing for a seven justice majority296 Justice Stevens drew on a line of
cases traced to Doyle.297 Based on these cases the Greenfield court held that,
tutional error" (thus requiring a contemporaneous objection at trial to preserve the issue for appeal).
Greenfield v. State, 364 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1978). On remand, the District Court of Appeal reaffirmed
its earlier decision.
286. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 637.
287. After hearing evidence regarding the question of whether Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
85-86 (1977)-which precludes habeas consideration of claims not raised at trial or on direct appeal
in accordance with state trial procedures-barred consideration of his claim, the magistrate recom-
mended that the issue not be considered barred (because the state appellate court did reach the
merits), but recommended dismissal on the merits. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 637. The District Court
accepted that recommendation. Id. The Sykes doctrine is dissussed infra note 338.
288. Greenfield, 741 F.2d at 330.
289. Id. at 331 n.1.
290. Id. at 333-34.
291. 426 U.S. 910 (1976).
292. The court stressed the difficulties inherent in interpreting the silence of a mentally disabled
person: "the probative value of a person's post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence in determining
his sanity at the time of the crime will vary markedly with the disease he has, the symptoms he tends
to exhibit, and the closeness in time between the arrest and warning and the crime." 741 F.2d at
333. In this case, it concluded, "the evidence was probative only of petitioner's ability to understand
English and to remain calm, which would [based on the expert testimony before it,] be consistent with
the mental disease of paranoid schizophrenia." Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 334.
294. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit's position disagreed with that taken by two other circuits-see Sulie v.
Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983); United States v. Tru-
jillo, 578 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978)-but was consistent with a
Florida Supreme Court decision rendered after Greenfield exhausted his state remedies, State v.
Burwick, 442 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984).
295. 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
296. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist concurred.
297. See, eg., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231
(1980); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
See supra notes 261-265; see generally Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 638. Justice Stevens first disposed of
the procedural default issue: because the Florida appellate court "clearly addressed the issue on the
merits," the default argument must fall, even where trial counsel failed to make an appropriate
objection at trial. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 637 n.3; see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S.
140, 149 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 n.* (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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in response to Miranda warnings, "silence will carry no penalty, '298 and
that "breaching the implied assurance of the Miranda warnings is an affront
to the fundamental fairness that the Due Process Clause requires. ' 299 The
Court specifically rejected the state's argument that, since "proof of sanity is
significantly different from proof of the commission of the underlying of-
fense," Doyle and its progeny were distinguishable in an insanity defense
case such as Greenfield.
300
The Court found "no warrant" for this "claimed distinction":
30t
The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to
promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him
and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach
his trial testimony. It is equally unfair to breach that promise by using
silence to overcome a defendant's plea of insanity. In both situations,
the state gives warnings to protect constitutional rights and implicitly
promises that any exercise of those rights will not be penalized. In
both situations, the State then seeks to make use of those rights in
obtaining his conviction. The implicit promise, the breach and the
consequent penalty are identical in both situations.
302
Further, the Court rejected the state's argument that a suspect's com-
prehension of Miranda warnings, as evidenced by his silence, "is far more
probative of sanity than of commission of the underlying offenses. '30 3 The
Court characterized the argument as "fail[ing] entirely to meet the problem
of fundamental unfairness that flows from the state's breach of implied as-
surances. ' '3°4 On this point, the Court quoted from an intervening Florida
Supreme Court decision: "[s]ilence in the face of an accusation is an enigma
and should not be determinative of one's mental condition just as it is not
determinative of one's guilt.
'305
Justice Rehnquist concurred, 30 6 arguing that, in his view, only that as-
pect of the prosecutor's summation which commented on defendant's silence
was constitutionally objectionable as a breach of Miranda.30 7 He differed
sharply with the majority on the question of the significance of request for
counsel:
But a request for a lawyer may be highly relevant where the plea
is based on insanity. There is no "insoluble ambiguity" in the request;
it is a perfectly straightforward statement tending to show that an indi-
vidual is able to understand his rights and is not incoherent or obviously
confused or unbalanced. While plainly not conclusive proof of sanity,
the request for a lawyer, like other coherent and responsive statements
298. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 638, quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618-19.
299. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 639.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 639.
303. Id. at 640; on the "psychiatric realities" of the significance of silence in such a context, see
Greenfield Respondent's Brief, supra note 278, at 17-20.
304. Id.
305. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 640 n. 11, quoting Burwick, 442 So. 2d at 948.
306. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 641 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Chief Justice joined in this
concurrence.
307. Id. at 641, 643.
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made near the time of the crime, is certainly relevant."' 8
(3) Smith v. Murray
309
While the constitutional principles which the Court had articulated ini-
tially in Estelle31 ° were philosophically and jurisprudentially important,
311
in practice, they had little direct bearing on the great majority of pretrial
evaluations, which are usually sought either by the defense or by the prose-
cution (in response to an indication by the defendant that he intends to put
his mental state into issue).312 Thus, it appeared that the court's decision to
hear Smith v. Murray would both clarify and elaborate upon the principles
first articulated in Estelle.
Smith posed an important substantive question: when a criminal de-
fendant facing the death penalty seeks a pretrial psychiatric evaluation to
explore the possibility of the insanity defense or potentially to be used in
mitigation of punishment, can the prosecutor use incriminating statements
made by the defendant to the psychiatrist at such an evaluation to prove the
state's "case-in-aggravation" at the sentencing phase?
313
The facts were relatively uncontested: upon being arrested, Michael
Marnell Smith confessed that he sexually assaulted, stabbed, strangled and
drowned a young woman.3 14 Upon being appointed, trial counsel (Pugh)
immediately asked that Smith be examined to determine if he were compe-
tent to stand trial.315 The examiner concluded that he was. 316 Because of
the seriousness of the offense and the possibility of a death sentence, trial
counsel sought more comprehensive psychiatric evaluations, and asked that
defendant be committed to a state hospital for testing, where he was ex-
amined by Dr. Dimitris.
3 17
Dissatisfied with the hospital evaluation, counsel asked the trial court to
appoint a private psychiatrist (Dr. Pile) to evaluate defendant.318 Counsel
had warned the defendant not to discuss the offense with which he had been
charged (or any prior offense) with anyone other than counsel and co-coun-
sel.319 Dr. Pile told defendant nothing about either the purposes of the eval-
308. Id. at 642 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
309. 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 207-55.
311. See infra text accompanying notes 627-42.
312. See White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in Capital
Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943 (1983); Slobogin, supra note 33. See also supra note 45
(on the use of hypotheticals to "end run" Estelle decision).
313. Perlin, Another "Incredible Dilemma:" Psychiatric Assistance and Self-Incrimination,
[1985-1986] ABA PREVIEW, Issue No. 10 (March 14, 1986), at 288.
314. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2663.
315. Brief of Petitioner, Smith v. Sielaff (decided by the Supreme Court sub.nom. Smith v. Mur-




319. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2664.
While Dr. Dimitris warned defendant that anything he said could "be used one day against
[him] in a court of law," Smith Petitioner's Brief, supra note 315, at 5, he nevertheless inquired about
the defendant's criminal behavior, telling defendant it would be "helpful" if he discussed these mat-
ters, defendant complied, id.
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uation or the uses to which the information revealed could be put.320
Specifically, Dr. Pile did not tell defendant that a copy of his report
would be sent to the prosecutor 321 and that it could be used against him at
trial as part of the state's affirmative case.322 This practice conformed with
what was then Virginia law.
323
In his letter to the court and counsel, Dr. Pile reported that the defend-
ant told him that thirteen years earlier, when he had been a teenager, he had
"come close" to raping a girl on a school bus that he had been driving, but
that, after he tore her clothes off "he thought better of it and did not do
so. '' 324 Defendant had never been charged with this crime; neither defense
counsel nor the prosecutor had any knowledge of it prior to Dr. Pile's re-
port.325 Dr. Pile concluded that defendant was a "sociopathic personality;
sexual deviation (rape)."
326
At the sentencing hearing which followed defendant's murder convic-
tion, Dr. Pile was called by the state, and testified about the "school bus
incident," the court overruling defense counsel's objection, on the grounds
that the evidence was relevant and that the witness had examined the de-
fendant at defense counsel's request.327 On cross-examination, defense
counsel asked Dr. Pile for his diagnosis. 328 After the witness stated the diag-
nosis, counsel asked, "What is that?" In response, Dr. Pile said, "They seem
to feel no guilt, and they don't seem to learn from eithei experience or pun-
ishment. They seem to particularly have no feelings or standards of what's
right and what's wrong.
'329
The jury returned a death sentence, 330 finding two statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances: that there was a "probability" that the defendant "would
320. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2664.
321. Smith Petitioner's Brief, supra note 338, at 5.
322. Id.
323. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S.E.2d 845 (1975), but see Gibson v.
Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 439 U.S. 996 (1978), discussed infra note 334.
324. Smith Petitioner's Brief, supra note 315, at 5.
325. Id.
326. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2664.
Although there is no consideration of the possibility in the opinion, the question as to whether
the "school bus incident" ever happened must be broached. According to Dr. Andrew Watson, the
psychological defense of "undoing"-a mechanism in which the individual attempts to neutralize
something "which in his imagination or in reality was done before, and which he feels was objection-
able," A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 126 (1968)-is revealed during the so-called "false
confession." Individuals who employ the unconscious defense mechanism of undoing will "attempt
to get themselves punished to remove their guilt," id. at 127. "They will confess even at the risk of
capitalpunishment. The need for punishment is so great that possible death does not deflect the defen.
sive maneuver." Id. (emphasis added).
Cf. Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1401, 1411 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "At times, it
seems, the judicial mind is in conflict with what behavioral-and theological--specialists have long
recognized as a natural human urge of people to confess wrongdoing. See, e.g., T. RE1K, THE COM-
PULSION TO CONFESS (1959)." Reik's work in this context is discussed in Brief for Amicus Coalition
for The Fundamental Rights and Equality of Ex-Patients, Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515
(1986), at 53 n.51.
327. Smith Petitioner's Brief, supra note 315, at 6.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 7. See supra notes 64, 215.
330. In urging the imposition of the death penalty in his closing argument, the prosecutor relied
on Dr. Pile's description of the school bus incident as well as his diagnosis of defendant. Smith
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 315, at 7-8.
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commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society," and that his conduct in committing the underlying offense
was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved
torture and aggravated battery to the victim."
331
On direct appeal-at which trial counsel did not assign the admission of
Dr. Pile's testimony as error 33 2-- the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.
333
Although the issue was discussed in an amicus brief filed by a law school
clinical program (the Post-Conviction Assistance Project), the court ex-
pressly refused to consider it because it was not raised by either party as an
assignment of error.
334
On state habeas (alleging ineffective assistance of counsel), 335 appellate
counsel called trial counsel (Pugh) to testify. Pugh stated that he did not
assign Dr. Pile's testimony as error because he thought the claim was with-
out merit under Virginia law.3 3 6 He admitted that he had not personally
researched the question of the claim's possible merit under federal law, and
did not know the extent of research his student assistant had performed on
the issue. 337 The trial court found that the claim was forfeited on the
grounds of "procedural default," under Wainwright v. Sykes, 338 rejecting de-
331. Id. at 8.
332. Id.
333. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979).
334. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 139.
Following the submission of trial briefs, but prior to oral argument before the Virginia Supreme
Court in Smith's case, the Fourth Circuit had decided Gibson v. Zahardnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied 439 U.S. 996 (1978) finding that a criminal defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination was violated when the state trial court allowed a state-employed psychiatrist who had
examined the defendant to testify that, during the course of the examination, the defendant had
admitted the commission of the crime, id. at 78.
335. See generally infra note 720; Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 141; Perlin, supra note 9.
336. Smith Petitioner's Brief, supra note 315, at 9.
337. Id.
338. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). One of the most important developments in the Burger Court's juris-
prudence has been the articulation and expansion of the procedural default doctrine-a federal
habeas petitioner who has failed to comply with state procedural rules at trial must show cause for
the procedural default and prejudice resulting from it in order to obtain federal review of the de-
faulted constitutional claim. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. For helpful analyses of pre-Sykes federal habeas
corpus jurisprudence, see Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Ex-
ceptionalRemedy, 23 HASTINGS CONST'L L.Q. 597 n.3 (1985). It is now clear that this applies at the
state appellate stage as well. Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2647-48 (1986).
This doctrine "explicitly rejected" the "deliberate by-pass" doctrine which had been articulated
in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Carrier, 106 S. Ct. at 2644. Under Fay v. Noia a federal
habeas corpus court could refuse to review a defaulted claim only where the defendant had deliber-
ately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts. This standard had been assessed by the
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment" waiver test first enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). After Sykes, at a minimum, absent "extraordinary circumstances," Carrier,
106 S. Ct. at 2644, default by counsel pursuant to trial strategy or tactics would bind the habeas
petitioner even if he did not personally waive the claim. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
Sykes was embellished upon in a trio of subsequent cases. See Note, Procedural Default at the
Appellate Stage and Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 38 STANFORD L. REV. 463, 464 n.5 (1986)
[hereinafter Stanford Note]. In Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982), the court refused to limit
the doctrine to cases "in which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding function of the
trial." See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035, 1093 (1977) ("most constitutional truths do not fit neatly into the category of truth-
furthering or truth-obstructing"). In United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), in extending the
doctrine to cases that involved federal trials, the Court added that the applicant must prove "not
merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual
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fendant's claim that trial counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal was
due to "ignorance or neglect" rather than "informed professional delibera-
tion. '339 Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court denied defendant's petitions for review. 340
Defendant's collateral habeas attack was then dismissed by the District
Court, and that dismissal was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, which ad-
dressed the question of Dr. Pile's testimony without explicitly dealing with
the issue of procedural default.341 Although the Circuit assumed without
deciding that Dr. Pile's testimony was inadmissible, and that it tainted the
jury's finding of future dangerousness, it ruled that the death sentence was
still valid because the testimony did not taint the jury's other finding that the
offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."3 42
The question posed by Smith for the Supreme Court thus appeared to
draw into focus one of the persistent problems of criminal procedure: can a
defendant be forced to give up one right (in this case, the privilege against
self-incrimination) to exercise another right (here, clinical evaluation and
assistance by a trained mental health professional)?3 43 Because the case fol-
lowed so closely on the heels of the Court's decision in Ake, entitling a de-
fendant to such expert help in both consultative and evaluative functions,344
it appeared that the Court was willing to come to grips with the question of
whether this problem created an "incredible dilemma":3 45 forcing a defend-
ant to abandon one constitutional right in order to assert another one.34 6
The Court, however, never reached the merits of the psychiatric issue.
and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension." Id.
at 170. In Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court held that the novelty of an unraised claim
might constitute cause if its "legal base [was] not reasonably available to counsel." Id. at 2910,
The Sykes rule has been criticized by commentators as "too restrictive," Note, supra, at 490
(specifically regarding appellate default), "too stringent," Rosenberg, supra, at 625, "draconian,"
Note, Habeas Corpus-The Supreme Court Defines the Wainwright v. Sykes "Cause" and "Preju-
dice" Standard, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 469 (1983) and as putting habeas corpus "virtually
out of reach of state prisoners" Rosenberg, supra at 627. According to Justice Brennan, as inter-
preted in Engle, Sykes reflects "unvarnished hostility to the assertion of federal constitutional
claims." Engle, 456 U.S. at 137, 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Note, Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 981, 1012 (1982)
(Sykes, though perceived as "harsh," expresses "legitimate concerns"; curbing deliberate use of
habeas corpus to bypass state courts, and promoting state's right to "protect its system of orderly
administration.)"
339. See Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd en banc 754 F.2d 520 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. granted sub. nom. Sielaff v. Carrier, 105 S. Ct. 3523 (1985), rev'd sub. nom. Murray v.
Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986).
In Carrier, the Supreme Court specifically applied the procedural default test where the sub-
stantive claim was inadvertent, in the context of appellate (not trial) error, id. at 2646-2650, But see
Stanford Note, supra note 338 at 465, arguing that the rationales of the "cause" and "prejudice"
tests are inapplicable in appellate procedural default cases, and "too restrictive" in that context, id.
at 490.
340. Smith v. Morris, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
341. Smith v. Procunier, 769 F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1985).
342. Id. at 174.
343. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 313 at 289.
344. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes
151-201.
345. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957).
346. See generally Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the
Forfeiture of Another, 66 IowA L. REV. 741 (1985).
[Vol. 29
MENTALLY DISABLED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Relying strongly on the principles developed in Sykes, 347 the court-per Jus-
tice O'Connor, in a sharply-split 5-4 opinion-ruled that the defendant
failed to demonstrate "cause" for his non-compliance with state proce-
dures.348 This barred consideration of a claim in subsequent proceedings
when that claim was not raised on direct appeal from a criminal convic-
tion.349 The grant of federal habeas corpus would be inappropriate unless
the defendant successfully shows both "cause" for noncompliance with the
state rule and "actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional
violation. ' 35
0
The Court found it unnecessary to reach the prejudice question because
it was "self-evident" that defendant failed to demonstrate cause for the non-
compliance with state procedures evidenced by his failure to include his ob-
jections to Dr. Pile's testimony in his initial appeal.351 The record revealed
that trial counsel "consciously elected not to pursue that claim," making the
kind of "deliberate, tactical decision" which was "the very antithesis of the
kind of circumstance that would warrant excusing a defendant's failure to
adhere to a state's legitimate rules for the fair and orderly disposition of its
criminal cases."
'352
The court similarly dismissed defendant's argument that the default
should be excused because trial counsel made his decision "in ignorance" as
he failed to satisfactorily investigate the validity of the claim. 3 5 3 "[T]he
mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a
claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute
cause for a procedural default. ' 354 The court also rejected the claim that the
"novelty" of the argument excused default;355 the issue in question-while
not definitively resolved-had been "percolating in the lower courts for
years at the time of [Smith's] original appeal, ' 356 and had even been raised
by an amicus before the Virginia Supreme Court.
3 5 7
Finally, the Court examined whether interposition of the procedural de-
fault rule would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."3 58 The
347. See infra text accompanying notes 693-737, for a full discussion of the implications of the
use of Sykes in this context.
348. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2066.
349. Id. at 2665, citing Coppola v. Warden of Virginia State Penitentiary, 222 Va. 369, 282
S.E.2d 10 (1981); Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
350. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2666, quoting Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84; cf. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106
S. Ct. 634, 637-38 (1986).
351. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2666.
352. Id. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2909 (1984):
[D]efense counsel may not make a tactical decision to forgo a procedural opportu-
nity-for instance, to object at trial or to raise an issue on appeal-and then when he
discovers that the tactic has been unsuccessful, pursue an alternative strategy in federal
court. The encouragement of such conduct by a federal court on habeas corpus review
would not only offend generally accepted principles of comity, but would undermine the
accuracy and efficiency of the state judicial systems to the detriment of all concerned. Pro-
cedural defaults of this nature are, therefore inexcusable, and cannot qualify as "cause" for
purposes of federal habeas corpus review.
353. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2666.
354. Id. at 2667, quoting Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2641 (1986).
355. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2667.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).
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Court ruled that it would not; "the alleged constitutional error neither pre-
cluded the development of true facts nor resulted in the admission of false
ones." 359 There was nothing "fundamentally unfair" about enforcing proce-
dural default rules "in cases devoid of any substantial claim that the alleged
error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination.
' 360
Justice Stevens361 dissented. 362 He criticized the majority for failing to
reach the merits of the case,363 which "unquestionably demonstrates that [de-
fendant's] constitutional claim is meritorious, and that there is a significant
risk that he will be put to death 364 because his constitutional rights were
violated."
365
Brushing off trial counsel's "default" as "'harmless' error, '366 Justice
Stevens expressed the "fear that the Court has lost its way in a procedural
maze of its own creation and that it has grossly misevaluated the require-
ments of 'law and justice' that are the federal court's statutory mission
367
under the federal habeas corpus statute.
'368
The dissent characterized the role of the writ of habeas corpus "as the
ultimate protection against fundamental unfairness. '369 This led them to
sharply criticize the majority's "reformulation of the traditional understand-
ing of habeas corpus... premised on the notion that only constitutional
violations which go to guilt or innocence are sufficiently serious to implicate
the [concept of] 'fundamental faimess'. ' 370 Finding that this view was "far
too narrow and . . . conflicts with the nature of our criminal justice sys-
359. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2668.
360. Id.
361. The author of the majority opinion in Greenfield. See supra text accompanying note 296.
362. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2669 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and, on the psychiatric issue, Justice Brennan.
363. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
364. Smith was executed on July 31, 1986. See Baker, Va. Killer Executed As Appeals Fail;
Smith Recites Psalm Before Electrocution, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 1986), at B3 (Metro section).
365. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2669 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original) (Stevens, J,,
dissenting).
366. The issue was raised at trial by counsel, id., and before the Virginia Supreme Court by
"respected amicus," id.
367. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243: "The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice require."
368. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2669-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 2670. Justice Brennan did not join in this portion of the dissent.
370. Id. at 2671, quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982). Justice Stevens continued:
If accuracy is the only value, however, then many of our constitutional protections-
such as the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and the Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, the very claims asserted by peti-
tioner-are not only irrelevant, but possibly counter-productive. Our Constitution, how-
ever, and our decision to adopt an "accusatorial," rather than an "inquisitorial" system of
justice, reflect a different choice. That choice is to afford the individual certain protec-
tions-the right against compelled self-incrimination and the right against cruel and unu-
sual punishment among them-even if those rights do not necessarily implicate the
accuracy of the truth-finding proceedings. Rather, those protections are an aspect of the
fundamental fairness, liberty, and individual dignity that our society affords to all, even
those charged with heinous crimes.
In my opinion, then, the Court's exaltation of accuracy as the only characteristic of
"fundamental fairness" is deeply flawed. Our criminal justice system, and our Constitu-
tion, protect other values in addition to the reliability of the guilt or innocence determina-
tion, and the statutory duty to serve "law and justice" should similarly reflect those values.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tern," 37 1 the dissenters reached the merits of the case.
First, they found that the introduction of defendant's comments to the
court-appointed psychiatrist "clearly violated the Fifth Amendment"
372
under Estelle,373 which made it "absolutely clear" that the introduction of
this evidence by the prosecution at the sentencing stage374-thus making the
defendant the "'deluded instrument of his own conviction' "375-was con-
stitutionally impermissible. 376 Justice Stevens concluded on this point:
Given the historic importance of the Fifth Amendment, and the
fact that the violation of this right makes a significant difference in the
jury's evaluation of petitioner's "future dangerousness" (and conse-
quent death sentence), it is not only proper, but imperative, that the
federal courts entertain petitioner's entirely meritorious argument that
the introduction of the psychiatrist's testimony at his sentencing hear-
ing violated that fundamental protection.
377
Dissenting both in Smith and in Murray v. Carrier,378 a non-psychiatric
case involving a similar procedural default issue,379 Justice Brennan (for
himself and Justice Marshall) argued that, where a defendant's constitu-
tional rights had been violated and that violation "might have affected the
verdict," a federal court should not decline to entertain a habeas petition
"solely out of deference to the State's weak interest in punishing lawyers'
inadvertent failures to comply with State procedures," and that, under
Sykes, "cause" should be deemed to be established "where a procedural de-
fault resulted from counsel's inadvertance.
' 380
371. Id. at 2672; see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.)
("death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country");
cases cited in Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2672 n.l1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 2675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
373. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
374. Id. at 462.
375. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. at 2675, quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581
(1961), quoting 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 595 (8th ed. 1824). Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (citing same references); see supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
376. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2675-76.
377. Id. at 2676 (footnote omitted).
The dissent continued by rejecting the state's argument that the case in question was distin-
guishable from Estelle, because the defendant requested the evaluation:
In view of the fact that Dr. Pile related the account to the prosecution and the court,
and testified for the prosecution, he was quite clearly an "agent for the State" in the same
sense in which the psychiatrist in Estelle was an agent for the State. See 451 U.S. at 467
("When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence
and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's
future dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent for the
State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting").
Id. at 2676 n.23.
On the other hand, the dissent declined to consider the argument urged by defendant and sup-
porting amici that "an absolute guarantee of confidentiality, rather than Miranda warnings should
have been required." Id.
The dissent also would have found that introduction of the evidence in question violated the
defendant's Eighth Amendment right to a fair sentencing proceeding, noting that the introduction of
such "highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence... quite clearly undermines the validity of the capi-
tal sentencing proceeding." Id. at 2626-27.
378. 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986). Justice Brennan's dual dissent in Carrier and Smith is found at 106
S. Ct. 2678 (1986).
379. See supra note 339.
380. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. at 2678, 2682 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1987]
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(4) Illinois v. Allen
a. The privilege against self-incrimination and "'civil" cases: an
overview
There can no longer be any question as to the applicability of the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the criminal trial and, in
capital punishment cases, to the penalty phase of the prosecution as well.
381
On the other hand, one of the sharpest conflicts in caselaw has been found in
cases determining whether or not a patient facing involuntary civil commit-
ment has a right to assert such a privilege,382 either in a pre-trial psychiatric
examination 383 or at trial.384 This issue has been characterized by a com-
mentator as "one of the most troublesome problems in judicial scrutiny of
civil commitment procedures.
'3 85
(1) Cases finding privilege applicable
The lead case finding the privilege applicable is Lessard v. Schmidt.
386
There, a federal district court relied strongly on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in In re Gault387 that a state may not, consonant with due process,
"commit individuals on the basis of their statements to psychiatrists in the
381. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981).
382. See, eg., Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Statements Informing One Under Investi-
gation for Involuntary Commitment of Right to Remain Silent, 23 A.L.R. 4th 563.
383. See infra text accompanying notes 386-95.
384. See, e.g., People v. Nayder, 106 Ill. App. 3d 489, 435 N.E.2d 1317 (1982) (not error-as
violation of patient's constitutional right to counsel-to allow state to call respondent to testify as
adverse party at involuntary civil commitment proceeding).
385. Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guideposts in Civil Commitment Proceedings,
55 NOTRE DAME L. 53, 73 (1979). See generally Griffith & Griffith, The Patient's Right to Protec-
tion Against Self-Incrimination During the Psychiatric Examination, 13 TOLEDO L. REV. 269 (1982).
The issue is one which has traditionally attracted a substantial amount of academic attention.
See, eg., Fielding, Compulsory Psychiatric Examination in Civil Commitment and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 117 (1973); Note, Civil Commitment in Tennes-
see-What Process is Due?, 8 MEMPHIS STATE U.L. REV. 135 (1977); Note, Conservatorship of
Roulet and Cramer v. Tyars: Inconsistency in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings, 68 CALIF.
L. REv. 716 (1980); Note, 61 J. URB. L. 639 (1984); and see articles cited in Tyars v. Finner, 709
F.2d 1274, 1280-81 nn.9-10 (9th Cir. 1983).
386. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1100-1102 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975),
reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The implementation of Lessard has been examined
carefully in Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact ofLessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis.
L. REv. 503.
On the question of the applicability of the physician-patient privilege to involuntary civil com-
mitment proceedings, see eg., Chacko v. State, 630 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), see also Shu-
man & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893 (1982).
387. 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967):
[Tihe availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of
proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or
admission and the exposure which it invites. The privilege may, for example, be claimed in
a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be inculpatory.
[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will,
whether it is called "criminal" or "civil." And our Constitution guarantees that no person
shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation
of liberty-a command which this Court has broadly applied and generously implemented
in accordance with the teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office in man-
kind's battle for freedom.
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absence of a showing that the statements were made with 'knowledge' that
the individual was not obliged to speak.
'388
The district court carefully explained that its use of the term "knowl-
edge" was premised on the presumption that an individual subject to invol-
untary civil commitment was competent, and that, therefore, if his rights
"are explained to him in simple terms, it may be presumed [also] that he has
the requisite knowledge. ' 389 After counsel and the psychiatrist have ex-
plained to the patient that he is to be examined, that his statements may be
the basis for commitment, and that he does not have to participate, the pa-
tient may be examined if he "willingly assents.
390
The court "fortified" its conclusion by medical evidence indicating that
patients "respond more favorably to treatment when they feel they are being
treated fairly and are treated as intelligent, aware, human beings, '391 and
finally distinguished those cases that had rejected the privilege in criminal
trials where the defendant had raised the question of his own mental capac-
ity.392 The reasoning in this decision has been endorsed by some of the
scholarly literature,393 and has been followed both in other constitutional
See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
But see Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20
HARV. J. LEGIs. 275, 342 (1983), characterizing this discussion as focusing on a "metaphysical issue
[that] misses the point."
388. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1101 (footnote omitted).
On the other hand, the court also held that the safeguards of the privilege could be obtained
"without the presence of counsel in the psychiatric interview." Id Cf. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 470 n.14
(no constitutional right to presence of counsel during interview asserted).
389. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1101 n.33.
390. Id. at 1101.
391. Id. at 1101-1002.
392. Id. at 1102. See, eg., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
The Lessard court explained:
The purpose of a civil commitment proceeding is to ascertain if a person's mental state
justifies the state taking away his liberty. The "evidence" obtained in a psychiatric inter-
view goes to the heart of the government's case in the civil proceeding. In a criminal
context, evidence obtained as to mental capacity goes only to a defense. In fact, any real
evidence obtained which relates to the real issue in the proceeding, the defendant's guilt of
the crime charged, is excluded at the subsequent trial.
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1102.
393. See, eg., Note, Application of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to
the Civil Commitment Proceeding, 1973 DUKE L.J. 729, 746-47. See also Aronson, Should the Privi-
lege Against Self-incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55,
93 (1973):
[W]hen commitment is equivalent to criminal incarceration, that is, when it is based
on "dangerousness" and no treatment is given, the privilege against self-incrimination
should apply. However, in other contexts, for example where the defendant has waived the
privilege by raising the insanity defense and producing his own psychiatric testimony, or
where treatment is in fact being given following involuntary civil or postconviction com-
mitment, application of the privilege is not desirable. In such instances, the deprivations
inherent in institutional commitment nonetheless demand that the policies behind the priv-
ilege be protected by providing the defendant with maximum due process safeguards con-
sistent with recognizing the state's interest in meeting its burden of proof. Thus, presence
of defense counsel or psychiatrist at the examination would be desirable if such procedures
would not excessively disrupt the interview. And, at the minimum, the defendant should
be warned that his statements may serve as the basis of his commitment.
See also, Note, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric Examinations: Implications of
Estelle v. Smith, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 275, 303 (1982) [hereinafter Estelle Implications] (recom-
mending application of Estelle to involuntary civil commitment cases).
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challenges, 394 and in a group of cases premised on state statutes similarly
granting the privilege.3
95
(2) Cases finding privilege inapplicable
On the other hand, more courts have found the privilege to be inappli-
cable to involuntary civil commitment proceedings. In the lead case of
French v. Blackburn,396 a federal district court rejected plaintiff's argument
that the privilege was compelled by the fifth amendment: "To apply the
privilege to the type of proceedings here challenged would be to destroy the
valid purposes which they serve as it would make them unworkable and
ineffective. '39
7
The court reasoned that, because the purpose of the North Carolina
involuntary civil commitment statute was "treatment,"398 the granting of
the privilege would frustrate the "legitimate objectives of the legislation"
and "thwart the personal examinations and interviews considered indispen-
sable in determining" whether or not commitment is appropriate.399
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declined to or-
der the privilege applicable, noting that, to grant it would make the proce-
dures too "burdensome [and] cumbersome." 40 More recently, a New York
trial court stressed that, as there is no way to obtain a "fair view of the
patient's mental status without a psychiatric interview," the privilege against
self-incrimination "must give way to ensure that the more fundamental
394. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Suzuki v. Quisenberry,
411 F. Supp. 1113, 1130-32 (D. Haw. 1976); Tyars v. Finner, 518 F. Supp. 502, 509-10 (C.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd on other gds. 709 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1983).
Suzuki elaborated upon the Lessard holding:
We must be clear about what the claim of privilege against self-incrimination means in
this context. It means that the state may not commit an individual on the basis (in whole
or in part) of his statements to examining psychiatrists (or others) in the absence of a
showing that the statements were made voluntarily after the individual was informed of
and understood the purpose of the examination and that he was not obliged to speak. It
does not mean that psychiatrists cannot talk to a patient for purposes of treatment. It does
not mean that evidence cannot be adduced as to the patient's statements in a non-inquisito-
rial setting.
411 F. Supp. at 1131-32 (footnotes omitted).
But see Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 176-78 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed infra at note 401.
395. See, eg., Matter of Collins, 102 Ill. App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 535-36 (1981) (under
"plain" statutory language [ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 911/, 1 3-807 (1986 Supp.)], examining physicians
"must personally inform respondents of his rights") (emphasis in original); Matter of Rizer, 87 I1.
App. 3d, 409 N.E.2d 383, 385-87 (1980); State ex rel. Simanek v. Berry, 597 S.W.2d 718, 720-22
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
See also In re D.B.W., 626 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Okla. 1980) (requirement that counsel inform
patient of his statutory and constitutional rights obviated any need for further warning by mental
health professionals); Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 946 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976) (statements
made to doctor pursuant to court order as aspect of involuntary civil commitment proceeding was
subject to privilege to the extent that statement may not be used to incriminate patient in subsequent
criminal proceedings).
396. 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd 443 U.S. 901 (1977).
397. Id. at 1359.
398. Id. See Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986), discussed infra at text accompanying notes
406-56.
399. French, 411 F. Supp. at 1359, quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1162 (4th Cir.
1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
400. State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974).
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right, in this context, to a full and fair hearing is not compromised. '40 1
These rationales have been applauded in another segment of the schol-
arly journals 4° 2 and in state cases.4° 3 In its draft model civil commitment
statute, the American Psychiatric Association stresses that patients "shall
not have a 'right to remain silent' at a psychiatric examination or hear-
ing," 4° 4 arguing that such a right would be "fundamentally inconsistent with
the therapeutic purposes of the [involuntary civil commitment] process." 40 5
b. The Allen case
4 ° 6
While the Supreme Court had shown some interest in cases involving
sex offender statutes in the late 1960's and early 1970's,4° 7 it had not chosen
401. Ughetto v. Acrish, 130 Misc. 2d 74, 494 N.Y.S.2d 943, 947 (Sup. Ct. 1985). See also Pro-
ject Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
Elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit reversed that aspect of a district court decision which had held
that a Hawaii statute, HAw. REv. STAT. § 334.60(b)(4)(G) (1976), allowing for a five day involun-
tary commitment period in which to evaluate an individual if he refuses to be examined, violated the
privilege. Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, dismiss'g in part
438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Haw. 1977); see also Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw.
1976) (construing predecessor law).
The Court of Appeals noted that "practical considerations," 617 F.2d at 177, warranted
reversal:
If the state may not commit a person absent a medical evaluation, and if the subject
refuses to be examined, then under the district court's ruling, he must be released. Any
subject of a commitment petition could avoid commitment merely by refusing to speak.
We can imagine the case of a belligerent hostile person who is the subject of a petition. He
may be demonstrably dangerous to himself or others. His hostility may extend to examin-
ing physicians, to whom he refuses to speak. Without some means of ealuating his condi-
tion, the purpose of the statute (protecting others from mentally ill persons) would be
defeated. Sound policy reasons demand that this portion of the decision below be reversed.
Id. at 177-78; see also id. at 179-80 (Schroeder, J., concurring in part).
For the circuit court's other policy and constitutional reasons for reversal, see id. at 176-77.
402. See, eg., Stromberg & Stone, supra note 387, at 341-44; Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1312 (1974).
At least one empirical study has concluded that implementation of the privilege in the civil
commitment context has had "little impact on the willingness of involuntarily committed patients to
be evaluated by hospital staff." Miller, Maier & Kaye, Miranda Comes to the Hospital: The Right to
Remain Silent in Civil Commitment, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIARY 1074, 1076 (1985). Cf. Shuman &
Weiner, supra note 386, at 927 (both proponents and opponents of application of physician-patient
privilege to commitment setting have "overstated their cases").
403. Cases are collected in In re Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99, 103 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). See,
eg., State v. O'Neill, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97, 103-04 (1976) (statements not designed to elicit
"incriminating information," but to determine "what urgent medical treatment is necessary for the
individual"); Matter of Mathews, 46 Or. App. 757, 613 P.2d 88, 90-92 (1980); In re Beverly, 342
So.2d 481, 488-89 (Fla. 1977); Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d at 102-05; In re Porter, 98 Ill. App. 3d 869,
424 N.E.2d 952, 954 (1981) (distinguishing Matter of Rizer, 87 Ill. App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531
(1981)); Kraemer v. Mental Health Board, 199 Neb. 784, 261 N.W.2d 626, 632-34 (1978); In re
Winstead, 67 Ohio App. 2d 111, 425 N.E.2d 943, 946-47 (1980) (involuntary civil commitments not
"penal in nature, but humanitarian").
404. Stromberg & Stone, supra note 387, at 341 (Guideline 6.D.6.). The Model Law specifies
further that no patient shall be held civilly or criminally liable for not testifying, id., and that no
information adduced at such an interview or hearing "may be admitted against the patient on the
issue of guilt in a criminal proceeding unless he places his mental condition in issue in such proceed-
ing, and unless the disclosure or opinion is relevant to such an issue raised by him," id.
405. Id. at 342. Such warnings might "bewilder and alarm the patient," and might "make it
impossible to ascertain the patient's mental state, thereby preventing the assessment both of his need
for treatment and his potential dangerousness." Id.
406. Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
407. See supra notes 2, 5.
For a helpful history and survey of such laws, see Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal
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to consider either the substantive or procedural limitations on the use of
such laws4°8 for nearly fifteen years, 4° 9 before it agreed to hear Allen v. Illi-
Law, in S. BRAKEL, PARRY & WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 693, 739-43 (3d
ed. 1985); M. FORST, CIVIL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 17-29 (1978). While more than
half of the states had such laws in the mid 1960's-for general discussions of the early laws, see
Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41
NOTRE DAME L. 527 nn.1-3 (1965) (citing sources)-since 1976, thirteen states have repealed their
laws and another twelve have modified them, leaving only seventeen jurisdictions which retain such
laws; of these, the laws are regularly enforced in only six states. Weiner, supra at 739-40.
The laws have been under attack for years-in 1952, Guttmacher and Weihofen noted "there is
doubtless no subject on which one can obtain more definite opinions and less definite knowledge"
than the sentencing of sex offenders, M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 110 (1952), quoted in Walsh, Differential Sentencing Patterns Among Felony Sex Offenders and
Non-Sex Offenders, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 443 (1984). These attacks have been on a
variety of legal (see, eg., Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ohlinger v.
Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 777-79 (9th Cir. 1981)), and clinical grounds (see, e.g., Monahan & Davis,
Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 326 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman, eds., 1983); Note, supra at 550-55,
with critics noting that sex offenders are not a homogeneous grouping (Weiner, supra at 741; cf.
Baxter, Marshall, Barbaree, Davidson & Malcom, Deviant Sexual Behavior: Differentiating Sex Of-
fenders by Criminal and Personal History, Psychometric Measures and Sexual Response, 11 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 477, 498 (1984) (drawing personality profiles of pedophiles, hebephiles [persons
who seek sexual contact with adolescents], and rapists)), and that the laws were enacted "with few or
no data to support the premise of existence of a broad category of people known as 'sexual psycho-
paths' who can be treated successfully," Weiner, supra at 741. See generally, Dix, Differential
Processing ofAbnormal Sex Offenders: Utilization of California's Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders
Program, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 233, 242-43 (1976).
As with "sociopathy" (see supra note 215), a full range of causes, (see, eg., Rada, Laws, Kell-
ner, Stivastava & Peake, Plasma Androgens in Violent and Nonviolent Sex Offenders, 11 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149, 155-57 (1983) (some relationship found between plasma testosterone
levels and aggressive behavior, but "psychological, social, pathological and organic factors appear to
be much more important than hormone levels in influencing aggressive interactions")), and potential
cures and treatments, including eg., castration (see Note, Castration of the Male Sex Offender: A
Legally Impermissible Act, 30 LOYOLA L. REV. 377 (1984)), group therapy (see Kopetski, Psycho-
therapy for People Who Molest Children, 13 COLO. L. 246 (1984)), behavior modification (see sources
cited in Weiner, supra, at 742 nn.580-81), and pharmacological agents (see Bradford, The Hormonal
Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159 (1983)), have been
suggested and discussed. The use of the drug Depo-Provera has touched offthe most recent flurry of
supportive (see, eg., Comment, Sexual Offenders and the Use of Depo-Provera, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 565, 586 (1985)), critical (see Demsky, The Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Of-
fenders, 5 J. LEG. MED. 295, 321 (1984)), and cautious articles (see Note, Depo-Provera Treatment as
an Alternative to Imprisonment, 23 HOUSTON L. REV. 801, 818-19 (1986)).
Again, as with "sociopathy," see supra note 215, major mental health professional groups have
taken the position that the category of "sexual psychopath" lacks clinical validity and that sexual
psychopathy is thus not a valid psychiatric diagnosis, see GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSY-
CHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30s TO THE 80S, 840 (1977);
consequently, leading professional groups have called for the repeal of such laws, see Weiner, supra,
at 743. Writing recently regarding the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards-which concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that such statutes
should be repealed, (see ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-8.1 (1984), and
Weiner, supra, at 447)-Professor Zenoff concluded, somewhat ruefully: "[I]t is worth noting that
[this particular experiment in predicting dangerousness] lasted for fifty years and could have been
avoided if legislators required some empirical support for the theory before enacting the laws." Ze-
noff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 562, 580-81 (1985). Cf Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-65 n.13 (courts should pay "particular defer-
ence to reasonable legislative judgments").
Nonetheless, courts continue to uphold provisions of such statutes providing lessened proce-
dural due process safeguards and extended commitment periods in the face of constitutional attacks
such as the one successful in Ohlinger. See, e.g., People v. Sherman, 167 Cal. App. 3d 10, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 861, 864 (1985); People v. Kibel, 701 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1985).
408. For recent empirical inquiries into the use of such statutes and the fate of released sex
offenders, see Konecni, Mulcahy & Ebbesen, Prison or Mental Hospital. Factors Affecting the
Processing of Persons Suspected of Being "Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders," in NEW DIRECTIONS
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nois. The question posed in Allen was whether, under Illinois' sex offender
law,410 the privilege against self-incrimination was available to an individual
facing such commitment.
After Terry Allen was indicted for certain sexual crimes,411 the state
filed a petition to have him declared a "sexually dangerous person" in ac-
cordance with state law.412 Pursuant to the act, the trial court ordered the
defendant to submit to two psychiatric examinations. 413 At trial, the state
presented the testimony of the psychiatrists over the defendant's objection
that the statements were elicited from him in violation of his privilege
against self-incrimination. 41 4 The court ruled that while the defendant's
statements were inadmissible, the psychiatrists could express their opinion of
defendant, based on the interviews.
415
Both witnesses testified that the defendant was mentally ill and, in ac-
cordance with the statute, that he had "criminal propensities to commit sex-
ual assault. ' 416 Based upon this testimony (and testimony from the victim
of the underlying sexual assault), the court found that the defendant to be a
sexually dangerous person.
417
The state appellate court reversed, relying on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Estelle41 8 for the proposition that the testimony in question violated
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 419 The state supreme court
reversed and reinstated, finding the privilege inapplicable because the pro-
ceedings were "essentially civil," and because the statute's aim was "treat-
ment, not punishment.
'420
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, per Justice Rehnquist, that the
proceedings in question were essentially civil in nature.421 First, the Court
IN PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH 87 (P. Lipsitt & B. Sales, eds. 1980); Sturgeon & Taylor, Report of a
Five-Year Follow-Up Study of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Released From Atascadero State
Hospital in 1973, 4 CRIM. JUsT. J. 30 (1980).
409. See, eg., Davis v. Connecticut, 190 Conn. 327, 461 A.2d 947 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
350 (1983) (does state sex offenders' statute create "capricious classification" in violation of equal
protection clause); Thrasher v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 147 (1985) (denying certiorari) (application of sex
offenders' statute to defendant sentenced, but not convicted, after act's effective date).
410. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-1.01 to 105-9. (Supp. 1986).
411. Prior to indictment, defendant had been charged by information with the same offenses,
and the state had then filed its initial petition to have him declared sexually dangerous. Allen, 106 S.
Ct. at 2990. Both the information and petition were apparently dismissed, and the defendant was
subsequently indicted on the same charges. Id.
412. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 1105-1.01 (Supp. 1986).
413. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2990.
414. Id. at 2990-91.
415. Id. at 2991.
416. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-1.01 (Supp. 1986).
417. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2991. In accordance with Illinois caselaw, the Court found 1) that
defendant suffered from mental illness for at least one year, 2) that he had propensities to commit
sexual offenses, and 3) that by his actions he had demonstrated such propensities. See People v.
Pembrock, 62 I11. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28, 29-30 (1976).
418. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 207-55.
419. People v. Allen, 123 I1. App. 3d 669, 463 N.E.2d 135 (1984).
420. People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 481 N.E.2d 690, 694, 695 (1985). The court added that the
statutory aim of treatment would be "almost totally thwarted" by the invocation of the privilege, id.
at 696. On the other hand, it ruled that such statements could not be used against the defendant in
any subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. See also e.g., People v. Nayder, 106 Ill. App. 3d 489, 435
N.E.2d 1317 (1982).
421. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2992-93.
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stressed that the privilege was available only in criminal proceedings, 422 or
in other circumstances "where the answers might incriminate [a defendant]
in future criminal proceedings."
423
Next, the Court noted that the Illinois legislature had characterized the
statute as "Civil." '424 While it conceded that the "label" employed was "not
always dispositive," 425 the Court found that defendant failed to show that
the scheme was "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
State's] intention" that it be civil.
426
Although the proceedings in question were accompanied by certain
strict procedural safeguards, including the presence of counsel,427 a jury
trial,428 and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 429 the pro-
ceedings nevertheless remained civil in nature.430 Under the statute, the
state is obliged to provide care and treatment 431 in a facility for psychiatric
care.4 32 When the individual is no longer dangerous, the court shall order
him discharged.433 Although the burden is on the defendant to show he is
no longer dangerous, he may apply for release at any time.434 Under these
circumstances, the Supreme Court found that this emphasis on treatment
"does not appear to promote either of the 'traditional aims of punishment-
retribution and deterrence.' 435
The Court rejected defendant's argument that, despite the "apparently
nonpunitive purposes" of the law, it should still be considered criminal for
purposes of the privilege. 436 It noted that the fact that the state has chosen
not to apply the act to the "larger class of mentally ill persons does not
somehow transform a civil proceeding into a criminal one."'437 The Court
relied in part on its opinion in Addington v. Texas:
438
[T]he initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is very dif-
ferent from the central issue in either a delinquency proceeding or a
criminal prosecution. In the latter cases the basic issue is a straightfor-
422. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
423. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2991-92, quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984), quot-
ing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
424. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-3.01 (Supp. 1986).
425. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2992.
426. Id., quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
427. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 1105-5 (Supp. 1986).
428. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-5 (Supp. 1986).
429. People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill. 2d 524, 168 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1960).
430. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2993.
431. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-8 (Supp. 1986).
432. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-8 (Supp. 1986).
433. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 1105-9 (Supp. 1986).
434. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 1 105-9 (Supp. 1986). Conditional release is also available. Id.
435. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2992, quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martin, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
436. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2992.
Defendant also argued that the act could not be invoked unless criminal charges had been
brought against an individual (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 105-3 (Supp. 1986)), and that, to sustain a
petition, the state must prove the individual committed at least one sexually dangerous criminal act,
Allen, 481 N.E.2d at 697. Such attributes, he suggested, distinguish the case from other civil com-
mitments which are "not typically tied to any criminal charge." Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2993. At oral
argument, the defendant apparently conceded that other civil commitments were not to be consid-
ered "criminal" for purposes of the self-incrimination clause. Id.
437. Id.
438. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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ward factual question--did the accused commit the act alleged? There
may be factual questions to resolve in a commitment proceeding, but
the factual aspects require only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others
and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts
which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.
4 39
The Court brushed aside defendant's reliance on In re Gault440 for the
proposition that, even though the proceedings might be denominated as
"civil," the facility to which individuals are committed under the act-a
maximum security institution run by the state department of correction-
results in "total deprivation of liberty in a criminal setting." 441 First, the
Court characterized Gault's statement that "our Constitution guarantees
that no person shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is
threatened with deprivation of his liberty" 442 as "plainly not good law,"
'443
relying again on Addington to demonstrate "that involuntary commitment
does not trigger the entire range of criminal procedural protections."
444
Second, the Court read Gault as being concerned with the punishment
of juvenile offenders. 445 In Allen, the Court stressed, "the State serves its
purpose by treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by
committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric
care and treatment."
446
Had the defendant shown that sexually dangerous persons were con-
fined under conditions "incompatible with the State's asserted interest in
treatment," or had he shown that the confinement to which they were sub-
jected was "essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need
for psychiatric care," the case "might well be a different" one,44 7 the Court
noted. Nothing in the record before it, however, supported the assertion
that "the conditions of [defendant's] confinement themselves amount to
'punishment' and thus render 'criminal' the proceedings which led to the
confinement." 4
48
439. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2993, quotingAddington, 441 U.S. at 429. The Court relied on a portion
of this same quotation in Barefoot as well. See 463 U.S. at 898.
440. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
441. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2994.
442. Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
443. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2994. It appears that this is the first time that the Court has ever
specifically disapproved of this Gault language. Cf. Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 35-42 (1976)
(distinguishing Gault, and holding that a summary court martial is not a criminal prosecution for
sixth amendment purposes).
444. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2994.
445. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50.
446. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2994 (emphasis in original). The fact that the institution to which
defendant would be committed also housed prisoners from other institutions in need of psychiatric
treatment did not "transform the State's intent to treat into an intent to punish." Id.
See Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution of the Mentally Disordered, 20 LAW & SOC'y REv. 279,
291 (1986) (in 47% of sample of cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants studied,
courts used their criminal authority to mandate treatment only).
447. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2994.
448. Id. at 2995.
The Court concluded by rejecting defendant's due process arguments, and by concluding that
the privilege "has no place among the procedural safeguards discussed in Mathews v. Eldridge,
which are designed to enhance the reliability of [the factfinding] process." Id.
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Dissenting on behalf of four justices, Justice Stevens responded. "When
the criminal law casts so long a shadow on a putatively civil proceeding, I
think it is clear that the procedure must be deemed a 'criminal case' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment." 449
Beyond this, Justice Stevens saw the criminal law as occupying "a cen-
tral role in the sexually dangerous person proceeding.
'450
Thus, the Illinois "sexually dangerous person" proceeding may
only be triggered by a criminal incident; may only be initiated by the
sovereign State's prosecuting authorities; may only be established with
the burden of proof applicable to the criminal law; may only proceed if
a criminal offense is established; and has the consequence of incarcera-
tion in the State's prison system-in this case, Illinois' maximum se-
curity prison at Menard. It seems quite clear to me, in view of the
consequences of conviction and the heavy reliance on the criminal jus-
tice system-for its definition of the prohibited conduct, for the discre-
tion of the prosecutor, for the standard of proof, and for the Director
of Corrections as custodian-that the proceeding must be considered
"criminal" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 45'
Further, Justice Stevens argued that the statute's "benign purpose" of
treatment "is not sufficient, in and of itself, to render inapplicable the Fifth
Amendment, or to prevent a characterization of proceedings as 'crimi-
nal.' "452 If the sexually dangerous person proceeding may escape character-
ization as criminal simply because "a goal is 'treatment,'... nothing would
prevent the State from creating an entire corpus of 'dangerous person' stat-
utes to shadow its criminal code," resulting in the "evisceration of criminal
law and its accompanying protections. '453
Finally, Justice Stevens focused on what he saw as the "role and value"
of the Fifth Amendment,454 by quoting Dean Griswold:
[T]he Fifth Amendment can serve as a constant reminder of the
high standards set by the Founding Fathers, based on their experience
with tyranny. It is an ever-present reminder of our belief in the impor-
tance of the individual, a symbol of our highest aspirations. As such it
is a clear and eloquent expression of our basic opposition to collectiv-
ism, to the unlimited power of the state.455
Justice Stevens concluded by characterizing the court's decision as con-
flicting "with the respect for liberty and individual dignity that has long
449. Id. at 2995, 2996 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
He reasoned that the "impact of an adverse judgment against an individual deemed to be a
sexually dangerous person' is at least as serious as a guilty verdict in a typical criminal trial," noting
that the ensuing commitment-accompanied by a significant stigma-involved a "massive curtail-
ment of liberty" (id., quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)), which might last far
longer "than a mere finding of guilt on an analogous criminal charge," id., citing United States ex
rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976).
450. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2997 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
451. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 2998 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
453. Id. at 2998-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
454. Id. at 2999 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
455. Id. at 2999-3000 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT
TODAY 81 (1955). Note that the majority opinion in Estelle also cited Griswold's treatise. 451 U.S.
at 462.
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characterized, and that continues to characterize, our free society." 456
(C) Execution of the insane
(1) Introduction
Dr. Paul Appelbaum has aptly characterized the question of the consti-
tutional appropriateness of standards and procedures required to determine
whether a death row prisoner is competent to be executed as "one of the
more perplexing issues in criminal justice today. ' 457 In Ford v. Wain-
wright,45 8 the Supreme Court has finally given a partial answer.4 59 Nonethe-
less, the "conundrum" perceived by Dr. Appelbaum still exists.
460
Examination of the Ford opinion in its historical context should reveal some
helpful clues to understanding both the depth of the Supreme Court's true
feelings in this matter, as well as the expected impact of the Ford case.
The issue of executing the insane is one which has plagued the legal
system for centuries. In their seminal study, Professors Hazard and Loui-
sell461 examined arguments made by Blackstone, 462 Hale463 and Coke464
specifically opposing such execution, and looked also at the writings of St.
Thomas Aquinas465 and Shakespeare466 for the religious and cultural roots
of the doctrine.467 In his classic treatise on Insanity and the Criminal Law,
Dr. William White focused over 60 years ago on the "general feeling of ab-
horrence against executing a person who is insane.
468
The Supreme Court had rejected as recently as 1950 the argument that
there was a due process right to a pre-execution judicial sanity determina-
tion.469 That decision predated by twelve years the court's incorporation of
the eighth amendment to be applied to the states,470 and the Court had not
considered the argument again since that time. In short, while the slate was
not a clean one when certiorari was granted in Ford, neither was there much
in the way of binding precedent for the Court to uphold, distinguish or
overrule.
Although the roots of the policy against execution of insane offenders
456. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 3000 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
457. Appelbaum, Competence to be Executed: Another Conundrum for Mental Health Profes-
sionals, 37 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 682 (1986).
458. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
459. See infra note 548.
460. Appelbaum, supra note 457, at 682.
461. Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV.
381 (1962).
462. Id. at 383-84 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 395*-396* (13th ed. 1800)).
463. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 461, at 383 (citing 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35
(1736)).
464. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 461, at 384-85 (citing COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6 (1797)).
465. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 461, at 387 (citing T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, First
Part, Treatise on the Angels, ques. 64, art. 2, objection, reply to second objection; T. AQUINAS,
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, bk. 3, ch. 146).
466. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 461, at 387-88 (citing and quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, HAM-
LET, act III, sc. iii, lines 72-96).
467. See also Ward, supra note 37, at 49-57. Traditional arguments are collected in Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 17-19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
468. W. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 245 (1923) (1981 reprint).
469. Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 12.
470. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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are ancient, 471 according to Professor Zenoff "no consensus exists about the
reasons for it, about the meaning of 'insane' in this context, or the proce-
dures which should be used to determine it.' '472 Another commentator sug-
gests that these "seemingly intractable dilemmas" 473 are no more perplexing
than other problems regularly arising out of the law/psychiatry relationship.
Earlier attempts at prescribing appropriate standards474 "have proved inco-
herent because they failed to confront the reality that law and psychiatry
rarely, if ever, exist separately from culture and politics."475
Capital punishment is today "probably a stronger force in American
society than it has been in thirty years."'476 Therefore, it should be no sur-
prise that the "conundrum"4 77 raised by Dr. Appelbaum has begun to,
again, assume greater significance as an issue to be confronted both by foren-
sic psychiatrists and the law. This has become especially important in the
post-Hinckley478 universe. Insanity defense statutes479 had been seen tradi-
471. See supra notes 461-66.
472. Zenoff, Can an Insane Person Be Executed? [1985-1986] ABA PREVIEW, Issue No. 16
(June 27, 1986), at 465, 466. Professor Zenoff has graphically represented the various policy argu-
ments both in support of and in opposition to such a ban:
ARGUMENT
1. The insane are unable to suggest reasons
why the sentence cannot be carried out.
2. Insanity is sufficient punishment for the
crime.
3. The insane cannot make their peace with
God.
4. It is inhumane to take the life of an
offender who became insane after trial and
conviction.
5. Deterrence and retribution are not served
by executing the insane.
Id.
473. Ward, supra note 37, at 100.
474. See, for an overview, id. at 59-68.
475. Id. at 100.
COUNTERARGUMENT
Offenders who were sane at the time of trial
and sentence are unlikely to have any new
information to offer.
It is not recognized as sufficient punishment
because the offender who recovers sanity is
executed.
Assessing the offender's capacity to do so is
difficult in a pluralistic society and presents
first amendment problems.
It is reverse humanitarianism that frees one
from capital punishment only if insane.
The death penalty is a deterrent because the
potential murderer will know that he or she can-
not escape punishment, even if he or she becomes
insane after being sentenced. Retribution is
served if it is regarded as exacting a life for a life.
476. Perlin, supra note 9, at 97; see generally H. BEDEAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
3-95 (3d ed. 1982).
477. Appelbaum, supra note 457, at 682.
478. For pretrial rulings, see United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), opin-
ion clarified and reconsid, denied 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir.
1982). The Hinckley verdict has inspired a cottage industry of commentary. See Perlin, The Things
We Do For Love: John Hinckley's Trial and the Future of the Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts
(book review of L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.
(1984)), 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 857, 859 nn.6-7, 860-61 nn.ll-17 (1985), for a partial listing of
sources; see also Hermann, Assault on the Insanity Defense: Limitations on the Effectiveness and
Effect of the Defense of Insanity, 14 RtrrSRs L.J. 241 (1983); Slovenko, The Insanity Defense in the
Wake of the Hinckley Ruling, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 373 (1983); Perlin, After Hinckley: Old Myths, New
Realities, and the Future of the Insanity Defense, DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, Vol. 5, Lesson 22
(1985).
479. See, for an analysis of the tactical problems confronted by counsel for mentally ill defend-
ants facing the death penalty on the question of whether or not to interpose the insanity defense,
White, supra note 312, at 989-90.
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tionally, albeit incorrectly,480 as "an impenetrable bulwark to prevent execu-
tion of the insane. ' 481  After Hinkley, however, these statutes have
narrowed,482 and some states have even abolished the insanity defense.
483
What can be expected is that more mentally ill offenders484 will be repre-
sented in prison,485 and that a significant number of death row inmates
486
will suffer serious mental disorder.
(2) Psychiatric ethics and capital punishment
The issues involved in psychiatric participation in capital punishment
decision-making 487 raises a series of "intractable" 488 operational problems
for mental health professionals. These problems include: the responsibility
480. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 96 n.31, and see especially, SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 105-08 (1960).
481. Perlin, supra note 9, at 96. See, eg., sources cited at id. nn.27-30. See also C. BLACK,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981); J. CHRIS-
TOPH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITICS, 23 (1962).
The Chief Justice has made it clear that, in his view, the problem of imprisoning and executing
the insane is rooted strictly in the past. See Burger, supra note 10, at 5:
I have little doubt that in times past, especially prior to the mid-1800's, a great many
people were found guilty and condemned either to lengthy imprisonment or even to death
when their wrongful conduct was, by present day standards and knowledge, attributable to
a true lack of recognition of wrong or true lack of capacity to control behavior.
(emphasis added).
482. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (1984).
483. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (1986 Supp.); Mont House Bill 877 (1979). Montana's
abolition of the insanity defense has been upheld in State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984), and
in State v. Raty, 692 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1984).
484. See, for a recent survey, Steadman et at, Mentally Disordered Offenders: A National Survey
of Patients and Facilities, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 31 (1982).
485. See, on the health problems of prisoners, Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The
Search for Constitutional Standards for Prison Health Law?, 63 VA. L. REV. 921 (1977). On the
specific problems of mentally ill prisoners, see George, The American Bar Association's Mental
Health Standards, An Overview, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 338, 371-74 (1985).
486. It has been estimated that "as many as fifty percent of Florida's death row inmates become
intermittently insane." Ward, supra note 37, at 42. See generally, Lewis, Pincus, Feldman, Jackson
& Bard, Psychiatric and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United
States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 (1986) [hereinafter Lewis]; see also, West, Psychiatric Reflections
on the Death Penalty, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 689, 694 (1975).
487. The general ethical issues relating to medical participation in execution by lethal injection
were raised over six years ago by Dr. William Curran and an associate who argued that such involve-
ment, by "intentional, careful, skillful injection of a medically prepared substance into the veins of
the prisoner," seemed to constitute a "grievous expansion of medical condonation of and participa-
tion in capital punishment." Curran & Cascells, The Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital Pun-
ishment by Intravenous Drug Injection, 302 N. ENG. J. MED. 226, 228 (1980). See also, Curran &
Cascells, Strange Bedfellows: Death Penalty and Medicine, 248 J.A.M.A. 518 (1982).
Drawing on declarations of the International Conference for the Abolition of Torture; citing
Final Report, Amnesty International Conference for the Abolition of Torture (Paris, France), Dec.
10-11, 1973); the 29th World Medical Assembly of the World Medical Association (the so-called
Declaration of Tokyo); 22 WORLD MED. J. 87 (1975), the authors concluded that a medical profes-
sional who "orders or prepares a chemical substance to kill a prisoner under sentence of death would
be in direct violation," of these accords. Curran & Cascells, supra at 229. Similarly, they suggested
that it would be ethically improper for physicians to monitor the condemned prisoner's condition
during the drug administration and to carry on this action to pronounce his death when heartbeat
and respiration were found to be absent. Id.
They concluded by urging that medical professionals should "examine seriously the issues
presented by this new method of capital punishment .... The line should be drawn here. The
medical profession in the United States should formally condemn all forms of medical participation
in this method of capital punishment." Id. at 230.
488. Ward, supra note 37, at 100.
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of psychiatrists to appropriately construe the key terms in operative statutes
(such as the Florida law which prohibited execution if the defendant did not
have "the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death pen-
alty"); 489 the assessment of the appropriate standard of proof;490 the reliabil-
ity of diagnosis; 49 1 and the possibility of regression between evaluation and
execution.4 92 Such participation also raises core ethical problems493 which
have not yet been resolved.
Drs. Radelet and Barnard have recently articulated a set of issues to be
considered by psychiatrists in determining the appropriateness of participa-
tion in the competence-to-be-executed process. The first issue involves the
need for vigorous, professional standards to govern the conduct of the exam-
ination, where the "life or death issue makes the question of the validity of
and reliability of psychiatric diagnosis and opinions of more crucial signifi-
cance than in any other area of psychiatric practice. '494 The second issue
concerns the problems of due process; since, at least before the Supreme
Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright, expert opinion could not necessarily
be challenged in an adversarial judicial process, a finding of competence
should require "more certainty, clarity, and comprehensiveness than a find-
ing of incompetence. '495 Finally, there are the implications of a finding of
incompetence; subsuming both the ethical implications of treating a prisoner
so that he can be restored to competency and then executed, and the
problems involved in a psychiatric assessment when it is believed that com-
petency has been restored.496
Barbara Ward has identified four separate positions raised by Radelet
and Barnard: (1) the "principled approach" (calling for a total professional
boycott of the entire process), 497 (2) the "consequentialist approach"
(whereby psychiatrists agree to participate but "argue for increased safe-
guards to ensure fairness"), 498 (3) the "empirical approach" (by which psy-
chiatrists examine the prisoner and report on the degree of mental disorder
but avoid the ultimate question of competency for execution), 499 and (4) the
489. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(3) (1986 Supp.).
490. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 37, at 43.
491. See generally Ennis & Litwack, supra note 18.
492. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 37, at 43; see also Hazard & Louisell, supra note 461, at 400.
493. For a helpful overview of the full range of psychiatric ethics, see Roth, To Respect Persons,
Families, and Communities: Some Problems in the Ethics of Mental Health Care, 40 PSYCHIATRY
DIGEST 17 (1979).
494. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 37, at 46.
495. Id. at 47.
496. Id. at 49.
497. Ward, supra note 37, at 85. See, eg., West, supra note 486; Stone, To Let Live or Die,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Oct. 1, 1976), at 2. Cf Bonnie, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging
Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. Rv. 167, 174 (1980) (by requiring states to "individualize" the
capital sentencing process, the Supreme Court "has virtually assured routine participation by mental
health professionals, especially psychiatrists, in the sentencing phase of capital murder trials");
Showalter & Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital Sentencing: Risks and Responsibilities in a Unique
Legal Setting, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159, 160 (1984) ("indispensability" of psy-
chiatric testimony assured by language of new statutes).
498. Ward, supra note 37, at 86.
499. Id. at 87; Kenner, Competency on Death Row, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 253, 255 (1986)
(expert should present a "functional rather than diagnostic appraisal"). Cf FED. R. EVID. 704(b)
(1985):
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"psycholegal approach" (whereby psychiatrists simply examine the prisoner
and render an opinion as to his competence to be executed).50
While Radelet and Barnard appear to endorse the "consequentialist"
position (rejecting what Ward terms the "principled" approach on the the-
ory that this would lead to "nonrepresentative participation by other, per-
haps less principled psychiatrists" in competency determinations), 501 and
where Ward supports the "empirical" stand (as the most defensible "[g]iven
a desire not to abdicate responsibility in this area, '502 Appelbaum suggests
that the issue of participation in treatment to restore competency is a "sepa-
rate, and perhaps even more troubling issue."503 Although he does not per-
sonally endorse any of the three positions he defines,5°4 Appelbaum notes
that discussion of these issues among clinicians "has been limited by their
lack of awareness of competency requirements for execution: ' 50 5 "If a sys-
tem that mental health professionals find acceptable is to emerge, some effort
at achieving consensus within the professions will be required.
'50 6
(3) Ford v. Wainwright 5 7
The Supreme Court's decision to hear Ford suggested some recognition
of the depth of the problem and appeared to promise a relatively broad-
based solution. Florida's "competency-to-be-executed" law50 8 was similar in
critical aspects to the statutes enacted in over half a dozen other states.509
Alvin Ford was convicted in 1974 of murdering a police officer during
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defend-
ant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or
of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
See infra text accompanying notes 672-74.
500. Ward, supra note 37, at 87; Adler, The Cure That Kills, AM. LAWYER (Sept. 1986), at 1, 30
(quoting administrator of Florida facility used to house death row inmates currently incompetent to
be executed: "It doesn't make any difference to us how we treat them no matter what sentence
they're under... The State executes a sentence, not a mental health staff").
501. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 37, at 45.
502. Ward, supra note 37, at 87.
503. Appelbaum, supra note 457, at 683. See also, Adler, supra note 500, at 30 (currently incom-
petent-to-be-executed prisoner was "put through the usual procedure for establishing a treatment
plan with no special regard for his death sentence or the overriding issue of his incompetence to be
executed"). Cf Leuchter, The Responsibilities of the State for the Prevention and Treatment of
Mental Illness Among Prisoners, 26 J. FORENSIC SC. 134 (1981); Denkowski & Denkowski, The
Mentally Retarded Offender in the State Prison System: Identification, Prevalence, Adjustment, and
Rehabilitation, 12 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 55 (1985).
504. Appelbaum, supra note 457, at 683 (treat without regard to the consequences; treat only
when the prisoner wishes to be treated; refuse to treat since "it might well be more humane to allow
a person to suffer the ravages of psychosis than to administer treatment that will restore competency
and terminate his life.").
505. Id.
506. Id. See also Appelbaum, supra note 45, at 176:
If the enormous problems raised by the use of hypothetically derived testimony in
capital cases are to be addressed.... it will have to be by the psychiatric profession, not by
the federal courts .... Despite the failure of the federal judiciary to respond to this issue, a
strong stand by the profession may prompt state courts and legislatures to prohibit this
most regrettable pratice.
507. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
508. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985).




an attempted robbery, 510 and sentenced to death.51 1 While there was no
suggestion that he was incompetent at the time of the offense, at his trial or
his sentencing, 512 he began to manifest behavioral changes in 1982, nearly
eight years after his conviction.5 13 He developed delusions5 14 and hallucina-
tions515 and his letters revealed "an increasingly pervasive delusion that he
had become the target of a complex conspiracy, involving the Ku Klux Klan
and assorted others, designed to force him to commit suicide. t5 1 6 Counsel
requested that a psychiatrist continue to see Ford and recommend appropri-
ate treatment.5 1 7 After fourteen months of evaluation and interviews, the
treating psychiatrist concluded that the defendant suffered from "a severe,
uncontrollable mental disease which closely resembles 'Paranoid Schizo-
phrenia With Suicide Potential.' -518 This was a "major mental disorder...
severe enough to substantially affect [defendant's] present ability to assist in
the defense of his life." 519
Ford's lawyer then invoked Florida procedures governing the determi-
nation of competency of an inmate sentenced to death.5 20 In accordance
with the statute, the Governor appointed three psychiatrists to evaluate
whether the defendant had "the mental capacity to understand the nature of
the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him. '52 1 After a
single thirty minute meeting, each psychiatrist reported separately to the
Governor: while each produced a different diagnosis, 522 all found him to
510. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
511. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2598.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. "Delusions" are false beliefs or wrong judgments held with convictions despite incontro-
vertible evidence to the contrary.
515. "Hallucinations" are the apparent, often strong, subjective perception of an object or event
when no such situation is present.
516. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2598.
He believed that the prison guards, part of the conspiracy, had been killing people and
putting the bodies in the concrete enclosures used for beds. Later, he began to believe that
his women relatives were being tortured and sexually abused somewhere in the prison.
This notion developed into a delusion that the people who were tormenting him at the
prison had taken members of Ford's family hostage. The hostage delusion took firm hold
and expanded, until Ford was reporting that 135 of his friends and family were being held
hostage in the prison, and that only he could help them. By "day 287" of the "hostage
crisis," the list of hostages had expanded to include "senators, Senator Kennedy, and many
other leaders." Appendix, at 53. In a letter to the Attorney General of Florida, written in
1983, Ford appeared to assume authority for the "crisis," claiming to have fired a number
of prison officials. He began to refer to himself as "Pope John Paul, III," and reported
having appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 59.
Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2598.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. Ford subsequently refused to see the psychiatrist again, believing that he had now
joined the conspiracy against him. Id. Later, Ford "regressed further into nearly complete incom-
prehensibility, speaking only in a code characterized by intermittent use of the word 'one,' making
statements such as 'Hands one, face one. Mafia one. God one, father one. Pope one. Pope one,
leader one.' [App.] at 72." Id. at 2599.
520. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985).
521. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(2) (West 1985).
522. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2599. One psychiatrist diagnosed Ford as suffering from "psychosis with
paranoia;" a second as "psychotic," and a third as having a "severe adaptational disorder." Id. All
three, however, found that he had enough "cognitive" functioning to know "fully well what can
happen to him." Id.
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have sufficient capacity to be executed under state law. 52 3
The Governor subsequently and "without explanation" signed Ford's
death warrant.5 24 After the state courts rejected Ford's application for a de
novo hearing to determine competency, 525 Ford applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. Ford sought an evidentiary hearing on his sanity,
"proffering the conflicting findings of the Governor-appointed commission
and subsequent challenges to their methods by other psychiatrists.
'526
After the district court denied the petition without a hearing, the Elev-
enth Circuit granted a certificate of probable cause, and stayed defendant's
execution.527 The Supreme Court rejected the State's application to vacate
the stay.528 A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of the writ.529 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
resolve the important issue whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of the insane and, if so, whether the District Court should have
held a hearing on [defendant's] claim.
'530
A fractured court reversed, and remanded for a new trial. In the only
portion of any of the four separate opinions to command a majority of the
court,531 Justice Marshall 532 concluded that the eighth amendment did so
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on an insane prisoner.5
33
First, Justice Marshall pointed out that, since the court decided Soles-
bee v. Balkcom 534 in 1950, its eighth amendment jurisprudence had "evolved
substantially." 535 Presently, the Court's ban on "cruel and unusual punish-
ment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had
been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted. ' 536 Further, the Court's decisions recognize the "evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 537 In com-
ing to this determination, the Court thus takes into account objective
evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a particular
punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity that the amend-
ment protects.
538




527. Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984).
528. Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
529. 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985).
530. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2599.
531. On the question of what procedures were appropriate to satisfy the constitution, three other
justices joined Justice Marshall. Id. at 2598. Justice Powell concurred on that issue, and wrote
separately. Id. at 2606. Justice O'Connor (for herself and Justice White) concurred in part and
dissented in part. Id. at 2611. Justice Rehnquist (for himself and the Chief Justice) dissented. Id. at
2613.
532. The author of Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). See supra text accompanying
notes 151-206.
533. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2598-2602.
534. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
535. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
536. Id., citing, inter alia, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
537. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2600, citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).




The opinion traced the common law development of the doctrine bar-
ring execution of the insane,539 noting that, while the reasons for the rule
were not precisely clear,54° "it is plain the law is so."541 It concluded that
there was "virtually no authority condoning the execution of the insane at
English common law,"'542 and that "this solid proscription was carried to
America. '5
43
This ancestral legacy has not outlived its time, the Court added.544 No
state currently permits execution of the insane545 and it is "clear that the
ancient and humane limitation upon the State's ability to execute its
sentences has as firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of today as it had centu-
ries ago in England":5 46
The various reasons put forth in support of the common-law re-
striction have no less logical, moral, and practical force than they did
when first voiced. For today, no less than before, we may seriously
question the retributive value of executing a person who has no com-
prehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his funda-
mental right to life. See Note, "The Eighth Amendment and the
Execution of the Presently Incompetent," 32 STAN. L. REv. 765, 777
n.58 (1980). Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at
killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own con-
science or deity is still vivid today. And the intuition that such an
execution simply offends humanity is evidently shared across the Na-
tion. Faced with such wide-spread evidence of a restriction upon sov-
ereign power, this Court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death
upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the con-
demned from fear and pain without comfort or understanding, or to
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting
mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
Amendment. 547
On the question of what procedures were appropriate in such a case, the
Court was sufficiently fragmented that no opinion commanded a majority of
justices.5 48 In a four-justice opinion, Justice Marshall concluded that, under
539. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
540. See supra note 472.
541. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2601.
542. Id.
543. Id.: "[It was early observed that 'the judge is bound' to stay the execution upon insanity of
the prisoner." Id., citing I J. CHITrY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *761 (5th
Amer. ed. 1847), and 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 59 (8th ed. 1880).
544. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 26061.
545. Id. See id. at 2602-02 n.2 (listing statutes).
546. Id. at 2601-02.
547. Id. at 2602.
548. Recently, there has been a significant amount of scholarly attention paid to the meaning
and interpretation of plurality decisions by the Supreme Court, and their implication for the judicial
process. See, eg., Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court,
1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 756 (1980) [hereinafter Columbia Note]; Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision.
making, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
Where multiple opinions appear to be of "varying scope or breadth," Columbia Note, supra, at
760, the Court has indicated that the opinion concurring in the judgment on the "narrowest
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the federal habeas corpus statute549 and Townsend v. Sain,550 a de novo evi-
dentiary hearing on Ford's sanity was required unless "the state-court trier
of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.1551 Further,
if some sort of state judgment were rendered, the habeas statute compels
federal courts to hold an evidentiary hearing if state procedures were inade-
quate,5 52 or insufficient, 553 or if the applicant did not receive a "full, fair and
adequate hearing" in state court.
554
In cases such as the one before the Court where factfinding procedures
must "aspire to a heightened standard of reliability, '555 the ascertainment of
a prisoner's sanity "as a lawful predicate to execution calls for no less strin-
gent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital pro-
ceeding."'5 56 This standard is particularly demanding in light of the reality
that "the present state of the mental sciences is at best a hazardous guess
however conscientious. 55 7
Under this analysis, Florida's procedures failed to pass muster. The
state procedure is "wholly within the executive branch, ex parte, and pro-
vides the exclusive means of determining sanity. '558 That this "most cur-
sory form of procedural review559 fails to achieve even the minimal level of
reliability required for the protection of any constitutional interest, and thus
falls short of adequacy under Townsend, is self-evident.
560
There were three significant deficiencies in the Florida procedures.
First, state practice failed to allow any material relevant to the ultimate deci-
grounds" represents the highest common denominator of majority agreement and should thus be
considered authoritative for future cases, id. at 761; see, eg., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169
n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980) (on question of scope of
right to assistance available to prisoner prior to prison-mental hospital transfer, Justice Powell's
separate one-justice opinion becomes judgment of the court). See also Columbia Note, supra, at 767
(lower courts look for guidance to "the alignment of the Justices and the extent of agreement, the
compatibility of different lines of reasoning, the persuasiveness of the various rationales, and the
relative stature of the opinion writers"). Interestingly, another commentator has noted that, among
the areas in which plurality opinions "consistently occur," are cases involving the death penalty and
various constitutional criminal procedure questions. Harvard Note, supra, at 1137 n.66.
The Gregg "narrowest grounds" standard has been interpreted as "referring to the ground that
is most nearly confined to the precise fact situation before the Court, rather than to a ground that
states more general rules." United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1981). But see
e.g., Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding of concurring Justices
viewed as holding of the Court).
549. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
550. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
551. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13.
552. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1982).
553. Id., § 2254(d)(3).
554. Id., § 2254(d)(6).
555. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
556. Id.
557. Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ('there are many forms of mental illness that are not
understood"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) ("Given the lack of certainty and the fallibil-
ity of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous").
558. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
559. The Governor's office had refused to inform defendant's counsel whether his submission of
written materials (including psychiatric reports of experts who examined Ford "at great length")




sion to be submitted on behalf of the prisoner,5 61 in contravention of estab-
lished doctrine that the factfinder must have before it "all possible relevant
information about the individual defendant whose fate it must deter-
mine."'5 62 Any procedure that precludes the prisoner or his counsel from
presenting material relevant to his sanity or which bars consideration of such
material by the fact finder is "necessarily inadequate."
5 63
On this point, Justice Marshall cited to and quoted from his opinion for
the court in Ake, holding that, because " 'psychiatrists disagree widely and
frequently on what constitutes mental illness [and] on the appropriate diag-
nosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms,' the factfinder must
resolve differences in opinion within the psychiatric profession 'on the basis
of the evidence offered by each party'564 when a defendant's sanity is at issue
in a criminal trial.' ' 565 The same holds true, he concluded, after conviction:
[W]ithout any adversarial assistance from the prisoner's represen-
tative-especially when the psychiatric opinion he proffers is based on
much more extensive evaluation than the state-appointed commis-
sion-the factfinder loses the substantial benefit of potentially proba-
tive information. The result is a much greater likelihood of an
erroneous decision.
566
Justice Marshall found two other defects in the treatment of the defend-
ant. Under Florida law, the defendant had no opportunity to challenge or
impeach the opinion of the state-appointed experts through cross-examina-
tion,567 thus creating a "significant possibility that the ultimate decision
made in reliance on those experts will be distorted. '568 "Perhaps the most
striking defect," was the placement of the decision entirely in the executive
branch: "The commander of the State's corps of prosecutors 569 cannot be
561. Id.
562. Id., quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion).
563. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2604.
564. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2604, quoting Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
565. Id. at 2604.
566. Id. at 2604-05.
567. Id. at 2605.
"[Cross-examination... is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of the truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbour rev. 1974).
Cross-examination of the psychiatrists, or perhaps a less formal equivalent, would contrib-
ute markedly to the process of seeking truth in sanity disputes by bringing to light the bases
for each expert's beliefs, the precise factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or
caprice of the examiner, any personal bias with respect to the issue of capital punishment,
the expert's degree of certainty about his or her own conclusions, and the precise meaning
of ambiguous words used in the report.
Id.
568. Id. See also id. n.3:
The adequacy of the factfinding procedures is further called into question by the cur-
sory nature of the underlying psychiatric examination itself. While this Court does not
purport to set substantive guidelines for the development of expert psychiatric opinion, cf
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983) [parallel citations omitted], we can say that the
goal of reliability is unlikely to be served by a single group interview, with no provisions for
the exercise of the psychiatrists' professional judgment regarding the possible need for dif-
ferent or more comprehensive evaluative techniques. The inconsistency and vagueness of
the conclusions reached by the three examining psychiatrists in this case attest to the dubi-
ous value of such an examination.
569. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (1985).
On the issue of dual loyalties in general, see Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemma of Dual
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said to have the neutrality that is necessary for reliability in the factfinding
proceeding."5 70 "In no other circumstance of which we are aware," Justice
Marshall concluded, "is the vindication of a constitutional right entrusted to
the unreviewable discretion of an administrative tribunal."
5 71
The opinion thus left it to the state to develop appropriate procedures
"to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences,
'5 72
noting that it was not suggesting that "only a full trial on the issue of sanity
will suffice to protect the federal interests. ' 573 The "lodestar" of any such
procedures, however, "must be the overriding dual imperative of providing
redress for those with substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the
factfinding determination." 574 Because the state's procedures failed to pro-
vide adequate assurance of accuracy to satisfy the Townsend doctrine, de-
fendant was thus entitled under the habeas corpus statute to a de novo
evidentiary hearing on the question of his competence to be executed.57 5
Justice Powell concurred, joining fully in the majority's opinion on the
substantive eighth amendment issue,57 6 but differing substantially from Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion on the issue of the appropriate procedures which
states must follow pursuant to the habeas statute.577 Further, Justice Powell
considered an issue not addressed by the court: the meaning of "insanity" in
the context of the case before it.578
First, after considering the common law justifications for barring execu-
tion of the insane, Justice Powell concluded that the eighth amendment
should only bar the execution of those "who are unaware of the punishment
they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it,'579 a category into
which Ford "plainly fit."
'580
On the question of what procedures are appropriate, Justice Powell in-
dicated that he agreed with Justice Marshall's opinion that the Governor's
finding of sanity was not entitled to a presumption of correctness under the
habeas statute.5 81 Justice Powell also agreed that Florida's procedures in-
vited "arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from offering
contrary medical evidence or even from explaining the inadequacies of the
State's examinations,1 582 and thus failed to comport with the requirements
Loyalties, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 7 (F. Ayd, ed.
1974). See also, Roth, supra note 493.
570. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2605.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 2606; see also id. n.5.
573. Id. at 2606.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 2606 (Powell, J., concurring).
577. Id. at 2607.
578. Id. at 2608; cf. Mezer & Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: .4 Psycholegal
Problem, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827, 828 (1962) (identifying varying competency standards gov-
erning eleven separate areas of the law).
579. Id. at 2609.
580. Id.
581. Id. Justice Powell agreed because (1) 28 U.S.C. § 2254 required deference to the fact-find-
ings of a "state court of competent jurisdiction," which could not be "stretch[ed]" to include the
Governor, id., and (2) defendant did not have a "full and fair hearing" under § 2254(d)(2), id.




On the other hand, Justice Powell parted company with Justice Mar-
shall on the question of what procedures were necessary. Justice Powell
found that "the requirements of due process are not as elaborate as Justice
Marshall suggests." s584 First, because the defendant "has been validly con-
victed of a capital crime and sentenced to death," the question is not
"whether, but when, his execution may take place. '5 85 This view made inap-
plicable earlier court decisions imposing heightened procedural requirements
on capital trials and sentencing proceedings.5 86
Second, since the defendant's competency to stand trial was never seri-
ously in question, the state can presume that the defendant remained sane at
the time sentence is to be carried out. The state may thus require "a sub-
stantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing
process.P 587
Third, the sanity issue in Ford is not like the basic "historical fact"
issues at trial or sentencing; rather, it calls for a "basically subjective judg-
ment"588 depending substantially on "expert analysis in a discipline fraught
with 'subtleties and nuances.' "589 In such cases, "ordinary adversarial pro-
cedures-complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argu-
ment by counsel-are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound,
consistent judgments as to a defendant's sanity."' 590
In short, Justice Powell concluded that constitutionally acceptable pro-
cedures "may be far less formal than a trial."'591 In addition to provision by
the state of an impartial officer or board to receive evidence and argument
from defense counsel (including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ
from the state's own evaluation) the state "should have substantial leeway to
determine what process best balances the various interests at stake."592
Because the defendant's "viable" eighth amendment claim was not
fairly adjudicated, he was entitled to a habeas hearing in federal court, Jus-
tice Powell concluded. Because of this conclusion, Justice Powell joined the
Court's judgment.5 93
Writing for herself and Justice White, Justice O'Connor concurred in
part and dissented in part. Because she agreed fully with Justice Rehnquist's
two-justice dissent that the eighth amendment did not create a substantive
right not to be executed while insane, Justice O'Connor did not join in the
Court's opinion or reasoning.5 94 Justice O'Connor concurred in the result,
583. Justice Powell read Justice O'Connor's opinion as agreeing with him on this point as well.
Id. at 2609-10.
584. Id.
585. Id. (emphasis in original).
586. Id. He noted that "some defendants may lose their mental facilities and never regain them,
and thus avoid execution altogether." Id. n.5.
587. Id. at 2610. In a "cf" reference, he cited to Ake.
588. Id. at 2611, citing Addington, with a "cf' reference to Barefoot.
589. Id. at 2611, quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 430.
590. Id., citing, in a "cf' reference, Parham, 442 U.S. at 609.
591. Id. at 2611.
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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however, because it was "inescapable" that Florida state law provided a pro-
tected liberty interest in not being executed while incompetent.
5 95
As Florida did not provide "even those minimal procedural protections
required by due process,"5 96 she would vacate the judgment and remand for
a state court hearing in a manner "consistent with the requirements of the
due process clause."' 597 She emphasized, however, that, in her view, the fed-
eral court should have no role "whatever in the substantive determination of
a defendant's competency to be executed."5 9 8
Relying on the Court's decision in Hewitt v. Helms599 that liberty inter-
ests may stem from either the due process clause or state law, Justice
O'Connor read applicable, mandatory Florida statutes60° as creating a pro-
tected liberty-expectation that "state conduct injurious to an individual will
not occur 'absent specified substantive predicates.' "601 This was so even
where the same statute specified certain procedures to be followed.
60 2
"[R]egardless of the procedures the State deems adequate for determining
the preconditions to adverse official action, federal law defines the kind of
process a State must afford prior to depriving an individual of a protected
liberty or property interest.1
60 3
Due process demands in this sort of case are "minimal," Justice
O'Connor concluded, 604 noting that "substantial caution" was warranted
"before reading the Due Process Clause to mandate anything like the full
panoply of trial-type procedures. ' 60 5 This was so for several reasons: 1) af-
ter a valid conviction, the demands of due process are "reduced accord-
ingly;' 60 6 2) the potential for false claims and deliberate delay in this context
is "obviously enormous; ' 60 7 and 3) by definition, the defendant's protected
interest can "never be conclusively and finally determined... until the very
moment of execution." 60 8 Even given the "broad latitude" 60 9 that she
would give the states in this area, Justice O'Connor concluded that one as-
pect of Florida's procedure violated the "fundamental requisite" of due pro-
cess entitling an individual an opportunity to be heard. Florida's failure to





599. 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983).
600. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(3) (West 1985).
601. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting,
in part, Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
602. Id. at 2612.
603. Id., citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985).
604. Id. at 2612.
605. Id.
606. Id., citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
607. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897); cf. Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra
note 9, at 404 (no question as to existence of serious mental illness in 138 of 141 successful insanity
defense cases studied).
608. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
609. Id.
610. Id. at 2613. See Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 999, 1101 (Fla. 1984) (describing Gover-
nor's "publicly announced policy of excluding all advocacy on the part of the condemned from the
process of determining whether a person under a sentence of death is insane").
1987]
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dures constitutionally deficient. 61'
Because Florida failed to consider the defendant's submissions, Justice
O'Connor would vacate with orders to the Eleventh Circuit to return the
case to Florida "so that it might assess [defendant's] competency in a man-
ner that accords with the command of the Fourteenth Amendment. '612 She
reiterated that the "only federal question presented in cases such as this is
whether the State's positive law has created a liberty interest and whether its
procedures are adequate to protect that interest from artificial depriva-
tion.' '613 If those procedures are adequate "a federal court has no authority
to second guess a state's substantive competency determination."
614
Finally, Justice Rehnquist dissented on behalf of himself and the Chief
Justice.615 In his view, the Florida procedures were "fully consistent with
the 'common-law heritage' and current practice on which the Court pur-
ports to rely," 616 and, in their reliance on executive-branch procedures,
"faithful to both traditional and modem practice. '617
Further, Justice Rehnquist saw no reason to abandon Solesbee, which
had sanctioned procedures vesting decision-making in "the solemn responsi-
bility of a state's highest executive with authority to invoke the aid of the
most skillful class of experts on the crucial questions involved. ' 618 He con-
cluded that Florida law did not grant defendant the sort of entitlement "that
gives rise to the procedural protections for which he contends. '619
To create a constitutional right to a judicial determination of sanity
prior to execution "needlessly complicates and postpones still further any
finality in this area of the law."'620 Yet another adjudication "offers an invi-
tation to those who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely
spurious claims of insanity. ' 621 He concluded:
Since no State sanctions execution of the insane, the real battle
being fought in this case is over what procedures must accompany the
inquiry into sanity. The Court reaches the result it does by examining
the common law, creating a constitutional right that no State seeks to
violate, and then concluding that the common-law procedures are in-
adequate to protect the newly created but common-law based right. I
find it unnecessary to "constitutionalize" the already uniform view
that the insane should not be executed, and inappropriate to "selec-
tively incorporate" the common-law practice. I therefore dissent.
622




615. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id. at 2613-14.
619. Id. at 2615.
620. Id.
621. Id.:
A claim of insanity may be made at any time before sentence, and, once rejected, may
be used again; a prisoner found sane two days before execution might claim to have lost his
sanity the next day thus necessitating another judicial determination of his sanity and pre-
sumably another stay of execution.
622. Id.
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RESPONSES TO THE CASES
(A) Pre-1986 Cases: Commentary and Caselaw
Of the four pre-1986 cases, only Estelle623 has been the subject of exten-
sive favorable commentary. Scholars have been intensely critical of Bare-
foot 624 and Jones,625 and the meager response to Ake 626 has been
surprisingly tepid.
(1) Estelle
At least one author characterized Estelle as "one of the most important
[decisions] in the field of criminal procedure," and, presciently, as a "fertile
source of criminal defense litigation for many years," with potential "far-
reaching effects outside of the capital punishment context. ' 627 Another au-
thor saw Estelle as safeguarding the integrity of the jury process by insuring
that "only the most credible evidence should be used in [death penalty] de-
terminations. '628 A third saw the heart of Estelle as "a recognition that all
psychiatrists may not have a benevolent purpose" in cases where such
mental health professionals become "an arm of the prosecutor. ' 629 Another
student note focused on Estelle's impact on pre-sentencing investigations,
concluding that the "potential danger of a 'Dr. Death' developing in the
probation profession necessitates that probation officers afford defendants
the same procedural safeguards [including Miranda warnings] in the
presentence interview process as are available to defendants in the arrest-to-
conviction process.
'630
Professor Slobogin, on the other hand, expressed cautious concern over
what he perceived as Estelle's "limited applicability."' 63 ' This concern was
caused by Estelle's failure to address the role that the fifth and sixth amend-
ments should play when the state plans to use the results of a pretrial evalua-
tion on issues other than the defendant's future dangerousness. 6
32
On the specific issue of how Estelle can be reconciled with the Burger
623. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 207-55.
624. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 43-79
625. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 80-124.
626. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 151-201.
627. Note, 10 AMER. J. CRIM. L. 65, 78 (1982).
628. Note, supra note 79, at 1033.
629. Estelle Implications, supra note 393, at 303. See also on the issue of "dual loyalties," Roth,
supra note 493; Shestack, supra note 570.
630. Note, 4 WHlrrER L. REv. 131, 149 (1982). At least two subsequent cases have dealt with
this aspect of Estelle. See infra note 641.
631. Slobogin, supra note 33, at 76. See id. at 135-38, suggesting model rules to govern compe-
tency evaluations, "reconstructive evaluations" (explained at id. 95-109), and capital sentencing
evaluations.
632. Id. at 76. He stressed that the majority opinion "backed away from the full import of the
critical stage analysis found in the Court's earlier decisions," id. at 75; see, e.g., United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), referring to its reservation of
decision on the question of whether the fifth amendment accords a defendant the right to the pres-
ence of counsel during an evaluation and its decision to not consider a fifth amendment claim for the
right to counsel. See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 75-76. Cf. White, supra note 312, at 973 (discussing
the use of a recording macine to tape psychiatric interviews as "less likely to inhibit the normal flow
of a psychiatric examination"; cf Estelle, 451 U.S. at 470 n.14).
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Court's well-publicized "retreat from the Miranda doctrine, ' 633 Professor
Sonenshein paraphrased Mark Twain, stating that "the demise of Miranda
may have been exaggerated, or at least premature," 634 and concluded that
Estelle is a "clear-cut [Miranda] victory. ' 63 5 While the Court could have
decided Estelle on non-Miranda grounds, by "going out of its way to apply
Miranda to the pretrial psychiatric examination, ' 636 it "implicitly made [Es-
telle] primarily a Miranda case by turning first to the fifth amendment self-
incrimination issue."' 637 This decision, along with another contemporaneous
non-psychiatric Miranda opinion, 638 demonstrated to Professor Sonenshein
that the Burger Court "perhaps . . . has finally accepted the Miranda
legacy."'6
39
Subsequent cases have, however, construed Estelle fairly narrowly.
While it has been held retroactive, 64° and applied in at least one case, to
statements to probation officers,64 it has been distinguished in cases where
defendant raised an insanity claim.642 Estelle was also distinguished in cases
where defendant sought a competency examination 643 and in a civil case,
where a prison adjustment committee imposed disciplinary sanctions on a
prisoner for his refusal to participate in a screening interview with a
psychologist. 644
(2) Barefoot
The psychiatric testimony prong of Barefoot has been criticized uni-
formly by commentators,4 5 and flies in the face of carefully crafted guide-
633. See Note, supra note 630, at 131, and sources cited at id. n.3; Sonenshein, supra note 20, at
407 ("Although the Burger Court has not overruled Miranda, the Court has consistently under-
mined the rationale, assumptions and values which gave Miranda life"). The Miranda saga is dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 884-95.
634. Id. at 408. Sonenshein wrote, of course, prior to such Miranda-limiting decisions as New
York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984); Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), and Oregon
v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
635. Sonenshein, supra note 20, at 451.
636. Id. at 454.
637. Id.
638. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), see Sonenshein, supra note 20, at 447-51.
639. Shonensheim, supra note 20, at 462.
640. Jones v. McCotter, 767 F.2d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1985) (Dr. Grigson testified for state);
Muniz v. Procunier, 760 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1985).
641. Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1982); but see Baumann v. United States,
692 F.2d 565, 574-78 (9th Cir. 1982).
642. Watters v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 1984); Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1109-11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J.); but see id. at 1137, 1147-50 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). See also Mahaffey v. Broglin, 630 F.2d
1280, 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (statement used at sentencing, not at merits trial, insanity plea with-
drawn prior to trial).
643. Shelby v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 432, 435-36 (D. Ut. 1984). But see Sturgis, 796 F.2d at
1108-09 (competency examination "critical stage" under Estelle).
644. Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 223-24 (4th Cir. 1984). If the state were to use the results of
the evaluation at a subsequent criminal prosecution, however, Estelle would apply. Id. at 224.
645. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 21; Appelbaum, supra note 22; Appelbaum, supra note 45;
Appelbaum, supra note 23; Levine, The Adversary Process and Social Science in the Courts: Barefoot
v. Estelle, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 147, 170 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L,
REV. 70, 121 n.28, 127 (1983); Showalter & Bonnie, supra note 497, at 176; Bonner, supra note 68, at
505-09. For the most blistering critique, see Geimer, supra note 33, at 760-66, characterizing Bare-
foot as a "gross retreat" from the Court's commitment to reliability in death penalty sentencing, id.
at 760, as a "bad faith abandonment" of established fairness standards, id. at 764, and as a reflection
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lines suggesting limitations on expert testimony in such areas. 646 As
Professor Richard Bonnie has artfully noted, "[e]ven the best clinical testi-
mony merely casts some light into a room that remains very dark." 647
To some extent, the Court's decision in Barefoot reflects a posthoc, de-
fensive posture. It appears to be saying: we've already decided (in Jurek)648
that dangerousness predictivity is acceptable at the penalty phase, so, even in
the light of the overwhelming evidence before us, how can we exclude "psy-
chiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion
on the issue?" 649 This attitude partially mirrors the Chief Justice's position
in Addington v. Texas: given "the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psy-
chiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether the state could
ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill
and likely to be dangerous. ' 650 A student note written two decades ago
augured both of these positions: "If ever it be proven that psychiatry is not
reliable, there will be created a doctrinal abyss into which will sink the whole
structure of commitment law, not just those portions which deal with the
harmless mentally ill."'65 1 The Court in Barefoot appeared unwilling to con-
front the implications of this potential "doctrinal abyss."
In an earlier presentation, I suggested:
Barefoot appears to be indefensible on evidentiary grounds, on
constitutional grounds and on common sense grounds. It flies in the
face of virtually all of the relevant scientific literature. It is inconsis-
tent with the development of evidence law doctrine, and it makes a
mockery of earlier Supreme Court decisions cautioning that extra reli-
ability is needed in capital cases.
652
No subsequent developments653 have suggested that this assessment is
in need of any major substantive revision. Barefoot has resulted in surpris-
of the "little desire on the part of the majority to be bothered with facts at all," id. at 763. See also
Perlin, supra note 9, at 118 n.155.
646. See, eg., Bonnie, supra note 497, at 177-78; Dix, supra note 64, at 575 (mental health
professional should be prohibited from expressing any predictive opinion more specific than that
"the subject poses a greater risk than the average person of engaging in future assaultive or otherwise
criminal conduct") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
647. Bonnie, supra note 497, at 188. But see Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme
Court, 1986 DuKE L.J. 1, 6 (Court should relieve itself of "the impossible and harmful process of
'finding' light when there is only darkness").
648. Jurek v. Texas, 426 U.S. 262 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 562.
649. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898.
650. 441 U.S. at 429.
651. UCLA Project, supra note 18, at 829 n.35.
652. Perlin, supra note 9, at Ill (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). See, on the question of
the need for extra reliability in capital punishment decisionmaking, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ); see also, Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.
Ct. 2595 (1986).
653. This aspect of Barefoot has seen surprisingly little pertinent follow-up litigation. See infra
notes 654-56.
See, however, State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 477 A.2d 308 (1984), sanctioning the admissibility of
statistical evidence by a defendant at the penalty phase of a capital case concerning empirical studies
relating to the defendant's rehabilitatory potential in a case where the defendant raised his character
as a mitigating factor, id. at 310-12; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3c(5)(h) (West 1982), relying on
Justice Blackmun's dissent to buttress its position, 477 A.2d at 311. Davis is discussed extensively in




ingly little legally significant litigation.654 Courts generally, and especially in
Texas, 655 apply the doctrine mechanically.
65 6
(3) Jones
Scholarly commentary on Jones has been almost entirely critical,
657
with several commentators linking the Court's opinion to the substantive
policy issues raised by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal
trial.658 Authors have condemned the decision in both moderate659 and ex-
treme660 tones, but have also reasoned that the ultimate impact of Jones may
be fairly limited.661 At least one commentator has charged that the decision
654. But see State v. Davis, "96 N.J. 611, 477 A.2d 308 (1984). Cf. Deveau v. United States, 483
A.2d 307, 315-16 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Justice Blackmun's dissent on unrealiability of
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness), and id. at 316: "If the trial court has reason to
reject the opinions of the experts on the issue of dangerousness, it may also do so even though they
are unanimous").
655. Streetman v. State, 698 S.W.2d 132, 137 (rex. Ct. Crim. App. 1985); Nethery v. State, 692
S.W.2d 686, 708-09 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1985) (a Dr. Grigson case); Holloway v. State, 691 S.W.2d
608, 616-17 (rex. Ct. Crim. App. 1984); Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 409 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
1984). But see, Brown v. State, 689 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1984) (Teague, J., dissent-
ing from denial of defendant's motion for rehearing) (Barefoot distinguishable in case where defend-
ant sought unsuccessfully to introduce testimony "to assist jurors in judging or evaluating eyewitness
identification testimony").
656. See, eg., State v. Gates, 198 Conn. 397, 503 A.2d 163, 166 (1986); State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d
619, 627 (1984); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813 (1985); see also In re L.R., 497
A.2d 753, 755 (Vt. 1985) (hypothetical question permissible at involuntary civil commitment pro-
ceeding under authority of Barefoot).
657. But see Comment, Jones v. United States: A Sociological Vindication, 23 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 221 (1984).
658. See, eg., Note, Mistreating a Symptom: The Legitimatizing of Mandatory, Indefinite Com-
mitment of Insanity Acquittees-Jones v. United States, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 569, 588 (1984)
[hereinafter Pepperdine Note] ("The Court appears to have succumbed to the ideological complexi-
ties of the insanity defense"); "Throwing Away," supra note 89, at 521 ("Judges and legislators
should not impose their dissatisfaction with the insanity defense on defendants who successfully
asserted the defense and gained acquittal"); Note, Automatic and Indefinite Commitment of Insanity
Acquittees: A Procedural Straightyacket, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1261 (1984) [hereinafter Vander-
bilt Note] ("To retain the insanity defense, states must understand that they cannot surreptitiously
punish the insanity acquittee by sending him to a mental hospital for an indefinite period when he is
not mentally ill"); Note, Automatic and Indefinite Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal:
Jones v. United States, 26 B.C.L. REV. 779, 808 (1985) [hereinafter B.C. Note] (Jones in keeping
with "recent statutory cutbacks in the insanity defense which followed in wake of [John] Hinckley's
insanity acquittal"); see also Schmidt, Supreme Court Decision Making on Insanity Acquittees Does
Not Depend on Research Conducted by the Behavioral Science Community: Jones v. United States,
12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 507, 515 (1984) ("in immediate aftermath of Hinckley fiasco," Supreme
Court used Jones as vehicle with which to deal with "one of the most controversial aspects of the
insanity defense, disposition").
Professor Singer has also pointed out that, as a practical matter, Jones will likely result in a
significant drop in the number of insanity pleas. Singer, The Aftermath of an Insanity Acquittal: The
Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Jones v. United States, 477 ANNALS 114 (1985).
659. See, e.g., Note, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 947, 971 (1984) (Jones results in less protection for
the insanity acquittee who is facing commitment); B.C. Note, supra note 658, at 808 (opinion both
"substantively and analytically flawed").
660. See Note, supra note 89, at 521 ("Jones v. United States rang the death knell for the consti-
tutional rights of insanity acquittees").
661. Hermann, Automatic Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees: Constitutional
Dimensions, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 667, 680-81 (1983); Vanderbilt Note, supra note 658, at 1260 (court
"appropriately framed its holding narrowly"); see also, Pepperdine Note, supra note 658, at 588:
immediate impact of Jones "will not be great," but long term impact "may be of much greater
significance" and: "As legislatures across the country consider proposals to reform or abolish the
insanity defense, they will do so with the knowledge that the Supreme Court has given them free
reign concerning the disposition of the insanity acquittee." Id.
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reveals an "unwillingness" on the Court's part to "contradict public senti-
ment in such a controversial area."'662
In the most comprehensive analysis yet offered,6 63 Professor Margulies
concluded that by invoking the most feeble model of review at its disposal
the Court's decision encouraged the punitive urge which is often displayed
toward insanity acquittees. Jones' language will thus encourage the indefi-
nite commitment of insanity acquittees unless legislatures and courts dealing
with commitment adopt less restrictive procedures.
64
Despite such scholarly criticism, however, courts have, virtually with-
out exception, found the Jones standards constitutionally sufficient in a vari-
ety of fact-settings and in the face of a variety of statutory challenges.665
662. Note, Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of Individuals Found Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity, 68 MINN. L. REv. 822, 840 (1984). See id. at 839-40:
The Court's inconsistent reasoning and selective use of the punishment rationale puts
insanity acquittees in the worst position possible-they can be automatically committed for
an indefinite period and are never provided a rehearing under the "clear and convincing"
standard. Instead, at all rehearings, the committed individual, rather than the state, must
shoulder the burden of establishing sanity. Considering the controversy currently sur-
rounding the insanity defense, this result may be most in line with the thinking of the
American public and may evidence societal uncertainty with regard to the insanity defense.
The Court's contradictory analysis of these issues reflects its unwillingness to contradict
public sentiment in such a controversial area.
(emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
663. See Margulies, supra note 33, at 801-35 (critiquing decision).
664. Jones is subject to a number of criticisms. Its justification of indefinite automatic com-
mitment ignored the profound gulf between the issue resolved at the acquittee's criminal
trial-the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense-and the issues which should
be resolved at the time of commitment (which may be years after the offense was commit-
ted): the acquittee's present level of mental illness and dangerousness. The Jones majority
ignored this disparity by invoking the most feeble model of review at its disposal-the
rational basis equal protection test. It then filtered these minimal standards through a due
process prism which blocked out individual liberty interests by labeling acquittees a "spe-
cial class." This truncated review failed to take into account the powerful punitive urge
which the public and its elected representatives, as well as some of our most noted judges,
have displayed toward insanity acquittees. The Court's upholding of a lower standard of
proof for acquittees than for civil commitment candidates in effect encourages this punitive
urge, along with the overprediction of dangerousness to which acquittees are also sub-
jected. In this context, the Court's caveat that insanity acquittees must be treated, not
punished, seems like a convenient device for insuring that no acquittee's indefinite commit-
ment will be abbreviated by the inconvenient intrusion of civil commitment due process
safeguards.
Finally, the Court's implied approval of release proceedings which shift the burden of
proof to the acquittee assures that for many acquittees, regardless of their underlying of-
fense or their present condition, indefinite commitment will be virtually interminable com-
mitment. Legislatures and courts dealing with commitment and release procedures for
insanity acquittees should look at less restrictive procedures for adequately protecting the
interests of both the patient and the public before embracing the drastic devices upheld in
Jones.
Id. at 836.
See also B.C. Note, supra note 658, at 784-85 (Jones incorrectly decided for three reasons: fail-
ure to accord sufficient weight to relevant commitment caselaw; holding based on presumptions, not
findings, of mental illness and dangerousness; patient's due process interests not given sufficient
weight).
665. Cases construing Jones are collected in Vanderbilt Note, supra note 658, at 1249 n.104; see,
e.g., United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (procedures governing NGRI for federal
defendants in District of Columbia constitutional).
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Jones, it vacated, in light of that decision, a Fifth Circuit




Critical response to Ake has been surprisingly tepid. Commentators
have characterized its due process reasoning as "paradoxical," suggesting
that the Burger Court's fourteenth amendment jurisprudence "as well as its
attitude toward the poor remain unchanged. '666 In accordance with the
Chief Justice's concurrence, commentators have predicted that the decision's
holding will be limited to capital cases.667 Due to the decision's unnecessary
vagueness and lack of explicit criteria for determining the scope of the
right,668 and the "ambiguity" surrounding the prerequisite showing neces-
sary to invoke the declared constitutional right,669 others have complained
that it has left "many unanswered questions. ' 670
Finally, a student author671 has questioned the potential impact of Ake
acquittees in commitment and release hearings. Ledbetter v. Benham, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983), vacat-
ing Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
On remand, the Georgia district court relied on Jones to repudiate its prior holdings, and rule
that "the Constitution provides no right in insanity acquittees to be free from the burden of proof in
release proceedings." Benham v. Ledbetter, 609 F. Supp. 125, 127 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd 785 F.2d
1480 (1 1th Cir. 1986); see also id. (quoting Jones in ruling that it was not unreasonable to presume
"an inference of continuing mental illness" in the case of an insanity acquittee). On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit-while warning that Jones "must be used cautiously in analyzing Georgia's proce-
dures," 785 F.2d at 1484,--considered Jones' emphasis on the flexibility of due process, consequently
examined state law through a Mathews v. Eldridge filter, and concluded that the state scheme was"an attempt to balance the interest of the insanity acquittee in liberty against the interest of the state
in maintaining a check on the medical profession's assessment of the current mental state of persons
acquitted by insanity," id. at 1488-93, and thus affirmed. See also Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434,
1439 (11th Cir. 1984); Hickey v.Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 547-49 (9th Cir. 1983).
In New Jersey, where the state legislature had enacted a preponderance standard for NGRI's,
see N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:4-8b(3) (1981), after an appellate court retroactively imposed Addington's
"clear and convincing" standard for that population, (see In re Scelfo, 170 N.J. Super. 394, 406 A.2d
973, 975 (App. Div. 1979); see also Matter of Newsome, 176 N.J. Super. 511, 424 A.2d 222 (App.
Div. 1979)), the same court found that, in light of Jones, the preponderance standard was constitu-
tional, and that its earlier holding had been "incorrectly decided." In re A.L.U., 192 N.J. Super.
480,471 A.2d 63, 65 (App. Div. 1984); see also Matter of Commitment of J.L.J., 196 N.J. Super. 34,
481 A.2d 563, 571 (App. Div. 1984), on remand appeal 210 N.J. Super. 1, 509 A.2d 184 (App. Div.
1985).
In New York, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a similar statute, pointing
out: "the New York statute, which places the burden of proof upon the District Attorney, rather
than the defendant, to show that an insanity acquittee is either mentally ill or has a dangerous
mental disorder, provides greater protection to the defendant than is required under the Federal
Constitution." People v. Escobar, 61 N.Y.2d 431, 474 N.Y.S.2d 453, 457, 462 N.E.2d 1171 (Ct.
App. 1984).
666. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REv. 120, 130, 135 (1985) [hereinafter 1984
Term]. The Court's focus on the due process rather than the equal protection clause as the source of
the constitutional right thus reflected a "fundamentally conservative" approach in Ake. Id. at 138.
See Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discrimination Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 1975 Sup. Cr. REV. 289, 298: "At bottom, equal protection makes one ask the wealth ques-
tion; due process does not. Under the due process approach, new cases would emerge as increments
to the federal constitutional definition of the essentials of ordered liberty." (citation omitted).
667. Note, supra note 201, at 973.
668. Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 TULSA L.J. 121, 155
(1985).
On the other hand, the same commentator has predicted that "Ake may prove to be the seminal
case for the development of a generalized body of law dealing specifically with forensic assistance to
indigent defendants." Id. at 156.
669. Note, ILL. B.J. 401, 404 (April 1986).
670. Note, supra note 668, at 155.
671. Comment, Ake v. Oklahoma: An Interloper in the Brave New World of the 1984 Insanity
Defense Reform Act Challenges Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), 55 Miss. L.J. 287 (1985).
["Vol. 29
MENTALLY DISABLED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
in federal prosecutions on cases brought under the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984.672 This Act, via an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, now bars experts from giving opinion testimony concerning the
mental state of a defendant as it relates to an element of the crime or as a
defense to the crime.673 She frames the ultimate question this way:
If a federal evidence rule precludes psychiatric testimony on the
mental state which includes intent or mens rea as a statutorily required
element of the crime, can this rule be overridden by the substantive
constitutional right of an indigent to meaningful psychiatric assistance
in his defense because of the limits this evidence rule places on such
assistance.
674
It is too soon to determine what impact, if any, Ake will have on the
new rule and statute.
As to litigation already concluded, post-Ake criminal675 cases have in-
terpreted the case's requirements fairly strictly.6 7 6 In a case vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Ake, 677 the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a murder conviction, distinguishing Ake
because the defendant in question did not "demonstrate to the trial judge
that his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant factor at
trial." 6 7 8
Other courts have not found Ake to require psychiatric assistance for all
defendants. The Eighth Circuit stressed the role of the trial judge's "sound
discretion" in assessing whether the defendant made the requisite "ex parte
threshold showing." 679 The Eleventh Circuit denied expert appointment
where trial counsel had previously acknowledged that the defendant had co-
operated with him in "all other phases of the case" 680 and defendant showed
"no signs of mental disturbance" at trial.681 Similarly, where "nothing"
other than defense counsel's statements indicated that defendant "might be
insane,"' 682 where defendant sought successive appointments of additional
psychiatric experts after a series of witnesses returned reports unfavorable to
672. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1986 Supp.). See generally, Perlin, supra note 478, at 861 nn. 18-19, 864-65
nn.41-45.
673. FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (1986 Supp.); see, for a critical analysis of pre-amendment Rule 704
recommending such an amendment, supra note 9, at 419-25. See generally, 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1985), at 704-1 to 704-26.
674. Comment, supra note 671, at 325-26. Ultimately, she concludes that, in the insanity con-
text, Ake "holds the potential ... to eviscerate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b)." Id. at 328.
675. Although it was suggested that the right in Ake had not been extended to civil cases, In re
Williams, 133 Ill. App. 3d 232, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869 (App. Ct. 1985), in In re Brown, 493 A.2d 447,
450 (1985), Ake is cited in a "see also" reference on the application of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 325 (1976), methodology to the determination of due process rights in a case involving a patient
subject to civil commitment. See also, United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985)
(applying Ake in criminal contempt case).
676. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 138 n.288, for earlier cases and commentary.
677. Tuggle v. Virginia, 105 S. Ct. 2315 (1985).
678. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 334 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1985).
679. Vassar v. Solem, 763 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985), quoting also, Williams v. Martin, 618
F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980). Williams is discussed in Perlin, supra note 9, at 122 n.184, and in
Note, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 317 (1981).
680. Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 764 (11th Cir. 1985).
681. Id. at 764-65.
682. Campbell v. State, 484 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
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his claim, 683 and where one member of a court-appointed sanity commission
had, pursuant to state law, examined defendant pre-trial and had "implicitly
attested to [defendant's] mental state at the time of the murders, ' 684 courts
have denied expert appointment. In one case, retroactive application of
Ake's holding was denied.
685
In two federal prosecutions, however, failure to appoint a psychiatrist in
accordance with Ake's dictates was deemed reversible error.686 In the most
expansive reading of the decision, the Eleventh Circuit construed Ake as
"seeming to equate the need for psychiatric aid to assistance of counsel. '687
(B) 1986 Cases: A First Look
(1) Greenfield 68
8
Of the cases decided in the 1986 term, only Greenfield has been con-
strued even briefly by commentators and interpreted by subsequent cases. A
student analysis has concluded that "uncertainties remain, '6 9 in light of the
court's sole focus on post-Miranda silence, 690 its failure to "recognize that a
request for an attorney in response to Miranda is, in and of itself, pro-
tected, '' 691 and in its failure to clarify a question "left open in Doyle-the
protections that the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause affords a sus-
pect who asserts the right to remain silent."'692 The few post-Greenfield
cases have reflected precisely these uncertainties.
693
683. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 933-35 (11th Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds,
781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1986).
684. Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1986).
685. Skurkowski v. Commonwealth, 341 S.E.2d 667, 674-75 (Va. Ct. 1986).
686. United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d
826, 833-34 (10th Cir. 1986); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1985):
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte application.
Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are
necesary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court.., shall au-
thorize counsel to obtain the services.
687. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 5631 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 374 (1986).
688. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 269-
308.
689. Note, Greenfield v. Wainwright: The Use of Post-Miranda Silence to Rebut the Insanity
Defense, 35 AMER. U.L. REV. 221, 269 (1985).
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Id. at 270.
693. See, eg., Fendl v. Abrahamson, 628 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 n.l (E.D. Wis. 1986) ("Greenfield
did not address the issue of whether there is any constitutional protection for pre-arrest or pre-
Miranda exercise of the right to counsel"); Nichols v. Wainwright, 783 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.2 (11th
Cir. 1986):
Greenfield's holding that the general defense of insanity does not invite comments
upon or evidence of post-Miranda silence is inapplicable to the instant case in which the
defense was specific in its reliance upon the proximity of the statement to the time of arrest.
Greenfield neither specifically nor implicitly overruled footnote 11 of Doyle v. Ohio which
permits comment upon post-Miranda silence in response to defense arguments that the
defendant's post-arrest behavior was probative of his innocence.
See also Accord v. Hedrick, 342 S.E.2d 120, 124 n.2 (W. Va. 1986) (Greenfield inapplicable where
prosecutor questioned defendant about his prior inconsistent statement, not his post-arrest silence).
In the narrowest reading yet rendered of the case, the Arizona Supreme Court limited Green-
field so as to bar only testimony as to the defendant's actual words in response to the Miranda
warnings: "The state can present evidence that [defendant] was able to talk rationally after his
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(2) Smith 694
Although Smith has yet to be interpreted or analyzed, its likely future
significance should be clear. While the Supreme Court has sanctioned death
sentences in other procedural default cases, 695 its endorsement and expan-
sion of Sykes in a case such as Smith is startling. Smith is extremely close on
the procedural default issue 696 and is clear on the merits. 697 The decision
appears to reflect nothing less than the Court's determination to remove
what it perceives as trivial procedural roadblocks to an accelerated execution
schedule.
698
Any understanding of Smith in the context of "mentally disabled crimi-
nal defendant" cases must be preceded by consideration of Smith in the con-
text of "post-Sykes procedural default cases," for at least two reasons. First,
Smith's precedential effect will inevitably be limited to cases involving proce-
dural default. Second, while it may be significant that the Court chose to
"deliberately by-pass" 699 the important mental disability issue, it is certainly
significant that it chose to expand Sykes in this kind of case: a case involving
a more-than-arguably mentally disabled criminal defendant whose execution
inexorably flowed from the Court's decision to avoid the merits.
70°
Beyond this, it is necessary to consider the importance, and the ex-
traordinary punitiveness, of the procedural default doctrine in the Court's
vision of a federal jurisprudence. Smith provides an opportunity to consider
the meaning of the procedural default doctrine to the Burger Court as a
microcosm of its vision of procedure as "a mechanism for expressing polit-
ical and social relationships and... a device for producing outcomes."
'701
Over a quarter century ago, in discussing the new federal criminal rules
of procedure, Professor Hall charted his vision of procedure by arguing that,
if "rational settlement" were possible in criminal trials, "it should be possi-
ble in every field of human conduct." 70 2 By its decision in Smith, however,
the Court raises a question as to whether it is truly interested in such a
"rational settlement."
The Court's decision in Smith rejects the notion that, for Sykes default
arrest; however, they cannot make specific reference to this conversation." State v. Mauro, 149 Ariz.
24, 716 P.2d 393, 401 (1986).
694. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 309-80.
695. See Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1128, 1212
(1986), discussing the "infamous decision" of Daniels v. Allen (companion to Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953)), upholding forfeiture of constitutional challenge where lawyer hand-delivered ap-
pellate papers one day late); see other cases cited in Meltzer, supra, at 1212 n.417.
696. See Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2669 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
697. Id. (discussing role of amicus).
698. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 101 n.57 (comparing Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), to Maggio v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 311,
317 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), on the question of whether the death penalty appeals process
impedes or expedites the imposition of the death penalty).
The significance of Smith to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area will be explored
more closely infra at text accompanying notes 710-34.
699. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), discussed supra note 338.
700. Cf. Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), discussed in Meltzer, supra note 695, at 1212.
701. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 840 (1984).
702. Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Reform, 51 YALE L.J. 723 (1941).
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purposes, "death is different. '70 3 The enforcement of default rules cannot be
characterized as "fundamentally unfair" absent any "substantial claim" that
the alleged error "undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing deter-
mination. ' ' 7°4 Such a test is insufficient, Professor Resnik argues, because its
net "may catch the possibly innocent as well as the likely guilty. '705
Smith also makes it clear that the Court is still obsessed by what it
characterized as "sandbagging" in Sykes. 70 6 The Court fears that defense
lawyers will take their chances on a "Not Guilty" verdict "with the intent to
raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus if their initial
gamble does not pay off."' 707 Although the meritricious nature of this argu-
ment has been more than adequately addressed,70 8 the Court nonetheless
quotes from its opinion in Reed v. Ross:
[D]efense counsel may not make a tactical decision to forego a
procedural opportunity-for instance, to object at trial or to raise an
issue on appeal-and then when he discovers that the tactic has been
unsuccessful, pursue an alternative strategy in federal court. The en-
couragement of such conduct by a federal court on habeas corpus re-
view would not only offend generally accepted principles of comity,
but would undermine the accuracy and efficiency of the state judicial
systems to the detriment of all. Procedural defaults of this nature are,
therefore, inexcusable, and cannot qualify as "cause" for purposes of
federal habeas corpus review.
70 9
Writing on Sykes and Smith v. Powell,7 10 Professor Rosenberg recently
suggested that, in its habeas corpus rulings, the Court "has gone far beyond
the traditional common law interpretative process and is engaging in a rule-
oriented jurisprudence designed to make habeas hearings on the merits al-
most as rare as sightings of Halley's Comet."' 711 This jurisprudence, exem-
plified by repeated "deference and preference" to state courts, 712 is an aspect
of the court's "federalism drive, '713 and is often "outcome-oriented.
'714
"[T]he Court, in its preclusionary procedural decisions, has exerted strin-
gent, hypertechnical barriers for habeas petitioners to overcome, with severe
703. See Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2672 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 357 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
704. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2668. See, Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 338, at 1086-1100, for the
implications of "innocence" in federal habeas corpus inquiries.
705. Resnik, supra note 701, at 898-99.
706. 433 U.S. at 89.
707. Id.
708. See, eg., Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional
Claims, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 981, 994-95 (1982); Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Rep-
resentation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 43-46 (1978);
Resnik, supra note 702, at 896-97.
709. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2666, quoting Ross, 468 U.S. at 14.
710. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (federal habeas corpus challenges to fourth amendment rulings
barred where defendant had opportunity for full and fair litigation in state court).
711. Rosenberg, supra note 338, at 598. See, for a historical perspective, Rosenberg, Jettisoning
Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REv. 341
(1978).
712. Rosenberg, supra note 338, at 633-34.
713. Id. at 633 n.187.
714. Id. at 634.
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sanctions for failure to do sO.'"715 The Court, Professor Rosenberg thus con-
cludes, has almost rendered habeas corpus "an extraordinary remedy con-
fined to prevention of miscarriages of justice, '7 16 an "ongoing evisceration
[which] roughly tracks the Court's constriction of substantive constitutional
rights," 7 17 leaving only "shards of the original rulings."
71 s
Other respected commentators paint a similarly gloomy picture. Pro-
fessor Hill predicted eight years ago, figuratively, that "we may well be on
the way to revival of the pre-Fay7 19 principle that a procedural forfeiture by
a federal or state prisoner will be fatal to the prisoner, on direct review and
collateral attack alike, unless the forfeiture is incompatible with the Federal
Constitution. ' 720 In Smith, this figurative prediction becomes a literal
reality.
One final issue of significance to the entire question raised implicitly by
Smith is the link between the procedural default doctrine and the criminal
defendant's right to be represented by competent counsel.72 1 The right of
715. Id. Cf. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897) ("Certainty generally
is [an] illusion"), and see generally Bradley, supra note 647.
716. Rosenberg, supra note 338 at 640; see also Comment, The Burger Court and Federal Review
for State Habeas Petitioners After Engle v. Isaac, 31 KAN. L. REV. 605, 634 (1983) (Supreme Court
in Engle, 456 U.S. 207, 135 (1982), "creates precisely the avenue for the 'miscarriage[s] ofjustice' it
professes to avoid").
717. Rosenberg, supra note 338 at 641. He refers here to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
and Miranda, "whose holdings remain only in skeletal form," id. at 641 n.237. But see, infra text
accompanying notes 884-94.
718. Id. See also Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal
by Indirection, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 545, 580 (1977):
Rather than forthrightly confronting [Warren Court] decisions and seeking to reverse
them openly, some members of the Court have apparently chosen to cripple them covertly
by dismantling the apparatus needed for their enforcement. While reasonable persons may
agree or disagree with many of the substantive decisions of the Warren Court, if they are to
be reversed, it should be pursuant to an open process after full argument, rather than by
emasculation of the federal courts.
719. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 711, at 372, for a
historical overview of the "fall of Noia," and see Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 338, at 1069-72,
for a discussion of the "erosion of Fay v. Noia."
720. Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050,
1096 (1978) (emphasis added).
721. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), establishing an "objective,"
id. at 2065, standard for attorney performance of "reasonably effective assistance," id. at 2064, mea-
sured by "simple reasonableness under prevailing professional norms," id. at 2065. In determining
whether counsel's assistance was "so defective as to require reversal," id. at 2064, the Court laid
down a two-part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This re-
quires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the con-
viction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders
the result unreliable.
Id.
Strickland has been criticized vigorously as "unfortunate and misguided," Genego, The Failure
of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 181, 182 (1984), for having been written so as "to ensure that the review test will
produce the same results as the old 'farce and mockery-due process' test," id. at 196, of being
"poisoned with obtrusive subjectivity," Note, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Quandry: The
Debate Continues, 18 AKRON L. REv. 325, 334 (1984), for establishing a "nearly-standardless, seem-
ingly-impossible-to-fail test," Perlin, supra note 9, at 164, and for presenting as a standard what "is
1987]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
representation is seen by Professor Meltzer as "the doctrine most pertinent"
to default questions.722 Writing prior to the Court's Smith and Strick-
land 723 decisions, Professor Resnik saw Sykes as standing for the proposi-
tion that failures by criminal defense attorneys to follow state court
objection rules may, "absent something deliberately not fully defined [in
Sykes], but labeled 'cause and prejudice,' make state first-tier rulings unas-
sailable in federal court." 724 Looking at the other side of the same coin,
Professor Rosenberg-writing after Strickland (not coincidentally, a death
penalty decision)-phrased the problem in this manner:
[W]ith respect to individuals represented by merely competent
criminal defense attorneys who are not prescient or skilled to be on the
cutting edge of constitutional litigation, the "demands of comity and
finality" require that defendants forfeit the opportunity to vindicate
their constitutional rights through federal court habeas corpus actions.
Thus, defendants face a formidable "Catch-22": counsel for the de-
fendant may be sufficiently competent to preclude an ineffective assist-
ance claim, yet insufficiently astute to enable the accused to avoid a
procedural default or to meet the apparently more difficult cause and
prejudice requirements. 725
Similarly, reading Strickland in light of Sykes, Professor Berger has
concluded that the Court's "rock-bottom focus on 'fundamental fairness' in
habeas corpus may be exerting a general downward pull on the law [as t]he
justices have simply grown used to discussing constitutional rights in base
line terms and blending enumerated guarantees with an eviscerated version
of due process."1726 As a result, the justices now march "less to the tune of
Gideon's trumpet than the faraway beat of Betts v. Brady:"72 7
In sum, we see an increasing use by the Court of a primitive mis-
carriage-of-justice test as a sort of universal solvent, a touchstone for
both the content of constitutional rights and the availability of federal
remedies. With respect to remedies, the trend is most pronounced in
the area of forfeited points: with regard to rights, Strickland and
Cronic728 furnish a prime and sad illustration. For many defendants
who are poor, ignorant, or just unlucky729 in their choice of lawyers
largely a concept without workable substance," Hagel, Toward a Uniform Statutory Standard for
Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Right in Search of Definition After Strickland, 17 LOYOLA U.L.J.
203, 209 (1986).
For post-Strickland cases, see Perlin, supra note 9, at 160 n.436, and see United States ex rel.
Franzen v. Rivera, 594 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Ill. 1984), discussed in Perlin, supra note 9, at 160-64.
But see, Alvord v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
ar), discussed infra note 816.
722. Meltzer, supra note 695, at 1186.
723. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); see supra note 721.
724. Resnik, supra note 701; at 891 (footnote omitted).
725. Rosenberg, supra note 338, at 617-18. After Strickland, the "troubling possibility" remains
that a defendant "may forfeit the right to assert constitutional claims of a sophisticated nature in
federal habeas actions if he or she is represented by a 'merely' competent criminal lawyer." Id. at
619-20.
726. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End? 86
COLUM. L. Rav. 9, 99 (1986).
727. Id.
728. United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), argued "in tandem" with Strickland.
729. Or mentally disabled. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 157 ("The problems with the Court's
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(or the state's choice of lawyers for them), assistance of counsel is now
a greatly debilitated safeguard.
730
Partially because "life and death should not be decided by a roulette
wheel assigning lawyers to capital defendants," 731 Professor Meltzer has
suggested the adoption of special procedural default rules in capital cases
where "the finality of the punishment requires less finality in the process.
'732
When a capital defendant raises a "nonfrivolous constitutional question,
neither state nor federal courts should be free to refuse to decide it simply
because it was not raised in accordance with state procedural requirements.
Rather, federal law should expressly provide that in matters of procedural
default, as in other matters, death is different.' '733 As Smith teaches us, how-




Allen has not been construed as of yet, and it is thus difficult to deter-
mine what its ultimate impact will be in sex offender prosecutions in other
jurisdictions. This is also true of involuntary civil commitment cases, espe-
cially in light of the fact that defendant's counsel conceded the privilege's
inapplicability in the latter situations.
On the other hand, the court stressed that its decision was premised on
both the promise of treatment and the lack of punitive motive.7 3 6 It is there-
fore conceivable that other courts might seek to distinguish Allen from other
fact patterns: where, for example, treatment has been demonstrably ab-
sent; 7 37 where punitive confinement conditions are present;738 or where there
are no relevant differences between the treatment afforded patients and
felons.
739
holding [in Strickland] are reflected in its treatment of trial counsel's failure to obtain a psychiatric
evaluation in preparation for his client's capital sentencing hearing").
730. Berger, supra note 726, at 100 (footnotes omitted).
731. Meltzer, supra note 695, at 1221; see also, id. at 1234 (the right to effective assistance of
counsel should be taken "more seriously").
732. Id. at 1221.
733. Id. at 1222 (emphasis added).
734. Cf Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2672 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Meltzer, supra, note
695).
735. Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 406-56.
736. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2994.
737. See, eg., Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 132 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 458 U.S.
1101 (1982), on remand 691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982) (in 24 years of plaintiff's confinement, "neither
a psychiatrist nor a psychologist had seen him individually on any regular basis"); Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 515 (5th cir. 1974), vacated and remanded 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (plaintiff
talked to the two psychiatrists in charge of his case for a total of three hours in ten years).
738. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (D.N.J. 1978), supp'l 476 F. Supp. 1294
(D.N.J. 1979), mod. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on
remand 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (recounting beating of patients by attendant while patient tied
to bed). See also, Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973) (the "mere characteriza-
tion of an act as 'treatment' does not insulate it from Eighth Amendment scrutiny").
739. On the question of the applicability of the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative to
persons so housed, see Petition of Thompson, 394 Mass. 502, 476 N.E.2d 216 (1985). On the ques-
tion of the minimum due process standards at a discharge hearing for sex offenders, see State v.
Higginbotham, 110 Wis. 2d 393, 329 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1982). On the question of the suffi-
ciency of evidence in such a case, see State v. Ward, 369 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1985).
See also German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERs L. REV. 1011 (1976).
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It is finally ironic that, only two terms ago, the Supreme Court noted
"the plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. "740
Discussing the proper allocation of responsibility for administration of a
Pennsylvania state facility for the mentally retarded in a case which greatly
expanded the role of the eleventh amendment in public institutional cases, 74 '
Justice Powell-speaking for a five-justice majority-noted:
As the District Court in this case found, "History is replete with
misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded." ... It is com-
mon knowledge that "insane asylums," as they were known until the
middle of the century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It
is not easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions,
particularly well trained professionals. Physical facilities, due to con-
sistent underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inade-
quate--especially in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for
the treatment of the mentally ill .... Only recently have States com-
menced to correct widespread deplorable conditions. The responsibil-
ity ... has rested on the State itself.74 2
Allen makes no reference to this decision.
743
(4) Ford7 "
Ford is both a curious and difficult opinion. Ford both reflects much of
the ambiguity and ambivalence which permeates this subject-matter, 745 and
serves as a paradigm for the Court's confusion. Ford, to some extent, also
illustrates the Court's use of rationalization 746 as a means of dealing with
most of the cases in question.
First, the difficulty which is always faced in the application of a plural-
ity opinion 747 will be increased where the states have enacted such a wide
range of statutory vehicles for making the critical determination, 748 and
where it is truly not clear what sort of procedures a state need enact to meet
Ford's standards. Professor Greenawalt aptly quotes Benno Schmidt in a
740. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 912 n.16 (1984).
741. Id. at 911-12.
742. Id. at 912 n.16 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
743. Also absent from the Allen opinion is any mention of Romeo v. Youngberg, 451 U.S. 307,
319 (1982), the only United States Supreme Court opinion dealing with the substantive treatment
rights of the mentally handicapped (finding right to "minimally adequate or reasonable training to
ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint").
More surprisingly, there is no mention in either the Allen majority or dissenting opinion of
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). In Specht, the Supreme Court construed the Colorado Sex
Offender's Act to lead to "criminal punishment even though it is designed not so much as retribution
as it is to keep individuals from inflicting future harm," id. at 608-09, and thus ruled that the due
process clause required that the defendant "be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be
heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evi-
dence of his own," id. at 610.
744. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 507-619.
745. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 167-69.
746. 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY 66 (1954): Rationalization is a
mechanism of defense in which the ego substitutes an acceptable reason for an unacceptable one in
order to explain a given action or attitude. This is carried on primarily to delude the superego [see
infra note 903] into accepting something which might otherwise result in guilt.
747. See supra note 549.
748. See, eg., Ward, supra note 37, at 72-76.
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different context but to the same end: "a confused opinion whose underlying
principles cannot be confidently ascertained may have much the same effect
of limiting the scope of the decision to the immediate facts as would a very
narrowly drawn opinion."
749
Second, there are significant inconsistencies between the positions ar-
ticulated in the various Ford opinions and positions with which the Court
has appeared to be entirely comfortable in the past:
1) Justice Powell's position that the only question is not "whether but
when"750 ignores the possibility that organic brain damage, for instance,
could make a once-competent-to-be-executed defendant become irreversibly
incompetent. The mirror image of this problem is that, in a state that has
abolished the insanity defense, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a
defendant like the petitioner in Jackson v. Indiana7 5 1 might face
execution.
752
2) Justice Powell's reliance on Parham v. J. 53 for the proposition
that the protections of the adversary process in proceedings to determine the
appropriateness of medical decisions "may well be more illusory than
real" 754 is astonishing when applied to a death penalty case. Parham coun-
tenanced looser procedural safeguards in the juvenile commitment context,
in part, because of the assumption that "natural bonds of affection lead par-
ents to act in the best interests of their children. ' 755 Certainly, no one would
suggest that such a benign motive propels state action in a capital punish-
ment case.
3) At its base, Justice Rehnquist's dissent, co-signed by the Chief Jus-
tice, sees little purpose in "constitutionalizing 756 the competency-to-be exe-
cuted procedures, since he views the problem as basically a trivial one: no
state sanctions execution of "the insane," so why "needlessly complicatel
and postponefl still further any finality in this area of the law?" 757 This is a
far cry from the Chief Justice's familiar position in O'Connor v. Donald-
son 758 that there can be "little responsible debate regarding 'the uncertainty
of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' ,,759
4) Both Justice Rehnquist's and Justice O'Connor's opinions remain
obsessed with the feat that defendants will raise "false" 760 or "spurious
749. Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982,
1004 n.76 (1978).
750. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying note 585.
751. 406 U.S. 715, 726 (1972) ("There is nothing in the record that even points to any possibility
that Jackson's present condition can be remedied at any future time").
752. See, eg., People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970) (defendant
indicted for murder in case "virtually indistinguishable" from the clinical and procedural facts of
Jackson). See 406 U.S. at 735-36.
753. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
754. Id. at 609, quoted in Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2611 (Powell, J., concurring).
755. Parham, 442 U.S. at 618, citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *447, 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *190.
756. See Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
757. Id.
758. 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
759. Id., quoting in part, Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
760. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1987]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
claims" 761 in desperate attempts to stave off execution. This fear-a doppel-
ganger of the public's "swift and vociferous ... outrage" 762 over what it
perceives as "abusive" 763 insanity acquittals, which allow "guilty" defend-
ants to "beat the rap" 764-was responded to more than adequately almost
150 years ago by Dr. Isaac Ray, the father of American forensic psychiatry:
The supposed insurmountable difficulty of distinguishing between
feigned and real insanity has conduced, probably more than all other
causes together, to bind the legal profession to the most rigid construc-
tion and application of the common law relative to this disease, and is
always put forward in objection to the more humane doctrines.
765
On the other hand, at least one inevitable outcome of Ford will be that
more clinicians will be aware of the problems involved and will begin to
stake out the competing positions outlined by Radelet and Barnard, Ward,
and Appelbaum, as a step towards, perhaps, "achieving consensus within the
professions. '766
RANDOM DECISIONS OR DOCTRINAL COHESION?
A. Guiding Principles?
A cursory examination of the cases just discussed appears to corrobo-
rate Professor Nagel's charge that the Burger Court has provided us with a
"fractured and uncertain quality of ... constitutional interpretation [and]
doctrinal inconsistency. '767 The decisions appear to create a crazy-quilt of
murky and inconsistent precedents, creating a "labyrinth of judicial uncer-
tainty," 768 and revealing no common jurisprudential or doctrinal thread, but
merely an unrelated series of outcome-determinative rulings which defy
meaningful characterization.
The opinions under consideration here seem to support all of Professor
Nagel's positions: Ake appears to reflect an "inexplicable reversal" of Bare-
foot and Jones; with regard to the actions of the psychiatric witnesses, Smith
stands in almost the same position vis a vis Estelle. The proliferation of Ford
opinions makes the understanding or resolution of one of the most profound
issues with which the Court will ever have to deal difficult, if not impossible.
761. Id. at 2615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
762. See I. KEILITZ & J. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A
GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (1984).
763. See Perlin, supra note 478, at 859, and see sources cited id. nn.6-7.
764. Id. at 860; see also, D. NiSSMAN, B. BARNES & G. ALPERT, BEATING THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE; DENYING THE LICENSE TO KILL (1980).
765. 1. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY § 247, at 243 (1962
ed.). See also, R. SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN
TRIALS 63 (1981) (in mid-eighteenth century Britain, psychiatrists were accused of "being biased in
favour of finding insanity and of being deceived by simulation").
766. Appelbaum, supra note 457, at 683.
767. Burger Comment, supra note 19, at 237. Professor Nagel finds futile the "great lengths" to
which some commentators have gone "to find harmony under the cacophony." Id. See also Frank,
The Burger Court-The First Ten Years, 43 LAWv & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 124 (1980) (Burger
Court has been "years of cacophony").
768. Bradley, supra note 647, at 14, quoting 2 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978), § 7.2
at 509, quoting People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 344 N.Y.S.2d 900, 298 N.E.2d 78 (,Vachtler, J.,
dissenting). See also Stone, Psychiatric Abuse and Legal Reform: Two Ways To Make a Bad Situa-
tion Worse, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 9, 15 (1982) (Supreme Court "embraces incoherence").
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Language in decisions such as Barefoot and Jones sanctions questionable leg-
islative judgments; Ford and Ake hold other questionable judgments consti-
tutionally impermissible. Allen may substantially undercut a Warren Court
decision 769 which it never cites; also, en passant, it calls into question a ma-
jor prong of the historic Gault decision. Greenfield and Estelle breathe life
into a staggering Miranda doctrine, but Smith and Allen reject similar
Miranda extensions. Smith, finally masks a repressive, punitive, and fatal
doctrine in sterile language of "procedural defaults," but the procedural de-
fault doctrine is rejected in Greenfield and Ake.
Is death, any more, different? Estelle says "yes;" Smith implies "no." Is
Gault still good law? Estelle implies "yes;" Allen suggests "no" or "not
completely." Must a defendant conform to common conceptions of "crazi-
ness" in order to succeed in a mental disability case? In Justice Rehnquist's
separate opinions in Estelle, Ake, Ford, and Greenfield, the answer is "abso-
lutely. Is empirical data credible? Justices Blackmun and Brennan insist it
is in their dissents in Barefoot and Jones, but the majority in Jones and Allen
pay it less than lip service.
Can these cases be meaningfully sorted out? Are these more than "ad
hoe, episodic opinions?" 770 A closer look might reveal some guiding princi-
ples in this area. First, it might be helpful to attempt to "factor" the cases to
examine how the court has dealt with certain elements in common: type of
penalty and crime, and type of psychiatric diagnosis. Second, an investiga-
tion of whether any or all of the justices have articulated positions which
appear to reflect any prevalent "themes" may help us understand their true
motivational concerns. Third, it is necessary to identify those extra-legal (or,
perhaps, more accurately, meta-legal), social, cultural, and psychological
principles which appear to be guiding the court in its decisionmaking. These
principles are important even though they may be influential on an unarticu-
lated or unconscious level. A close examination of these questions should
give us some idea as to whether or not there are "guiding principles" at
work, or whether the "doctrinal abyss" charge leveled twenty years ago is
indeed accurate.
1) "Factoring" the Cases
First, the fact that five of the eight cases in which the Supreme Court
has chosen to deal with issues affecting mentally disabled criminal defend-
ants are death cases is not coincidental.77 1 There is no reason to assume that
the members of the Court are any less the prisoners of symbolism than are
769. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
770. Howard, The Burger Court: A Judicial Nonet Plays the Enigma Variations, 43 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 24 (1980).
771. While all five homicide cases-Barefoot, Ake, Estelle, Smith, and Ford-were death penalty
cases, only Estelle involved a prototypic felony-murder fact pattern. Ake's case was part of a "crime
spree"; Smith's victim was a stranger, and Barefoot's a police officer. While Ford's murder grew out
of a robbery (like Estelle's), his victim was a police officer.
Of the other three cases, two involved sexual crimes (Greenfield and Allen), and one (Jones) a
minor charge (shoplifting).
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the rest of us. 772 The Court has continued to adhere rigidly to a policy
which "look[s] with disfavor on further efforts to impede application of the
death penalty. ' 773 This is evidenced by its adoption of an accelerated ap-
peals schedule in Barefoot in response to its "irritation at the use of multiple
habeas corpus petitions as a tool to thwart the imposition of the death pen-
alty," 774 and through its employment in Smith 775 of the procedural default
doctrine first articulated in Sykes. 776 Nevertheless, although the conse-
quences may be death,777 the fact that this substantive argument was im-
properly preserved below is dispositive of the case. That the introduction of
the psychiatric evidence violated the constitution by making the defendant
the "deluded instrument of his own conviction" 778 was substantively virtu-
ally unassailable. Such a crabbed approach to the constitutional issues ap-
pears to cruelly mimic Dickens' description in Bleak House of nineteenth
century Chancery practice, albeit with far higher stakes.779 This adherence
to Sykes in Smith-where death is the result-may be a significant clue to
understanding the Court's true view of these cases.
Second, of the eight defendants, the prevailing diagnosis in four cases-
Estelle, Barefoot, Allen, and Smith-was the generally-discarded and dis-
credited "sociopath" or "psychopath," while in the other four cases, the de-
fendants--Greenfield,780 Ake, Jones, and Ford-appeared to meet the
general criteria compatible with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. There seems
little question as to the severity of, at least, Jones', Ake's and Ford's major
mental illnesses. Jones' insanity defense was not contested.781 In Ake's
counsel's somewhat florid description, he was "goofier than hell." The viru-
lence of Ford's system of delusions and hallucinations was not even ques-
tioned seriously by those justices obsessed with the "fear of faking.
'782
Although the perils of diagnosis are well-known to all, 783 an attempt to
divide the cases by this determinant reveals that the only diagnosed soci-
opath to "win" was the defendant in Estelle (the first case of the eight to be
decided, and, perhaps, the Burger Court's highwater Miranda mark). The
only defendant diagnosed other than as a sociopath to "lose" was Jones (a
772. See Tyler & Weber, supra note 9; symbolism in a related context is discussed in Perlin,
supra note 9, at 91 n.1. See infra text accompanying notes 849-937.
773. Perlin, supra note 9, at 167.
774. Id. at 101.
775. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986).
776. See supra note 338.
777. See supra note 364.
778. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981), quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
581 (1962); see also, Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2675, quoting Culombe (Stevens, J., dissenting).
779. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HousE 3 (1904). See, e.g., W. HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS
A LEGAL HISTORIAN 86 (1928); A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 48-49
(1955).
780. Although there was a dispute as to Greenfield's diagnosis, a reasonable reading of the medi-
cal evidence in the case would suggest that this flowed from the defendant's raising of the insanity
defense, and that there was no real question as to his psychosis. See Greenfield Respondent's Brief,
supra note 278, at 17-18.
781. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
782. The psychiatrists who examined Ford for the Governor's sanity hearing, see Ford, 106 S.
Ct. at 2599, all couched their diagnosis solely in terms of cognitive abilities; i.e., the defendant's
ability to intellectually comprehend his pending execution,
783. See Appelbaum, supra note 45, at 173-74 (critiquing use of "sociopath" diagnosis).
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case that the Court was clearly using as a vehicle for an explicit social
agenda: the diminution of the use of the insanity defense in the wake of the
Hinckley acquittal).
2) Justices' "Themes"
The views of several of the justices on the types of questions before the
court in the eight cases in question appear to be fairly well crystallized. Four
justices-Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun consistently, Stevens gener-
ally784 -have articulated positions that are sympathetic to the plight of the
mentally disabled criminal defendant. These justices are suspicious of over-
blown claims of psychiatric expertise in matters dealing with the predictivity
of dangerousness and evince a willingness to extend procedural due process
protections in a wider variety of fact-settings. Their opinions are supportive
of the application of the Miranda doctrine in cases involving both psychiat-
ric and police activity, and reject the majority's efforts to broaden the spectre
of "procedural default." Notwithstanding the deep suspicion of psychiatric
predictive expertise, Justice Marshall, especially, looks at the multiple roles a
psychiatrist can play in aiding a defendant in "marshal[ling] his defense. '785
The other five-who typically make up the majority in a case where the
mentally disabled defendant "loses"-7 8 6 -do not approach the cases in such a
uniform way. Justice White's faith in the jury's ability to separate the
"wheat from the chaff"'787 enables him to sanction the admission of testi-
mony as to future dangerousness by a witness who has, in 120 of 120 capital
cases in which he has testified, never testified that a capital defendant would
not meet statutory criteria of "future dangerousness. ' 788 Justice White re-
tains this confidence in spite of overwhelming professional agreement that, in
a "best-case analysis," the types of psychiatric predictions relied upon by the
state as to future dangerousness are wrong two out of three times.7
89
Justice Powel 790 is willing to expand earlier opinions sanctioning fewer
safeguards for certain populations.7 91 He would apply the rationale of these
cases in Ford to competence-to-be-executed decisions and, in Jones, to com-
mitment and release hearings for insanity acquittees. He also appears to be
entirely comfortable leaving many of the hard questions in the area to medi-
784. In this term, Justice Stevens joined the other three on each case, writing for the court in
Greenfield, and authoring the dissents in Smith and Allen. In earlier terms, he concurred in the
judgment of the court in Barefoot, and dissented separately in Jones.
785. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1095.
786. E.g. Allen, Smith, Jones, Barefoot.
787. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 n.7.
788. Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 708-10 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1985).
789. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), relying on J. MONAHAN, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981). The state's witness at Barefoot's
habeas hearing had conceded that Monahan was the "leading thinker" at work in this area today.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899-900 n.7.
790. The author of Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984) (expanding scope of eleventh amendment
in federal cases brought against state officials on state law bases; see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note
26).
791. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (juveniles); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497




Justice O'Connor appears eager to expand the procedural default doc-
trine in Smith (notwithstanding the unique procedural posture of a death
case793 or the special issues raised by psychiatric testimony); also, she ex-
presses fear that Ford will inspire other defendants to feign insanity in last-
ditch efforts to cheat death.
Chief Justice Burger remains overwhelmingly ambivalent, and offers the
widest range of positions. Building on his years of involvement with similar
issues on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 794 and his earlier opin-
ions in civil cases, 795 he first authors Estelle-expanding Miranda and rais-
ing the issue of psychiatric expertise in dangerousness predictivity
problems-but then concurs in Ake (to limit its application to capital cases),
and is the sole member of the court to join in Justice Rehnquist's Ford dis-
sent and Greenfield concurrence. In addition, the Chief Justice joins in the
majority in Smith (reflecting that, in his core value system, Smith's lawyer's
trivial appellate796 default outweighs the importance of his client's on-the-
merits Estelle claim). Finally, Chief Justice Burger joins in the majority in
Allen, sanctioning fewer procedural due process protections because of the
promise of treatment, notwithstanding his solitary concurrences in
O'Connor797 and Youngberg798 as to the constitutional invalidity of such a
right.
Justice Rehnquist 799 is implacable and his positions are clear. He is the
only justice not to join in any of the opinions in which the defendants
"won." 8 His concurrences-urging-limitations in Estelle and Greenfield re-
veal a vision of mental disability that virtually mirrors public perceptions:
he sees an importance in the Estelle defendant's failure to "invoke ... [his]
rights when confronted with Dr. Grigson's questions"8 0' (Le., since he
wasn't "really crazy,"18 0 2 his failure to complain should be seen as proba-
tive),8 0 3 and focuses explicitly on Greenfield's appearance: when given his
792. Compare State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (1975) (determinations as to danger-
ousness, "while requiring the court to make use of the assistance which medical testimony may
provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one"), with Youngberg v. Romeo, 451 U.S. 307, 322
(1982) ("We emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional").
793. See generally Meltzer, supra note 695, at 1221.
794. See, eg., Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Campbell v. United
States, 377 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (insanity
acquittee's right to treatment).
795. See, eg., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(would find no right to treatment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 518 (1979) (burden of proof);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (juvenile commitment standards); see also, Youngberg, 457 U.S.
at 329 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting concept of constitutional right to treatment).
796. Cf. Note, supra note 338, at 465.
797. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
798. Youngberg v. Romeo, 451 U.S. 307 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment).
799. The author of Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
800. The use of the word "won" is concededly somewhat Orwellian. Glenn Ake, for instance,
was retried, and sentenced to life imprisonment. See High Court Appellant Found Guilty in 2d Trial,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, at 15 (insanity defense rejected by jury).
801. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 475 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
802. See infra notes 807-12.
803. It is not clear under Justice Rehnquist's formulation how any person-mentally disabled or
otherwise-would know to invoke his or her rights at an uncounseled Estelle-type examination.
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Miranda warnings, he was not "incoherent or obviously confused or unbal-
anced" 8 4 (Le., he didn't "look" crazy).
Justice Rehnquist is the lone dissenter in Ake, expressing concerns of
feigning805 in the face of staggeringly-unanimous professional diagnosis and
lay observation as to the profundity of Ake's mental illness. In his Ford
dissent, in addition to rejecting the argument that the eighth amendment
applies to the execution of the insane, he again raises the spectre of sane
capitally-sentenced defendants seeking to "cheat" death by raising spurious,
multiple claims of insanity. Writing for the majority in Allen; he rejects the
notion that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to committed sex
offenders on the thin reed of the promise of treatment, in an area where
unanimous scholarly and professional opinion appears to reveal that such a
promise is virtually oxymoronic.
806
3) Extra-Legal Principles
It might next be helpful to identify what other motivating social, cul-
tural, and psychological principles-all extra- or meta-legal in nature-
guide the court as a whole in its decisionmaking. First, the Court remains
fearful of ordering the execution of a "truly insane" person. 07 Writing in an
entirely different context, 80 8 Professor Stephen Morse has suggested that, if
any group of the mentally disabled is to be singled out for disparate treat-
ment, it should be "only [that] tiny fraction of crazy persons809 who seem
clearly and totally crazy." 810 While courts and jurors are suspicious of most
insanity claims,811 the Supreme Court still shies away from ordering the exe-
804. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
805. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1101 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
806. See supra note 738 (quoting Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973)).
807. Perlin, supra note 9, at 166.
808. Morse, supra note 16. Although Morse discusses the insanity defense briefly, id. at 640-45,
his article is globally concerned with whether there should be specifically different legal treatment of
those "recognizably abnormal" persons who behave "crazily," id. at 652.
809. He defines "crazy" generally as "an intuitive or commonplace meaning of abnormal that
reflects social evaluations and values." Id. at 549.
810. Id. at 654. See also, Mestrovic, Need for Treatment and New York's Revised Commitment
Laws: An Empirical Assessment, 6 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 75, 78 (1983) (in assessing admission
to facility, public hospital staff "essentially concerned with [the] idea of 'normal craziness' that en-
ables one to function versus 'more than normal craziness' ").
811. See, eg., Perlin, supra note 9, at 166 n.482; Ellsworth, supra note 9; Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1099,
1101 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that there was credible evidence that Ake had told his
cellmate he was going to try to "play crazy"); Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 641, 642 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (defendant's request for lawyer tends to show he "is not incoherent or obviously con-
fused or unbalanced"); 1984 Term, supra note 666, at 133 n.25 (criticizing Justice Rehnquist's Ake
opinion); see also, Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2611, 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("the potential for false claims and deliberate delay in this context is obviously enormous");
Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2613, 2615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (majority opinion "offers an invitation to
those who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely spurious claims of insanity").
Justice Rehnquist's vision-linking sanity to a "normal appearance"-is not a unique one. See
Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Setting, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 143, 147
(1975) ("[Tirial judges will say 'He doesn't look sick to me,' or, even more revealingly, 'He is as
healthy as you or me'), and id. at 147-48 quoting Laswell, Foreward, in R. ARENS, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE xi (1974) (judges, jurors and attorneys have been adverse to enlarge the scope of the in-
sanity defense "especially if the defendants failed to conform to popular images of'craziness' ") (em-
phasis added). Arens graphically reproduces transcripts of two competency hearings conducted by
the same judge on the same day in which he merely asks defendants the date, the names of the
President and Vice President and Washington's standing in the American League. Id. at 77-79. The
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cution of a defendant who appears to be, in Professor Morse's words,
"clearly and totally crazy," or, in the words of Glenn Ake's trial counsel,
"goofier than hell." 812
This is not a new point of view, of course: writing in 1817, John Has-
lam, in one of the first treatises on medical jurisprudence, set out the issue in
florid prose still applicable in American courtrooms today:81 3 "It is not ec-
centricity, habitual gusts of passion, ungovernable impetuosity of temper,
nor the phrensy of intoxication, but a radicalperversion of intellect, sufficient
to convince the jury that the party was bereft of the reason of an ordinary
man." 814 It is striking that the defendants in Ake and Ford (and perhaps in
Greenfield and Jones, two of the three non-death penalty cases) met Morse's
and Haslam's test.
8 15
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Jones-the one case that involved
a trivial, underlying offense (shoplifting)-makes the point as well as any
other decision. The Court fears the "smokescreen" of a spurious insanity
defense, and thus insures that defense lawyers will not seek that plea in a
last-ditch effort to avoid conviction, 816 so as to insure that only the "truly
motion of the defendant who answered all four questions correctly was denied; the defendant who
knew only the President's name was ordered held for psychiatric evaluation. Id.
812. See supra note 156. See also C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 52-54 (1974), quoted in White, supra note 312, at 943 n.2:
[Although [w]e are committed, as a society, not to execute people whose action is
attributable to what we call "insanity," [nevertheless,] where the crime exhibits a total wild
departure from normality, we come exactly to the point where consideration of the insanity
problem is at once most necessary and most difficult.
813. See Ellsworth, supra note 9.
814. J. HASLAM, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES TO INSANITY ACCORDING TO THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 50 (1817) (1979 reprint). Haslam noted that, while "insanity may be counter-
feited by the criminal, in order to defeat the progress of justice," id. at 60, such deception is virtually
impossible to effectuate: "To sustain the character of a paroxysm of active insanity would require a
continuity of exertion beyond the power of a sane person." Id. See also Smith, supra note 765, at 90-
92 (on the nineteenth century public's view of "raving lunatics" who committed crimes).
815. Another three (Barefoot, Ernest Smith in Estelle, and Michael Smith) were classified as
"sociopathic," a diagnostic category which has been characterized as a "garbage pail" grouping by
prominent psychiatrists for over half a century, and which is not listed by the American Psychiatric
Association in DSM-III, see generally, supra note 215.
It is probably not insignificant that, in affirming the denial of Michael Smith's habeas corpus
petition, the Fourth Circuit premised its decision, in addition to the procedural default issue (see
supra text accompanying note 342), on the fact that the jury had relied on two distinct aggravating
factors in recommending the death penalty, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1983), and that only
one of these was related to the subject matter affected by the psychiatric testimony. See Smith v.
Procunier, 769 F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1985). In other words, putting aside the psychiatric testi-
mony issue, the jury found an independent reason to recommend the death penalty. But see, Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court of Ap-
peals misread Zant).
816. But see Alvord v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari), where defense counsel accepted his client's refusal to rely on the insanity defense without
independently investigating either his client's mental or criminal history, in a case where the record
demonstrated "unequivocally" that defendant had history of mental illness and a prior insanity
acquittal.
The lower court has countenanced a view of counsel's constitutional duty that is blind
to the ability of the individual defendant to understand his situation and usefully assist in
his defense. The result is to deny the persons who are most in need of it the educated
counsel of an attorney.
Id. at 360 (Marshall, L, dissenting from denial of certiorari).
On the question of a defendant's right to refuse the imposition of an NGRI plea, see, e.g. State
v. Kahn, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 417 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1980); Fredak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364
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crazy" are so exempted from responsibility. As Justice Rehnquist noted in
Ake, the defendant's post-crime spree "would not seem to raise any question
of sanity unless one were to adopt the dubious doctrine that no one in his
right mind would commit a murder. '817
On the other hand, the available empirical data also reflects another
undeniable reality to which the court has paid no attention: the percentage
of death row inmates with serious psychiatric problems is staggeringly high.
An extensive and careful study of fifteen death row inmates nearing execu-
tion done by Dr. Dorothy Lewis and her colleagues revealed that all the
prisoners had histories of severe head injuries, that of the fifteen, twelve had
neurological impairments (assessed as "major" in five of the cases), that six
were chronically psychotic and two manic-depressive. 818 Perhaps most im-
portantly, malingering was ruled out since "almost all of the abnormalities
identified could be confirmed with objective evidence [e.g., hospital records,
CAT scans, paralysis]."
819
However, not all of these inmates appeared "totally crazy." Dr. Lewis
notes that, at first glance, "none of the subjects seemed flamboyantly schizo-
phrenic, ' 820 and it was only after "long interviews, hospital record reviews,
psychological assessments, and interviews with relatives" that "the nature
and extent of psychopathology in the group" could be appreciated. 821 As-
tonishingly, all but one of the subjects attempted to minimize their psychiat-
ric disorders, "preferring, it seemed, to appear 'bad,' rather than 'crazy.' "822
Second, a majority of the Court appears to feel that cases raising issues
of mental disability are, somehow, "different." In quietly expanding the
scope of its earlier civil decisions in cases such as Addington 823 and
Parham,824 the Court takes the position that cases involving mental illness
questions can somehow be dealt with in a way different from, and with con-
cededly fewer due process protections, than the more stringent criteria de-
manded in other factfinding investigations.
825
Allen clarifies that the promise of treatment (which may or may not be
(D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 637 (1980).
817. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1101 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
818. Lewis, supra note 486. Cf. Adler, supra note 500, at 32 (After Ford, "the detection of
malingering is going to have to be something that is really salient").
819. Lewis, supra note 486, at 842-43.
Elsewhere, Ward has cited evidence that as many as fifty percent of Florida's death row inmates
"become intermittently insane." Ward, supra note 37, at 42. See also Johnson, Life Under Sentence
of Death, in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 129 (R. Johnson & H. Toch, eds. 1982).
820. Lewis, supra note 486, at 840.
821. Id. at 840-41.
822. Id. at 841. On the feigning of sanity, see P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 165 (1958),
discussing the factual backdrop of Commonwealth v. Ballem, 386 Pa. 20, 123 A.2d 728 (1956), cert.
denied 352 U.S. 932 (1956).
823. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 518 (1979).
824. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
825. See, for an analysis of Addington, Parham, and Pennhurst I, Note, Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment: The Inadequacy of Existing Procedural and Substantive Protections, 28 UCLA L. REv.
906, 951 (1981) (decisions are consistent in that they "clearly" convey the "message" that the
Supreme Court does not view the federal courts as an appropriate forum in which involuntarily
committed individuals may assert their rights).
1987]
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illusory) 826 is enough to remove sex offender cases from the full mantle of
procedural due process protections available in criminal trials. This reduc-
tion produces, in the words of Justice Stevens' dissent, "a shadow criminal
law without the fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment [which]
conflicts with the respect for liberty and individual dignity that has long
charaterized, and that continues to characterize, our free society. '8 27 The
same reduction can be seen in Justice Powell's separate opinion in Ford, sug-
gesting that "due process minus" might be sufficient in hearings to determine
whether or not an individual is competent to be executed, citing to the civil
line of cases. 8
28
Third, the Burger Court remains overwhelmingly ambivalent about the
role of psychiatry and other mental health professions in the adjudicative
process.829 While this may be traced to some degree to the Chief Justice's
long-term fascination with this topic while he served on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 830 (especially in cases involv-
ing a "sociopathic" diagnosis),8 31 the decisions clearly indicate that much of
the court is troubled by this problem.
After consistently making reference in O'Connor and Addington to the
vagaries and unreliability of psychiatric testimony in civil cases (where com-
mitment to a hospital is the result), the court blithely sanctions the admis-
sion of broad ranging psychiatric evidence in Barefoot in spite of the
strongest possible disclaimer from the American Psychiatric Association,
and then demurs to the fact that the statutory scheme it upholds in Jones
flies in the face of virtually unanimous psychiatric knowledge.832 Remarka-
bly, the Jones majority re-cites the "uncertainty of diagnosis" cases, drawing
from them the lesson that "courts should pay particular deference to reason-
able legislative judgments," a quite different lesson than seen by Justice
Blackmun in dissent in Barefoot or Justice Brennan in dissent in Jones.833
Yet, the Court turns around and recognizes in Ake that this ambiguity risks
an "inaccurate resolution of sanity issues,"'834 thus compelling expert assist-
ance to indigent defendants.835
Psychiatrists have begun to take notice of this ambivalence as well.
For, as part of the process by which the law begins to question concepts that
826. See supra text accompanying notes 741-43, discussing Penhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
827. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 3000 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
828. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2611 (Powell, J., concurring).
829. Perlin, supra note 9, at 167.
830. Id. at 168. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 611-16 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(Burger, J., dissenting), discussed supra note 215.
831. Perlin, supra note 9, at 168.
832. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.13.
833. The Court's use of social science data has come under searing criticism in a broad variety of
mental disability cases. See, e.g., Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14
RUTGERS L.J. 595 (1983) (on Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)); Perry & Melton, Prece-
dential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633 (1983-
84); Perlin, supra note 9 (on Barefoot).
834. 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
835. See also Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2606 n.4 (noting Florida's statutory safeguards ensuring fairness
in incompetency to stand trial and involuntary civil commitment proceedings).
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psychiatrists "always held dear or [took] for granted, ' 836 the Supreme Court
has articulated positions that appear to reflect both ambivalence and incon-
sistency about the "role and efficacy" of psychiatrists. 837 The Court has
done this to such an extent that Paul Appelbaum has suggested that the
Court's unwillingness to confront the problems raised by cases such as Bare-
foot "leave[s] the ball in psychiatry's court.
'838
Indeed, it often appears that the Supreme Court is playing an elaborate
and ritualistic Alphonse-and-Gaston game with organized psychiatry. Ex-
tensive deference to psychiatric expertise is counseled in civil cases such as
Addington and Youngberg, while suspicion that psychiatrists cannot detect
malingering-a fear that has imprisoned the American legal system since the
early nineteenth century 39-permeates the writing of Justice Rehnquist and
is clear in Justice O'Connor's Ford opinion. If psychiatrists are competent to
testify as to dangerousness (in civil and criminal cases), and to make nearly-
unfettered treatment decisions in state-run institutions, why are they not
competent to ferret out the spurious insanity defense pleader84° or the com-
petent death row inmate who seeks to avoid execution? This question be-
comes even more perplexing since the only contemporary credible evidence
now available reveals that there are objective medical tests841 which can ver-
ify the presence of the full range of serious neurological disorders and disa-
bility suffered by the latter universe of defendants.
The Court, in short, appears paradoxically fascinated and repelled by
the role of psychiatry in the criminal trial process. While it eagerly
welcomes disreputable evidence (in Barefoot), it uses Jones to symbolically
narrow the universe of cases in which a psychodynamic explanation of aber-
rant behavior (L e., insanity defense testimony) will be offered. On one hand,
the Court suggests, psychiatrists are competent experts and this in the area
where all of the leading psychiatrists speak with a unified voice, saying
"We're not." On the other hand psychiatrists are little more than shamanis-
tic wizards 842
836. Sadoff, Changing Laws and Ethics for Psychiatrists, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
34, 39 (1977).
837. Malmquist, supra note 13, at 137.
838. Appelbaum, supra note 22, at 1004.
839. See Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra note 9, at 404 (quoting Dr. Isaac Ray; see supra
note 765). See also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897) (if a right to trial by jury as to
competency to be executed were to be conferred, "it would be wholly at the will of a convict to suffer
any punishment whatever, for the necessity of his doing so would depend solely upon his fecundity in
making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed by trial after trial") (emphasis added).
For what is probably the first recorded example of feigned insanity, see Cohn, Some Psychiatric
Phenomena in Ancient Law, in A. CARMI, S. SCHNEIDER & A. HEFEZ, PSYCHIATRY, LAW AND
ETHICS 59, 61 (1986) (David's decision to feign mental disorder so as to escape from King Saul; see 1
Samuel 21:13-16).
840. See Gerber, The Insanity Defense Revisited, [1984] ARiz. ST. L.J. 83, 117-18 (discussing
roots of President Nixon's charges that the defense has been subject to "unconscionable abuse by
defendants"); see also MacKenzie, New Code Would Alter Rules on Insanity, Wash. Post, Oct. 12,
1975, at C6, col. 1. See generally, Perlin, supra note 502, at 860; Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra
note 9, at 401.
841. See Diamond & Louisell, supra note 141, at 1340 ("The psychological sciences differ from
the biological sciences in that the subject matter of the former is not visible").
842. See, eg., W. BROMBERG, FROM SHAMAN TO PSYCHOTHERAPIST: A HISTORY OF THE
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 2-3 (1975) (Bronze Age shamans first used magical aids to con-
tribute to "mental ease"; attempts to invoke supernatural, "magical" powers "probably represents
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B. Sorting out Ambiguities and Searching for Symbols
What should one make of this remarkable state of affairs? 843 To some
extent the conflict may be no more than a reflection of the fact that, when
dealing with the mentally ill the Justices of the Supreme Court are con-
fronted by the same ambiguous emotions: "unconscious feelings, of awe, of
fear, of revulsion, of wonder," 844 which bring forth self-rationalization in all
the rest of us. For the Court's apparent randomness to come a bit more
clearly into focus, this "ambivalence and inconsistency" 845 must be consid-
ered in light of the powerful symbols of the insanity defense and the death
penalty.8 46 And this need is even greater in attempting to understand the
cases (Estelle and Greenfield squarely; Smith and Allen collaterally) which
are imbued with the additional layer of Miranda symbolism, an area of crim-
inal procedure about which the Court finds itself hopelessly fragmented.
8 47
1) Symbolism in General
If we define "symbol" in the Jungian sense-"the best possible expres-
sion for a complex fact not yet clearly apprended by consciousness"848-we
can see that the cases and issues in question are rich with multiple symbols:
the death penalty849 and the insanity defense,8 50 Miranda,51 the trial pro-
cess,852 and, finally, the conflicting symbols of the "Warren Court"853 and
the "Burger Court. 854
Making comprehension even more difficult is the reality that, in the law,
the earliest form of psychotherapy"); Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Vol. 230, No. 6 (June 1974), at 18 ("Psychiary... is the ultimate wizardry"); Steadman,
Predicting Dangerousness Among the Mentally Ill: Art, Magic, and Science, 6 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHI-
ARY 381, 382 (1983) (discussing whether expertise in predicting dangerousness--"so central to the
profession of psychiatry in the public's view"-"currently can be or ought to be considered science or
magic or art") (emphasis in original); Gunn, An English Psychiatrist Looks at Dangerousness, 10
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 143, 147 (1982) ("The psychiatrist is after all the medicine
man who heals anxiety, the man we call upon to take away our fears"). For a recent analysis in the
popular press of the public's ambiguity, see Bleak Days for Psychiatry: A Search For Answers, 98
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 25, 1985), at 73-74.
See also Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 926-27 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoting United States v.
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (scientific evidence is "likely to be shrouded with an
aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi").
843. See Dix I, supra note 44, at 217 (characterizing state of Texas law on use of expert testi-
mony to predict dangerousness as an "incredible state of affairs").
844. Perlin, supra note 9, at 168.
845. Malmquist, supra note 13, at 137.
846. See H. WEINHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 144-45 (1956) ("We can put to death only
creatures whom hatred and fear have convinced us are inhuman monsters").
847. See generally Stone, supra note 261.
848. Jung, On Psychic Energy, in 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG, THE STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE 75 (Hull trans. 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS] (empha-
sis added).
849. See Tyler & Weber, supra note 9.
850. See Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 KY. L.J. 263 (1982-83) ("the
insanity defense has become a scapegoat for the entire criminal justice system").
851. Saltzburg, supra note 20, at 199 n.335, citing G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADI-
TION 354-65 (1976) (Miranda engendered more public furor than any other Warren Court decision).
852. See generally, J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 18-20 (1935).
853. For a variety of relevant sources about the symbolic significance of the Warren Court, see,
e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 20, at 151-52 nn.l-10.
854. See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. BLASI,
ed., 1983).
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as in mysticism, 855 "no 'symbolic' object has only one meaning; it is always
several things at once."' 856 Moreover, "the very multiplicity of ... symbols
and symbolic processes prove that success [in reconciling and harmonizing
them] is doubtful." 857 This is so, in part, because, not all components of the
symbol can be "grasped by reason. ' 858 As Professor Erich Neumann has
pointed out, "While this is perfectly obvious with straightforward symbols
like the flag, the cross, etc., it is also true of more abstract ideas in so far as
these are concerned with symbolic realities.
859
Perhaps an examination of how the court views each of the key symbols
in the context of the cases in question will shed some helpful light on the
major issues with which this Article is concerned. I
a) Symbols of insanity defense and death penalty
It may thus be somewhat clearer why the members of the court--espe-
cially in badly-split opinions like Ford-invoke past sources "as symbolic
assurances of truths about judicial disinterestedness and legal continuity...
too complex to express literally in opinions. ' 860 While the court repressively
articulates sets of "formulaic rules" 861 to insure that the death penalty does
not remain "virtually an illusion"8 62 and expresses concern that a deceptive
defendant can avoid his.rightful punishment,8 63 it also understands-albeit
unconsciously-that it must stop one step short of shocking the con-
science 864 of the public by allowing the execution of the truly insane.
865
855. See J. FRANK, supra note 852, at 3-12 (on basic legal myths).
856. 14 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 848, at 443 (Hull trans. 1963). Jung added that "we are
all badly in need of the symbolic life" to "express the daily need of the soul." The Symbolic Life, in
18 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 848, at 267, 274 (Hull trans. 1976).
857. Psychology of the Transference, 16 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 848, at 163, 197 (Hull
trans. 1954).
858. E. NEUMANN, THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 367 (Hull trans.,
Princeton/Bollinger paperback ed. 1970).
859. Id. (emphasis added).
860. Greenawalt, supra note 750, at 1011.
861. See generally Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985). Professor
Nagel argues that the court's use of multi-pronged formulae distances the justices from their audi-
ence (the public) and their text (the Constitution). Also, its attempt to constrain the "activism" of
the federal judiciary has "created an irresponsible judicial freedom, while its attempts to locate a
middle ground between the fact-responsiveness of realism and the abstraction of conceptualism has
in reality led to a regulatory, abstract, and adversarial perspective." Id.
862. Perlin, supra note 9, at 102.
863. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 761-66, this is not a particularly new
complaint. See also, ag., M. KAVANAGH, THE CRIMINAL AND HIS ALLIES 90 (1928) (charging
that, because "skillful criminal lawyers" can turn insanity defense trials into "emotional disputes...
in cases where insanity is presented as a defense, so many verdicts which outrage justice are re-
turned"). On the use of the word "outrage" to describe insanity acquittals which puzzle and/or
shock and/or frighten the public, see Perlin, supra note 478, at 859 n.6.
Similarly, the court's focus on the underlying admission of a criminal act as inherent in an
insanity defense plea (see Jones, 463 U.S. at 364), is used as a partial justification of longer terms of
institutionalization for individuals who enter such a plea. See supra text accompanying notes 656-
64.
864. See, eg., Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh
v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment,
29 STANFORD L. REV. 893, 902 (1977), analyzing prison conditions cases which have found eighth
amendment violations for conditions which are so "base, inhumane and barbaric.., so as to shock
and offend a court's sensibilities." See, eg. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); see also cases cited in Robbins & Buser, supra, at 902 n.65. But
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To some extent, the "doctrine" which can be mined from the cases dis-
cussed reflects broad principles which are arguably a reasonably accurate
portrayal of contemporaneous public opinion. There is a profound suspicion
of the use of mental illness to exculpate criminal behavior and a concomitant
fear that extension of certain procedural due process protections to mentally
ill criminals, especially in a death penalty context, might either: 1) "open
the floodgates" to spurious claims8 66 or; 2) encourage duplicity.867 Respond-
ing to these concerns, stringent procedural rules are adopted as a "safety
net" to insure that mental illness defenses are not used to subvert commonly-
held social values as to punishment or free will.
Since, however, there is still a significant fear of sanctioning state behav-
ior that "shocks the conscience" or violates community standards of "funda-
mental fairness, 868 in the case of a "goofier than hell" Glenn Barton Ake or
a profoundly psychotic Alvin Ford, it is acceptable to approve of substantive
or procedural constitutional protections which allows such an individual-
but only such an individual-to "cheat the chair. '8 69 Again, this is a reflec-
tion of the way the Court's response mirrors the overwhelming ambivalence
shown by the public870 toward the role of psychiatry and psychiatrists871 at
see, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) ("But the Constitution does not mandate com-
fortable prisons, and prisons of [the] type [in the case before the Court], which house prisoners
convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort").
865. But see Lewis, supra note 486 (high incidence of serious neurological disability in sample of
death row inmates). See also SMITH, supra note 766, at 184 n.65 (in nineteenth century Britain,
when convicts in Ford's position returned to sanity, they were not subsequently executed).
866. See Nagel, supra note 862, at 169-70 (discussing how public has misinterpreted-and over-
exaggerated the perceived-Draconian effects of, important, symbolic court decisions in such areas as
criminal procedure, school suspensions, and libel requirements). For a discussion of symbolic issues
affecting the disposition of insanity defense cases, see Perlin, supra note 9, at 91 n.l; see generally
Bazelon, supra note 851.
See, for an excellent account of the response of prison officials to a court decision, J. JACOBS,
STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 105-37 (1977):
Since [Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967), on remand from 378 U.S. 546
(1964)], the Stateville [prison] elite defined the courts as the single greatest obstacle to
"running the institution." Almost any discussion with administrators or top guards elicits
the same invectives against the courts, which are said to be "for the criminal," "naive,"
"unsympathetic," and "ignorant" of the unique problems of administration in a maximum
security prison.
Id. at 107.
867. See supra text accompanying notes 607, 621 (discussing Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor's
opinions in Ford on this point).
868. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2672-74 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
its cramped interpretation of "fundamental fairness" doctrine).
869. Again, Justice Rehnquist's lament as to the allegedly mentally disabled defendant who does
not appear to be "incoherent or obviously confused or unbalanced," Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106
S. Ct. 634, 642 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring), stands in stark juxtaposition with the findings of
Dr. Lewis and her colleagues that, although none of the studied inmates appeared "flamboyantly
schizophrenic," Lewis, supra note 486, at 840 (emphasis added), almost all suffered from serious
psychiatric and/or neurological disability, id. at 841 (emphasis added).
870. See Steadman, supra note 842, at 386: "Is it possible that neither the profession nor the
public wants to know how accurate psychiatric diagnoses are? Might the empirical facts dispel the
magical power?" But see, Greenawalt, supra note 749, at 999 ("important stake" of litigants in
"reasoned justification" of judicial decisions); cf. Nagel, supra note 861, at 169 (public perception
often distorts constitutional requirements imposed by Supreme Court).
Compare e.g., Greenfield, 741 F.2d at 333 (paranoid schizophrenics often "quiet" and "capable
of spawning complex, rational plans of action"), with Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. at 642 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (request for lawyer tends to show defendant "is not incoherent, or obviously confused or
unbalanced").
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the "cutting edge" of the mental health and the criminal justice systems.
8 72
It may thus not be coincidental that the procedural default doctrine is
invoked successfully by the state in the case of the "sociopath" Smith, but
unsuccessfully in the cases of the "totally crazy" Ake and the most-likely,
similarly-situated Greenfield,8 73 or that the Court was aware in Smith that
the jury's death decision appeared to be premised on a putatively-untainted
independent evidential ground as well: that the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.
8 74
On the other hand, the court continues to back away from its decisions
of the early 1970's in Jackson and O'Connor, by overtly approving of fewer
due process protections for individuals in "civil" contexts.8 75 Beyond evis-
cerating much of the spirit, if not the stare decisis value of Gault 876 this is
most important in the present context because, on the part of at least Justice
Powell, this retrenchment extends to those already convicted and sentenced
to death.
877
This must all be sorted out in the context of other recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with other disabled populations; the institutionalized
mentally retarded 878 and the non-institutionalized physically handi-
capped.879 This latter case has triggered the resumption of a never-truly-
dormant debate on the question of whether the Supreme Court is, as is the
common wisdom, a countermajoritarian institution,880 or whether it has be-
871. See Bazelon, supra note 851, at 276-77.
Writing soon after Estelle was decided, Dr. Appelbaum noted:
The pressure from courts and legislatures for psychiatrists to play a role in sentencing
decisions should not come as a surprise to those who recognize the universal desire for
someone else to make the hard decisions. Unwilling to ban capital punishment yet dis-
turbed by the seemingly unfair manner in which it has been applied in the past, the
Supreme Court has emphasized in its decisions the importance of individualizing the sen-
tencing process. The justices seem to hope that if only enough data about the individual
can be accumulated, decisions will be fairer, more consistent, and easier to make.
In practice, it is unclear whether the use of psychiatric testimony accomplishes any of
these ends. Psychiatrists' opinions about dangerousness-of dubious reliability-have
often been accepted as definitive, while the courts are less sure what to do with their miti-
gating findings or "neutral" evaluations. The positivist belief that more information makes
better decisions appears fallacious in this context. Society's demand for psychiatric input
into these decisions may be serving as a substitute for some hard thinking about the pur-
pose of punishment, and particularly about the role of the death sentence in the modem
world.
Appelbaum, Psychiatrists' Role in the Death Penalty, 32 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
761, 762 (1981) (footnote omitted).
872. See Rodriguez Testifies on New Jersey's Insanity Defense, 110 N.J.L.J. 453, 473 (1982),
quoted in Perlin, supra note 478, at 863 n.26. See also, SMITH, supra note 761, at 3 ("Deciding
between guilt and insanity has a symbolism transcending an individual's fate").
See also Note, supra note 662, at 840 (Supreme Court's Jones decision reveals "unwillingness"
by court to "contradict public sentiment in such a controversial area").
873. See supra text accompanying note 278.
874. See supra note 342. But see, Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
875. See Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2995.
876. See supra text accompanying notes 440-46.
877. See Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
878. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
879. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
880. See, e.g., Attanasio, Everyman's Constitutional Law: A Theory of the Power of Judicial Re-
view, 73 GEo. L.J. 1665, 1666 n.4 (1984), discussing, inter alia, A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962); Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982).
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come, is becoming, or wishes to become, a "supermajoritarian" body.881
Although this issue is not dealt with squarely in the cases discussed, the
decisions in question may prove to be a microcosm of this trend to
supermajoritarianism
88 2
b) Symbolism of Miranda
In addition, the cases in question must be considered in light of the
Supreme Court's continual tinkering with the contours of the Miranda doc-
trine in a variety of settings. 8 3 For these cases reflect the court's ambiva-
lence-again-about Miranda. Miranda remains a punch-drunk fighter,
reeling on the ropes, but not yet counted out. For empirical, 8 4 institu-
tional,88 5 and instrumental purposes,88 6 the Court has chosen not to overrule
it, although it continues to carve out new exceptions. 887 The Court's deci-
sions are also so baffling as to make its doctrine, in Professor Bradley's
phrase, "an enigma wrapped in a mystery.
' 888
Whether the Court is responding implicitly to Professor Sunderland's
observation that to overrule Miranda outright "would have such potential
overtones that it would jeopardize the Court's status as an institution and
the perceptions of citizens and commentators that the Court is adjudicating
on the basis of constitutional principles, ' 889 whether it sees Miranda as an
aspect of what Professor Monaghan has characterized as "constitutional
common law,"' 890 or whether it is content to "simply bounce along from case
to case in these areas with no principle at all to justify its course of ac-
881. See generally, Sherry, supra note 26, at 660-62. She sees decisions such as Pennhurst 1I as
an ominous aspect of an "underlying agenda": "to change the Constitution from a document bal-
anced between majoritarianism and countermajoritarian premises to one that is primarily
majoritarian, and to transform the role of the court from the guardian of individual rights to the
guardian of majority rule," id. at 662-63.
882. Elsewhere, for instance, Professor Sherry characterizes Pennhurst 11 as reflecting the
Court's "aggressive majoritarianism," id. at 661 n.225, and "supermajoritarianism," id. at 660.
883. See, eg., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984); Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135
(1985); Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). The Court in Elstad acknowledges that the deci-
sion makes the Miranda rules "murk[ier]," id. at 1297; according to Professor Bradley, the court's
attempts to avoid the "clear rule of Miranda" in Elstad "makes the Justices look like shyster law-
yers." Bradley, supra note 647, at 60.
884. The great weight of empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact on
the police's ability to obtain confessions "has not been significant." White, Defending Miranda: A
Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19 n.99 (1986) (citing studies).
885. The Court's reluctance to overtly overrule established doctrine is not new. See, e.g., J.
FRANK, supra note 853, at 22-24, discussing Court's anti-trust policy, and the announcement of the
"rule of reason" in Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
886. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 305 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring): "The mean-
ing of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its
strictures. I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date."
887. See New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) ("public safety" exception).
888. Bradley, supra note 647, at 53.
889. Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona and Be-
yond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 201 (1979). See generally Wingo, Rewriting Mapp and Mi-
randa: A Preference for Due Process, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 219, 234-44 (1983). See also Stone, The
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 169 (justices who regularly vote to
limit Miranda "are almost surely sensitive to what would be the inescapably political overtones of a
direct reversal").
890. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1975). But see Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978); Wingo, supra note 891, at 238.
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tion,'891 Professor Sonenshein's reliance on Mark Twain 892 is probably apt;
reports of the doctrine's death are exaggerated. While Miranda's vigor is
questionable, decisions such as Estelle and Greenfield reflect a certain
amount of institutional force supporting retention. As Professor Stone noted
almost a decade ago, "Miranda is simply, but ambiguously, a given.
'893
c) Symbol of trial process
894
To understand the significance of the decisions, it is necessary to ex-
amine more closely the ritualistic and religious meaning of the criminal trial
process as a "moral parable ... of an order defined by the prevailing ethical
system." 895 Over half a century ago, Jerome Frank suggested-using psy-
choanalytic terminology 96-that the law often functions as an unconscious
parent symbol. "The Law-a body of rules apparently devised for infallably
determining what is right and what is wrong and for deciding who should be
punished for misdeeds-inevitably becomes a partial substitute for Father-
as-Infallible-Judge."
89 7
In this construct, the criminal law, "symbolized by policeman and
judge, is an ever-present threat of force, a punitive superego, 898 even when
not in consciousness." 899 This is reflected, unconsciously, in the motivations
891. Monaghan, supra note 892, at 15-20. See, eg., Note, Criminal Procedure-The Public
Safety Exception to Miranda v. Arizona-New York v. Quarles, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 189
(1985) (Quarles an "unprincipled departure" from traditional fifth amendment interpretations).
892. See Sonenshein, supra note 20.
893. Stone, supra note 261, at 106. It is probably not coincidental that the two Miranda cases in
which defendants "won" involved psychiatric issues rather than police practices; in Estelle, there was
no pertinent activity by the police whatsoever, while in Greenfield, there was no suggestion that the
police were at fault in their delivering the Miranda warnings to the defendant.
894. See Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND
INFERENCE 48, 52 (D. Lerner, ed., 1958) (lawsuit is ritual that is "society's last indispensable effort
to secure the peaceful settlement of social conflicts"); see Tribe, Trial By Mathematics, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1376 n.151 (1971).
895. ROCHE, supra note 823, at 245. Roche defines the criminal trial as "an operation having a
religious meaning essential as a public exercise in which the prevailing moral ideals are dramatized
and reaffirmed." Id.
896. It is not necessary to accept a psychoanalytic vision of the universe to concede the symbolic
significance of the trial process.
897. J. FRANK, supra note 853, at 18.
898. On the meaning of "superego" in this context, see generally C. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOA-
NALYSIS AND THE LAW 22-32 (1973). "[T]he superego ... performs such functions as setting moral
and ethical standards, evaluating thought and actions in light of these standards, granting rewards
(self praise, for example) for moral conduct and demanding repentance and punishment for punitive
behavior." Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted). See also E. BERGLER, THE SUPEREGO (1952); C. BREN-
NER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1957).
899. J. MARSHALL, INTENTION IN LAW AND SOCIETY 198 (1968).
On the need for "rational settlement" in criminal cases, see Hall, supra note 703, at 723:
Criminal procedure is a microcosm of universal significance. It is the repository of
present understanding of serious controversy-solving as well as the promise of any endur-
ing solution of major conflict in any field whatever. For in the procedure of criminal law,
we read the history of man's halting circuitous ascent from resort to vengeful feud and
sheer annihilation to that of peaceful and intelligent adjudication. To appreciate both the
conceit and the solemnity of such endeavor, one must recall, also, the long history of super-
stitious reliance on chance as well as that of dependency upon the Oracle or other author-
ity. The almost unimaginable advance represented by modern criminal procedure has not
meant progress merely of professionals. Criminal procedure is a community's way of life in
its areas of greatest stress. If rational settlement is possible here, where emotion and in-
stinctual drive beat hardest upon restraint and intelligence, it should be possible in every
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of those who seek to punish offenders by the most repressive means,900 and,
consciously, by the "marked" increase in punitiveness on the part of the
public towards criminal defendants charged with violent crime.901 The law,
in the words of Lon Fuller, must respond to an "inner morality," 902 that
"there must be rules of some kind, however fair or unfair they may be."
'903
In short, rules such as the one announced in Sykes and extended in
Smith must be seen as a reflection of both the law's unconscious need to
punish as well as its internal need for some kind of clear structure so as to
make the legal process "not so much 'sublimation mechanisms for combat
feelings and the expression of grudges,' as rational investigations of the fac-
tual bases of controversies.
''904
In a recent article, Professor Bradley has suggested that there is an "un-
certainty principle" 90 5 at work in the judicial process:
[A]ny attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important con-
field of human conduct. Hence the current undertaking for revision of federal criminal
procedure, though it demands the nicest of technician's skill, in its wider significance chal-
lenges American scholarship to understand its basic complex nature and the ramifications
of its social as well as its legal functions.
900. See, eg., WEIHOFEN, supra note 847, at 28.
901. See J. GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 105-
10 (1983). See id. at 110 (indignation and anger are the precipitant feelings of the public's "increas-
ingly punitive mood"). This, of course, is nothing new. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 766, at 185,
n.79, citing M. EGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1850, 179-87 (1978); D. PHILIPS, CRIME AND AUTHORITY IN VICTORIAN ENG-
LAND: THE BLACK COUNTRY 1835-1860 (1977); J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND SOCIETY IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY (1972).
902. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 43 (1964).
903. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
For other views on this point, see I. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALY-
SIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 15-32 (1967).
904. Schoenfeld, supra note 899, at 32, quoting, in part, Smith, Components of Proof in Legal
Proceedings, 51 YALE L.J. 537, 575 (1942). Concludes Schoenfeld on this point: "Hopefully, the
mature superego will help to supply the impetus needed to achieve this goal and, in so doing, help to
narrow the gap between man's moral strivings and the law." Id.
Schoenfeld's views on the death penalty appeared to have changed significantly since the publi-
cation of his text in 1973, when he suggested that "the failure of efforts to abolish timeworn and
counterproductive retributive punishments ... may well reflect in part the disinclination of the
immature and undeveloped superego to abandon its demand for talion vengeance." Id. at 28. Since
that time, he has employed psychoanalytic interpretative techniques in an attempt to understand the
arguments proffered by capital punishment abolitionists, and he has concluded that those arguments
are "so seriously flawed ... as to cause one to wonder whether the abolitionists who espouse them
are moved by unrecognized unconscious motives," including the "unconscious identification with
the criminals whose lives they seek to protect." Schoenfeld, The Desire to Abolish Capital Punish-
ment: A Psychoanalytically Oriented Analysis, 11 J. PSYCHOLOGY & L. 151 (1983); cf. Perlin &
Sadoff, The Adversary System, in I. KUTASH et al, VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON MURDER AND
AGGRESSION 394, 402 (1978), quoting D. ABRAHAMSEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME 3 (1964)
(law-abiding citizens "unconsciously identify with the criminal because of their latent anti-social
tendencies and somehow vicariously demand and accept the punishment to relieve their own guilt
feelings").
On the other hand, Schoenfeld has suggested that the continued support for the use of hypothet-
ical questions (see, eg. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 903-05), may be "irrational and unconscious," a vestig-
ial remnant of an earlier period when "word forms were endowed with powerful, magical qualities."
Schoenfeld, A Psychoanalytic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 109, 116
(1985).
905. Bradley, supra note 647, at 2 n.5. The phrase is borrowed from the Hysenberg Uncertainty
Principle, a now-accepted theorem of nuclear physics: it is impossible to ascertain with complete
accuracy both the position and velocity of a particle because the process of measuring one character-
istic introduces great uncertainty in the measurement of the other.
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stitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and--even if it does succeed in
the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty as to more issues than
it settles. The process of rendering a decision will tend to distort the
issue decided as well as the applicable precedents and doctrines.
90 6
As the Court's decisions "degenerate into incomprehensibility, ' 90 7 and
its efforts at clarification breed "obfuscation," 90 8 the Court should abandon,
in Professor Bradley's view, its beliefs in the "Wizard of Oz of legal cer-
tainty."909 The Court should instead acknowledge that it cannot "take the
place of God in this secular age," 910 and attempt to act so as to "avoid inso-
far as possible, causing undue confusion in the legal community and society
at large."911 While this advice is probably salutary, until there is some effort
at understanding the symbolic value of the trials that are the starting points
of all of the doctrines being developed in these cases, it is likely that the
uncertainty documented by Professor Bradley will continue unabated.
d) Symbols of the Burger Court and the Warren Court
The Court's sense of these cases must also be considered in light of the
public's view of the Burger Court (and, circularly, the Burger Court's view
of the public's view of itself) in contrast to how the public apparently per-
ceived the Warren Court. If Professor Kurland is right when he suggests
that the Warren Court "failed abysmally to persuade the people that its
judgments have been made for sound reasons,"912 it should be no surprise
that the Burger Court's decisions appear to speak specifically to the public's
"collective conscience. ' 913 Whereas the Warren Court was (and, perhaps
more importantly, was viewed as being) "the storm center of creativity in
American life" 914 or an "engine of social reform ' 915 (thus becoming "a con-
spicuous target for criticism"), 916 the Burger Court (or, more accurately, the
public's perceptions of the Burger Court) 9 17 reflected the view that "a major-
ity of the country had had enough of judicial dynamism."
918
906. Id. at 2.
907. Id. at 7. See id. at 47-48, quoting from opinions of the court and of individual justices
concurring and dissenting, describing court doctrine in fourth and first amendment cases, variously,
as full of "mysteries," "intolerably confusing," "bizarre," and a "Tower of Babel."
908. Id. at 11.
909. Id. at 63.
910. Id. at 63; see also, id. at 64 n.365.
911. Id. at 3 n.9.
912. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 205 (1970),
quoted in Greenawalt, supra note 750, at 983 n.8.
913. The phrase is used in Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert.
denied 334 U.S. 852 (1948). See generally on the "collective psyche," C. JUNG, COLLECTED PAPERS
IN ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 462 (2d ed. 1922), on archetypal symbols, C. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL
TYPES 475-76 (Baynes trans. 1924). On the "collective unconscious," see generally C. JUNG, CON-
TRIBUTIONS TO ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 157 (Baynes & Baynes trans. 1928): "Political, social
and religious conditions influence the unconscious, since all the factors which are suppressed in the
conscious religious or philosophical attitude of human society accumulate in the unconscious."
Jung's theories on the development of the collective unconscious are elaborated upon in NEUMANN,
supra note 859, at xv-xvi, 90, 212-13, 249-50.
914. Frank, supra note 768, at 121.
915. Howard, supra note 771, at 8.
916. Id. at 7.
917. See, eg., BLASI, supra note 855.
918. Frank, supra note 768, at 128.
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As Professor Saltzburg reminds us, the basic check on the Supreme
Court is "public pressure"; 919 the Court's institutional capital is "exhaus-
tible,"' 920 and its members are aware that the general public viewed the War-
ren Court as having "coddl[ed] criminals," 921 as having "tilt[ed] the balance
of advantage toward the suspect or the accused, ' 922 and otherwise produc-
ing "intolerably confusing" doctrine. 923 This later theme has been explicitly
articulated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Florida v. Royer,924 a fourth
amendment case, where he noted that a search invalidated by the majority
"would pass muster with virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly
steeped in the mysteries of the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence. '925
Professor Nagel has suggested that the style in which the Burger Court
majority has written many of its important opinions-reflecting a "self-ab-
sorption with formulae" 926-has served as a conscious means of encourag-
ing, yet simultaneously appearing to make more "natural and acceptable,"
the judiciary's "adversarial relationship with the general culture. ' 927 Such a
style, Nagel had previously asserted, demonstrates a "stark" contrast "to the
overt assertions of moral authority common in the famous Warren Court
opinions. ' 928 Even in cases where the Burger Court has approved "poten-
tially large increments in judicial power, ' 929 it has used a "[l]egalistic style
[suggesting] traditional judicial caution"930 to defuse political opposition,
93'
but with the result that "[l]awyers, judges, and scholars point sarcastically
and hopelessly to the bewildering proliferation of concurring and dissenting
opinions, and to the apparently inexplicable reversals of tone and
reasoning.
'932
919. Saltzburg, supra note 20, at 208.
920. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 138-39 (1980).
921. Stanford Note, supra note 338, at 479.
922. Saltzburg, supra note 20, at 152, and see sources cited id. at nn.6-10; see also Stanford Note,
supra note 338, at 479 n.8.
923. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); see also, Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
924. 460 U.S. 291 (1983).
925. Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
926. Nagel, supra note 861, at 183. Compare, eg., the formulae announced in Ake, 105 S. Ct. at
1097 (defendant entitled to psychiatric assistance in preparing insanity defense where he can make
an "ex parte threshold showing ... that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense"),
with the one suggested in Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring) (state may presume
defendant sane at sentence time and may require a "substantial threshold showing of insanity merely
to trigger the hearing process") (emphasis added).
927. Id. at 210.
928. Nagel, supra note 19, at 235.
929. Id. at 233-34, discussing school desegregation cases-Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)-which "substantially
undercut the restrictions that the Court had earlier announced in its efforts to protect local govern-
ments from overreaching by federal district courts."
Prof. Nagel has implied that the school desegregation decisions were seen as somewhat less
antagonistic to the "general culture" (and thus were more palatable to the general public) in that
they instead "attack[ed] an aspect of a largely regional culture." Nagel, supra note 861, at 212.
930. Burger Comment, supra note 19, at 236.
931. See Greenawalt, supra note 750, at 1008 (hypothesizing on the impact that a judge's percep-
tion that a decision will cause "tremendous resentment and considerable resistance" will have on the
language and scope of the ultimate drafted opinion).
932. Burger Comment, supra note 19, at 236 (footnotes omitted).
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The opinions under consideration here seem to support Professor
Nagel's gloomy positions.
2) Conclusion
What does all of this mean? The Court seems to agree (perhaps uncon-
sciously) with Professor Nagel that it cannot "routinely assault [the general]
culture, '9 33 and that it must, in Professor Greenawalt's phrase, invoke
sources "as symbolic assurances of truths about... legal continuity that are
too complex to express literally in opinions." 934 It thus, in Professor Res-
nik's phrase, uses procedure, most importantly, in the Smith case,935 as "a
device for producing outcomes.
'936
In all cases, symbols, public perceptions, and internal, perhaps uncon-
scious ambivalences, are shuffled, juggled, and eventually dealt out, as if all
parties were playing the game memorialized by Mark Harris in Bang the
Drum Slowly as TEGWAR: The Exciting Game Without Any Rules.
9 37
The Court, in the end, remains "a prisoner of external symbols and internal
impulses." 938 Until it begins to understand this, its procedural and substan-
tive decisions will continue to defy easy comprehension.
While the Court desires to give the illusion of alleviating confusion
939
933. Nagel, supra note 861, at 212.
934. Greenawalt, supra note 750, at 1011.
935. But also in Jones and Barefoot as well.
936. Resnik, supra note 703, at 840.
It is especially ironic that the Court has adopted such a repressive and punitive approach to this
procedural question, when, in another context, it has sneeringly brushed aside as "Kafkaesque" an
argument in a nuclear power case that failure on the part of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
to require additional environmental impact reports by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards mandated supplemental administrative proceedings. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978).
Concluded Justice Rehnquist on this point:
To say that the Court of Appeals' final reason for remanding is insubstantial at best is
a gross understatement. Consumers Power first applied in 1969 for a construction per-
mit-not even an operating license, just a construction permit. The proposed plant under-
went an incredibly extensive review. The reports filed and reviewed literally fill books.
The proceedings took years and the actual hearings themselves over two weeks. To then
nullify that effort seven years later because one report refers to other problems, which
problems admittedly have been discussed at length in other reports available to the public
borders on the Kafkaesque. Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of
power or it may not, but Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, estab-
lishing a reasonable review process in which courts are to play only a limited role.... [A]
single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by parties who never fully cooperated
or indeed raised the issue below, must not be made the basis for overturning a decision
properly made after an otherwise exhaustive proceeding.
Id. at 557-58.
The juxtaposition is startling: while it is "Kafkaesque" to require administrative hearings in a
nuclear power case (where an administrative agency arguably omitted a portion of a statutorily-
mandated report (see 42 U.S.C. § 4321)), it is not similarly "Kafkaesque" to sanction the execution
of a criminal defendant (where it was, according to the dissenters, "absolutely clear" (see Smith, 106
S. Ct. at 2675 (Stevens, J., dissenting)), that the merits issue was decided incorrectly, and where
there had been some attempts at issue preservation at both the trial and state appellate levels. (My
thanks to my colleague David Schoenbrod for putting me on the trail of the Vermont Yankee case; I
take full responsibility for the gloss put on it).
937. M. HARRIS, BANG THE DRUM, SLOWLY 8, 48 (1956); see also, M. HARRIS, THE SOUTH-
PAW (1953).
938. Perlin, supra note 9, at 169.
939. Bradley, supra note 647, at 3 n.9.
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(as a palliative to the public's dissatisfaction with its frequently impossible-
to-comprehend opinions),94° because of its own ambivalence it is helpless to
do so. Because it has not dealt with the roots of its ambivalence, it "mis-
characterizes... precedents, obfuscates the central issues... [and] adopts
startling and unprecedented methods of construing constitutional
guarantees.
'94 1
Whether or not the Court has fallen into a "doctrinal abyss" 942 is not
clear. Although most remain premised on what Professor Berger has called
the Court's "rockbottom focus on 'fundamental fairness,' -943 or what the
majority of the Court itself has characterized as a "fundamental miscarriage
of justice" rule,944 there are some doctrinal threads that can be drawn from
the decisions in question, as reflected by the Court's fear of executing the
"truly insane" so as to "shock the [public's] conscience." Even here, how-
ever, the decision are laden by symbols which continue to imprison the
Court.
Schoenfeld has suggested that the law can avoid imposing criminal lia-
bility upon the insane "because punishing them, unlike punishing criminals,
fails to serve the public's inner needs."' 945 On the other hand, if we believe
that the defendant is feigning insanity (a belief which has permeated the
American legal system for over a century, and which has been considered
seriously by some of our most respected jurists), 946 it is not unreasonable to
expect an even more punitive attitude toward these lawbreakers: they have
made a "play" for our unconscious, and have come up short.
947
If these symbols-and the unconscious feelings on the part of the
Court's members that they reflect-can be acknowledged and weighed, then,
perhaps, some sort of doctrinal consistency might emerge. Until that time,
however, the cases will be decided as they have been all along: out of
consciousness.
940. See Burger Comment, supra note 19, at 236-37.
941. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This confusion may, surprisingly, satisfy one of the public's inner needs. Professor Howard, for
instance, has suggested that our "eclecticD" roots-reflecting a tension between constitutionalism
and natural law-have led us to "abide a fair degree of contradiction," one of the earmarks of the
Burger Court. Howard, supra note 771, at 28.
But see Wales, supra note 11, at 105 (Judge Bazelon-the "champion of candor in judicial
decisionmaking"--dedicated his career to "preventing others from sweeping problems 'under the
rug of a doctrine that saves our faces by hiding our troubles,'" quoting United States v. Carter, 436
U.S. 200, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)). The battles between Judge Bazelon and
Chief Justice Burger on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals are legendary. Perlin,
supra note 9, at 168; see, eg., Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cross v. Harris,
418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
942. See supra note 18.
943. Berger, supra note 728, at 99.
944. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).
945. C. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE LAw 31 (1984), discussing Schoen.
feld, Law and Unconscious Mental Mechanisms, 28 BULL. MENNINOER CLINIC 23, 28 (1964).
946. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962) (Harlan, J.); United States v.
Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.), quoting Lynch. See generally, for a
thorough and helpful discussion of this phenomenon, Margulies, supra note 33, at 806-07 n.85.
947. See Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra note 9, at 401-02, and id. at 402 n.32 (defendants
whose insanity defense was rejected received disproportionately longer terms of imprisonment that
defendants convicted of similar offenses who did not raise the defense).
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